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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Well, it’s news to me that (all?) browsers currently don’t care and don’t check for CDPs or AIAs in certificates, and don’t do any revocation checking.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">If that’s true, why are CA OCSP responders getting so many queries, and why are our CRLs getting downloaded? Who is doing that?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">And if that’s true, then what revocation checking burdens are the advocates of short-life certificates trying to avoid?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Hard to evaluate this.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif""> Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi@google.com]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, October 28, 2014 5:05 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Kirk Hall (RD-US)<br>
<b>Cc:</b> CABFPub; jeremy rowley<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p>If browsers don't need to change (and I'm not aware of one that does), does that resolve your concern? Put differently, you addressed the logical result if you're correct, but if you're incorrect, as I believe you are - and no changes are necessary - how
does that change your reaction to the proposal?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>On Oct 28, 2014 4:59 PM, "<a href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a>" <<a href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> My point (maybe not very important) is that I think browsers MUST make changes in their code in order to support short-life certs that don’t contain any revocation pointers.<br>
><br>
> <br>
><br>
> If that’s correct – then browsers can go ahead and make those changes anyway, and can choose not to follow the revocation pointers in a short-life cert (as they define them). CAs would continue to include revocation pointers in the short-life certs (no change
to the BRs requiring revocation pointers would be needed), but the unilateral action / decision of browsers who support dropping revocation checking will cause them to disregard the pointers and do no checking – the revocation checking burden is lifted from
CAs, there is potentially faster page delivery, etc., and no changes are needed in the BRs.<br>
><br>
> <br>
><br>
> Put another way, if browsers would already have to change their code to say “it’s ok for a cert not to have revocation pointers if it’s a 48 hour cert” – why not skip that step, and go straight to browser code changes that say “I will ignore the revocation
pointers that are present and not do any revocation checking if this is a 48 hour cert” – it same result in the end, and the latter option leaves in the revocation checking pointers for those browsers and apps who chose not to drop revocation checking.<br>
><br>
> <br>
><br>
> From: <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] On Behalf Of Jeremy.Rowley<br>
> Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 4:08 PM<br>
> To: <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
><br>
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life Certificates<br>
><br>
> <br>
><br>
> The BR change wouldn't prohibit revocation pointers. Instead, the BRs should give CAs the option of using certificate expiration as an alternative to revocation. CAs who are worried about immediate revocation (<2 days) can still chose to include the pointers.
<br>
><br>
> Whether DigiCert will issue short-lived certs with or without the BR change is irrelevant. If short-lived certs are something CAs can implement without requiring browser updates, why not roll it out that way? What advantage is there in requiring browsers
to change all their code instead of letting CAs do the work? <br>
><br>
> Jeremy<br>
><br>
> On 10/28/2014 4:46 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> On Oct 28, 2014 3:42 PM, "<a href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a>" <<a href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Jeremy – as a CA who is potentially interested in issuing short-life certs – are you saying you would not want to issue any short-life certs if (say) 30% of browsers in use will do revocation checking and 70% will not (because some but not all browsers
modify their code to ignore revocation pointers in the short lived certs as a policy matter)? It seem in that example that the load on your OCSP servers will be only 30% of today’s load for longer life certs with revocation checking – isn’t that an improvement?<br>
>> ><br>
>> > <br>
>> ><br>
>> > Put another way, are you only willing to issue short-life certs if you know that 100% of browsers and applications will not check for revocation (because the BRs would prohibit revocation pointers in the short-life certs)?<br>
>> ><br>
>> > <br>
>> ><br>
>> > Related to that – what happens today in the browsers if they encounter a cert that has NO revocation pointers (no CDP or AIA inside the cert)? Do they treat the cert as valid? Or do they put up a warning? <br>
>> ><br>
>> > <br>
>> ><br>
>> > If browsers today put up a warning, it seems that 100% of browsers would have to modify and distribute their code to stop showing warnings in order for short lived certs to be viable – true? Just prohibiting revocation pointers in these certs via the
BRs will not automatically make them viable in 100% of browsers.<br>
>> ><br>
>><br>
>> No browser shows a warning for DV in the standard configuration.<br>
>><br>
>> Several browsers offer (generally undocumented) functionality to always require revocation checking, but this is so awful that users are already conditioned to see errors regularly.<br>
>><br>
>> > <br>
>> ><br>
>> > From: Jeremy.Rowley [mailto:<a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>]
<br>
>> > Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 3:15 PM<br>
