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<div>It seems awfully speculative to say EV would have prevented this under the current EV requirements.</div>
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Bruce Morton <bruce.morton@entrust.com> wrote:<br>
<br>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; color:#1F497D">Here is my recollection from an event.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; color:#1F497D"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; color:#1F497D">We were informed that a site with a certificate we issued was blacklisted. We informed the customer which had a wildcard certificate and they had a site which
they did not know about. Not sure if it was an internal attack or how it was posted. The result was not that we had a bad subscriber, but we had a subscriber which was attacked, but did not know it yet.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; color:#1F497D"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; color:#1F497D">Bruce.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; color:#1F497D"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi@google.com]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 20, 2015 9:31 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Bruce Morton<br>
<b>Cc:</b> CABFPub; jeremy rowley<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] EV Wildcards</span></p>
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On Mar 20, 2015 6:27 AM, "Bruce Morton" <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> Hi Jeremy,<br>
><br>
> <br>
><br>
> Thanks for bringing this up. Our position is that we would like EV certificates to be better than OV and DV. I think that was what we tried to do when the original specification was created.<br>
><br>
> <br>
><br>
> We believe that wildcard certificates have a higher security risk. Another example of a risk is that if a subscriber wants to protect 10 subdomains then a wildcard certificate can be used. But what if an attacker adds an 11th subdomain, then the certificate
can still be used. Seems like a risk we can avoid with the current EV spec.<br>
><br>
> <br>
><br>
> As such, based on this risk and other examples which have been brought up, we would not be in favor of adding wildcard to EV.<br>
><br>
> <br>
><br>
> Thanks, Bruce.</p>
<p>Hi Bruce,</p>
<p>I am having trouble understanding your attack scenario. Could you elaborate on what it means for an attacker to add a subdomain - how that might happen and what might be done by an attacker who could?</p>
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