<div dir="ltr">No, Nov 2015 is the date that all certificates issued after the BR effective date (July 2012) MUST expire. If the certificate issued expires after that, then it was done so in violation of the BRs. (I don't have Tor setup to check the cert).<div><br></div><div>My point is that the issue being raised for why the Forum should consider .onion names is to prevent CAs from misissuing or using lax validation, thus presenting a security risk to users of Tor. The obvious solution to that is not to have 3 months+ of free-for all debate in the Forum (as these things always take), leaving Tor users at risk during this period - it's to immediately stop issuing certs, revoke all the existing certs, then work out how they should work in a consistent manner.</div><div><br></div><div>It's hardly a slap in the face - it's a recognition of the security risks of allowing .onion names to be a wild-west free for all with no vetting - meaning ANYONE can MITM / any CA can issue for <a href="https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/">https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/</a> without violating a single one of the BRs or any root policy.</div><div><br></div><div>That alone should be concerning enough to immediately stop issuing and revoke these certs, and may not be something that Facebook or the Tor community are aware of.<br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 12:48 PM, Jeremy Rowley <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com" target="_blank">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<p class="MsoNormal"><a name="149c9d034dc064ce__MailEndCompose"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Well, Nov 1 2016 is the date that the certs should be revoked. Nov 2015 is the date of no more issuance.
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">I’m not really interested in ceasing all support for Tor. Having a special cut-off for onion seems like a slap in the face to their browser after they posted
their support for the project, especially since Google doesn’t use .onion names.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif"> Ryan Sleevi [mailto:<a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com" target="_blank">sleevi@google.com</a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, November 19, 2014 1:45 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Jeremy Rowley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Brian Smith; Gervase Markham; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a></span></p><div><div class="h5"><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] .onion proposal<u></u><u></u></div></div><p></p><div><div class="h5">
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<p class="MsoNormal">On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 12:36 PM, Jeremy Rowley <<a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com" target="_blank">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">How do you address this concern other than by modifying the way the onion names are assigned? I guess either not permit conflicting services by only routing to the service with the oldest identified service (instead of evicting the old
service) or having Tor move to a SHA-2 hash. I know Tor is looking at the issue and will likely have more insight they can share.<br>
<br>
While a solution is in flux, the Forum should still have validation rules in place for onion that last until 2016 (the revocation date of all internal names) so that current certs undergo a set process for issuance rather than issue as internal names.<br>
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<span>Jeremy</span></span><u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">You mean 1 November 2015. That's been the date that no BR-conforming CA is allowed to set the expiration date past. (9.2.1 of BR 1.2.2)<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">PROPOSAL: Effectively immediately, CAs MUST NOT issue certificates for the .onion TLD and MUST revoke all certificates issued for the .onion TLD<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Then we work out a proposal to set up rules for validating .onion names, which may or may not be blocked on Tor work at the protocol or browser level, and also work - with the broader Tor community - to see if there is any interim steps
that can be accepted.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<span>-----Original Message-----</span><br>
<span>From: Brian Smith [mailto:<a href="mailto:brian@briansmith.org" target="_blank">brian@briansmith.org</a>]</span><br>
<span>Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 1:26 PM</span><br>
<span>To: Gervase Markham</span><br>
<span>Cc: Jeremy Rowley; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a></span><br>
<span>Subject: Re: [cabfpub] .onion proposal</span><u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Gervase Markham <<a href="mailto:gerv@mozilla.org" target="_blank">gerv@mozilla.org</a>> wrote:<br>
> I'm in support of this in principle. There are two issues with 'normal'<br>
> internal server names:<br>
><br>
> 1) It's not possible to prove exclusive ownership of them (because they<br>
> aren't exclusively owned);<br>
<br>
<snip><br>
<br>
> For .onion names, problem 1) does not apply.<br>
<br>
That is only true assuming you can rely on the second-preimage resistance of truncated SHA-1, like Ryan pointed out. I think his point is that the second-preimage resistance of truncated SHA-1 is not strong enough to make claims like this. (Ryan: Sorry if I'm
misunderstanding you. Corrections appreciated.) I think that concern should be addressed. This is one reason I suggested to limit the maximum lifetime of .onion certificates.<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
Brian<br>
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