>> > To: <a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a>; <a href="mailto:philliph@comodo.com">
philliph@comodo.com</a>; Kirk Hall (RD-US)<br>
>> > Cc: <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
>> ><br>
>> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life Certificates<br>
>> ><br>
>> > <br>
>> ><br>
>> > The benefit is to everyone:<br>
>> > 1) CAs benefit by having a reduced load on their OCSP servers (at the exchange of more certificates issued)<br>
>> > 2) Subscribers benefit from a shortened lifecycle for revocation (two days instead of 10)<br>
>> > 3) Server operators benefit from smaller certificate sizes and no call back to the CA to check revocation information<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Jeremy<br>
>> ><br>
>> > On 10/28/2014 8:27 AM, <a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a> wrote:<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> How do you already know this is going to be a benefit? For who? Subscribers?<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> <br>
>> >><br>
>> >> <br>
>> >><br>
>> >> Iñigo Barreira<br>
>> >> Responsable del Área técnica<br>
>> >> <a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a><br>
>> >><br>
>> >> 945067705<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> <br>
>> >><br>
>> >> ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada (helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ!<br>
>> >> ATENCION! Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o confidencial a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el destinatario. Si usted lo recibe por error le agradeceriamos que no hiciera uso de la informacion y que se pusiese en contacto con el remitente.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> <br>
>> >><br>
>> >> De: <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] En nombre de Jeremy.Rowley<br>
>> >> Enviado el: martes, 28 de octubre de 2014 15:19<br>
>> >> Para: Phillip Hallam-Baker; <a href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a><br>
>> >> CC: <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
>> >> Asunto: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life Certificates<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> <br>
>> >><br>
>> >> By not making a change in the BRs, the CAB Forum is essentially saying CAs can't use expiration as a means of revocation. Without the benefit provided by short lived certs, you won't have subscribers using them.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> Jeremy<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> On 10/28/2014 7:49 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> Which is why I disagreed with Gerv’s claim that there is no point to issuing short lived certs with the revocation indicators present. The point is that it establishes a base of deployment that can then be used to justify the necessary changes in the
BRs.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> <br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> The reason that I am interested in short lived certs even with the compressed CRL technology is because even a compressed delta CRL is still a list. The scaling issue is postponed, not eliminated.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> <br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> If however we combine short lived certs with compressed CRLs we can reduce the vulnerability window from days to hours. Which is a big gain because it would mean that we likely remove the incentive to attempt an attack.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> <br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> <br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> The secret to keeping Disneyland clean is that the park is already clean. People feel bad about littering if the place is clean. If there is litter they don’t feel bad about making more.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> <br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> <br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> On Oct 27, 2014, at 10:26 PM, <a href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a> wrote:<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> Not everyone agrees at this point that the risk profile of short-lived certs that can't be recalled (no revocation checking possible) is equivalent to the risk profile of long-lived certs with revocation checking but with all the limitations discussed.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> Leaving the decision on whether to accept short-lived certs with no revocation checking to the interested browsers and interested CAs means that other CAs and browsers don't have to approve or participate -- and no changes to the BRs would be required.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> -----Original Message-----<br>
>> >>> From: Jeremy Rowley [mailto:<a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>] <br>
>> >>> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 6:26 PM<br>
>> >>> To: Kirk Hall (RD-US); Gervase Markham; Tim <a href="mailto:Hollebeek%3Bpublic@cabforum.org">
Hollebeek;public@cabforum.org</a><br>
>> >>> Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life Certificates<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> If short-lived certs are an acceptable form of revocation checking, then what advantage is there to use a phased-in approach with customer browser code? You get the same benefits with no changes by simply omitting the revocation pointers. I don't see
what risks are mitigated by phasing in short-lived certs only for new browsers. <br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> Jeremy<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> -----Original Message-----<br>
>> >>> From: <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] On Behalf Of
