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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/30/2014 12:24 AM, Ryan Sleevi
      wrote:<br>
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    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACvaWvYavFD-S0E7kmuB+=ToZZhsF4jgN8iP6R0hfW4goWovrw@mail.gmail.com"
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          <div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Eddy
            Nigg <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:eddy_nigg@startcom.org" target="_blank">eddy_nigg@startcom.org</a>></span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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                  <div>On 10/29/2014 08:50 PM, <a
                      moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com"
                      target="_blank">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a>
                    wrote:<br>
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                    <div><span
                        style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">I
                        agree that browsers and apps will make their own
                        judgments about when a case of BR non-compliance
                        is serious enough to warrant a UI warning, and
                        when it can be ignored.  I would just offer my
                        opinion that lack of CDP and AIA data in a cert
                        (whether or not Chrome wants to check that
                        information in the client) is a fundamental
                        certificate flaw that renders the cert
                        inherently untrustworthy, and it should
                        automatically be rejected by applications (just
                        as expired certs, etc. are now automatically
                        rejected).  But that’s just my opinion.</span></div>
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                  <br>
                </span> Considering that CAs were required to modify the
                OCSP responders to include Good, Revoked and <b>Unknown</b>
                upon request of the browsers mostly (I believe Google
                was a strong supporter of that), it's rather confusing
                to know that browsers entirely ignore it if the
                certificates have no OCSP (and CRL) pointers, not
                speaking about checking this information when
                available. </div>
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0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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                So what does it matter if Diginotar knew or didn't knew
                which certificates were issued if this information
                wouldn't be used anyway? <br>
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            <div><br>
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            <div>OCSP stapling. And OCSP Must-Staple. <br>
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    <br>
    If Chrome gets a stapled response it, it honors it? But if there is
    no stapled response it will not check with the responder? And if
    there is neither it will not complain either?<br>
    <br>
    Sorry, still confused (I'm sure other browsers will handle it yet
    differently, but since you are here I'm asking).<br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
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            <td colspan="2">Regards </td>
          </tr>
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            <td colspan="2"> </td>
          </tr>
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            <td>Signer: </td>
            <td>Eddy Nigg, COO/CTO</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td> </td>
            <td><a href="http://www.startcom.org">StartCom Ltd.</a></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>XMPP: </td>
            <td><a href="xmpp:startcom@startcom.org">startcom@startcom.org</a></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Blog: </td>
            <td><a href="http://blog.startcom.org">Join the Revolution!</a></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Twitter: </td>
            <td><a href="http://twitter.com/eddy_nigg">Follow Me</a></td>
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            <td colspan="2"> </td>
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