<a href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a><br>
>> >>> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 5:44 PM<br>
>> >>> To: Gervase Markham; Tim Hollebeek; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
>> >>> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life Certificates<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> Gerv, I've pasted in your original response to this question below. <br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> If I can summarize, you don't want revocation pointers in new "short lived certs" as defined because legacy browsers and apps (i.e., every browser and app in use today) will continue to check for revocation information, thereby lowering the benefit of
this new type of cert. (You estimated 90% will still check for revocation -- but is that number realistic under Google's and Mozilla's current revocation checking processes? I thought revocation checking was already omitted today for many long-lived certs...)<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> My question back is: how long would it take Firefox and Google (and other interested browsers) to modify your browser software as Tim and Rich have suggested - ignore revocation pointers if the cert is a short lived cert? And how quickly would those
code changes get distributed to your users?<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> The burden of revocation checking falls mostly on CAs, and it can only get better (fewer revocation checks) if some browsers decide not to check revocation for (self-designated) short lived cert by modifying their software. So why not just move forward
as browsers to do this? The revocation checking burden on CAs that decide to start issuing short-lived certs would not go up as compared to current long lived certs, and over time (maybe quickly) would go down.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> Having said that, Trend Micro is not yet convinced this is a good idea for the reasons stated by others -- but the browsers don't have to wait if they think the risk from eliminating revocation checking for short lived certs is acceptable.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> -----Original Message-----<br>
>> >>> From: <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] On Behalf Of Gervase Markham<br>
>> >>> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 12:33 PM<br>
>> >>> To: Tim Hollebeek; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
>> >>> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life Certificates<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> On 27/10/14 14:14, Tim Hollebeek wrote:<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> What does not having the revocation information in the cert actually solve?<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> I've covered this earlier in the thread :-)<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> Gerv<br>
>> >>> _______________________________________________<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> On 24/10/14 13:40, Rich Smith wrote:<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> I keep coming back to this same question every time this comes up, and <br>
>> >>> I have not received a satisfactory answer yet:<br>
>> >>> Why MUST a short lived certificate be issued without containing <br>
>> >>> revocation information?<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> And I keep asking it every time you ask: because putting in revocation information eliminates 90% of their advantage, because there is then no advantage in all the currently-existing clients. A short-lived cert with revocation pointers will still incur
the delay of revocation checking, even though (this is the argument, and the argument with which I hope you will engage) it's not necessary to provide them because the security properties of a 3-day cert are broadly comparable to a 1-year cert with 10-day,
5-day or 3-day-expiry OCSP responses.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> The simple fact of the matter is that revocation info in the <br>
>> >>> certificate MAY help SOME users IF the certificate gets revoked, and I <br>
>> >>> have yet to see anyone offer up any decent argument for why the <br>
>> >>> revocation info absolutely MUST NOT be present for short-lived certs to work.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> No one is arguing that it MUST NOT be present for short-lived certificates to "work". But if a site and a CA are together considering deploying such a technology, they will look at the costs and benefits.<br>
>> >>> There will be significant costs in setting up the system; if the benefits are only in 5% or 10% of clients, it may well be judged not to be worth it.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> I'm open<br>
>> >>> to such an argument, but until I see it I remain opposed to a ballot <br>
>> >>> to allow any certificate to be issued without revocation information.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> I don't understand this position. Surely the acceptability or not of short-lived certificates should depend on whether their security properties are broadly comparable to existing solutions, not on whether I can construct an argument that shows it's
required to remove the revocation information for it to be technically feasible to deploy them?<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> Gerv<br>
>> >>> <table class="TM_EMAIL_NOTICE"><tr><td><pre><br>
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>> >>><br>
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>> >>><br>
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>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> _______________________________________________<br>
>><br>
>> Public mailing list<br>
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><br>
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