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    The benefit is to everyone:<br>
    1) CAs benefit by having a reduced load on their OCSP servers (at
    the exchange of more certificates issued)<br>
    2) Subscribers benefit from a shortened lifecycle for revocation
    (two days instead of 10)<br>
    3) Server operators benefit from smaller certificate sizes and no
    call back to the CA to check revocation information<br>
    <br>
    Jeremy<br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/28/2014 8:27 AM,
      <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a> wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:763539E260C37C46A0D6B340B5434C3B0A40BC44@AEX06.ejsarea.net"
      type="cite">
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        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
            lang="EN-US">How do you already know this is going to be a
            benefit? For who? Subscribers?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
            lang="EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
              lang="EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:9.75pt"><b><span
style="font-size:8.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif""
                lang="ES-TRAD">Iñigo Barreira</span></b><span
style="font-size:8.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif""
              lang="ES-TRAD"><br>
              Responsable del Área técnica<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:8.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif""
              lang="ES-TRAD">945067705</span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
              lang="ES-TRAD"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
              lang="ES-TRAD"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"><img
                id="Imagen_x0020_1"
                src="cid:part2.02000406.05080709@digicert.com"
                alt="Descripción: cid:image001.png@01CE3152.B4804EB0"
                border="0" height="111" width="585"></span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
              lang="ES-TRAD"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:9.75pt"><span
style="font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:#888888;mso-fareast-language:ES-TRAD">ERNE!
              Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez
              babestuta egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko
              helbidera heldu bada (helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak
              huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, korreo honi erantzuna.
              KONTUZ!</span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#888888;mso-fareast-language:ES-TRAD"><br>
            </span><span
style="font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:#888888;mso-fareast-language:ES-TRAD">ATENCION!
              Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o
              confidencial a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el
              destinatario. Si usted lo recibe por error le
              agradeceriamos que no hiciera uso de la informacion y que
              se pusiese en contacto con el remitente.</span><span
style="font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:navy;mso-fareast-language:ES-TRAD"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        </div>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <div>
          <div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
            1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm">
            <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext">De:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext">
                <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
                [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] <b>En nombre de </b>Jeremy.Rowley<br>
                <b>Enviado el:</b> martes, 28 de octubre de 2014 15:19<br>
                <b>Para:</b> Phillip Hallam-Baker;
                <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a><br>
                <b>CC:</b> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
                <b>Asunto:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life
                Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">By not making
          a change in the BRs, the CAB Forum is essentially saying CAs
          can't use expiration as a means of revocation.  Without the
          benefit provided by short lived certs, you won't have
          subscribers using them.<br>
          <br>
          Jeremy<o:p></o:p></p>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal">On 10/28/2014 7:49 AM, Phillip
            Hallam-Baker wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
        </div>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal">Which is why I disagreed with Gerv’s
              claim that there is no point to issuing short lived certs
              with the revocation indicators present. The point is that
              it establishes a base of deployment that can then be used
              to justify the necessary changes in the BRs.<o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal">The reason that I am interested in
              short lived certs even with the compressed CRL technology
              is because even a compressed delta CRL is still a list.
              The scaling issue is postponed, not eliminated.<o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal">If however we combine short lived certs
              with compressed CRLs we can reduce the vulnerability
              window from days to hours. Which is a big gain because it
              would mean that we likely remove the incentive to attempt
              an attack.<o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal">The secret to keeping Disneyland clean
              is that the park is already clean. People feel bad about
              littering if the place is clean. If there is litter they
              don’t feel bad about making more.<o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          </div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          <div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">On Oct 27, 2014, at 10:26 PM, <a
                  moz-do-not-send="true"
                  href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a>
                wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
              <br>
              <o:p></o:p></p>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt">Not
                  everyone agrees at this point that the risk profile of
                  short-lived certs that can't be recalled (no
                  revocation checking possible) is equivalent to the
                  risk profile of long-lived certs with revocation
                  checking but with all the limitations discussed.<br>
                  <br>
                  Leaving the decision on whether to accept short-lived
                  certs with no revocation checking to the interested
                  browsers and interested CAs means that other CAs and
                  browsers don't have to approve or participate -- and
                  no changes to the BRs would be required.<br>
                  <br>
                  -----Original Message-----<br>
                  From: Jeremy Rowley [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>]<span
                    class="apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
                  Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 6:26 PM<br>
                  To: Kirk Hall (RD-US); Gervase Markham; Tim Hollebeek;<a
                    moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
                  Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life
                  Certificates<br>
                  <br>
                  If short-lived certs are an acceptable form of
                  revocation checking, then what advantage is there to
                  use a phased-in approach with customer browser code?
                   You get the same benefits with no changes by simply
                  omitting the revocation pointers.  I don't see what
                  risks are mitigated by phasing in short-lived certs
                  only for new browsers.  <br>
                  <br>
                  Jeremy<br>
                  <br>
                  -----Original Message-----<br>
                  From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
                  [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]
                  On Behalf Of <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a><br>
                  Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 5:44 PM<br>
                  To: Gervase Markham; Tim Hollebeek; <a
                    moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
                  Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life
                  Certificates<br>
                  <br>
                  Gerv, I've pasted in your original response to this
                  question below.  <br>
                  <br>
                  If I can summarize, you don't want revocation pointers
                  in new "short lived certs" as defined because legacy
                  browsers and apps (i.e., every browser and app in use
                  today) will continue to check for revocation
                  information, thereby lowering the benefit of this new
                  type of cert.  (You estimated 90% will still check for
                  revocation -- but is that number realistic under
                  Google's and Mozilla's current revocation checking
                  processes?  I thought revocation checking was already
                  omitted today for many long-lived certs...)<br>
                  <br>
                  My question back is: how long would it take Firefox
                  and Google (and other interested browsers) to modify
                  your browser software as Tim and Rich have suggested -
                  ignore revocation pointers if the cert is a short
                  lived cert?  And how quickly would those code changes
                  get distributed to your users?<br>
                  <br>
                  The burden of revocation checking falls mostly on CAs,
                  and it can only get better (fewer revocation checks)
                  if some browsers decide not to check revocation for
                  (self-designated) short lived cert by modifying their
                  software. So why not just move forward as browsers to
                  do this?  The revocation checking burden on CAs that
                  decide to start issuing short-lived certs would not go
                  up as compared to current long lived certs, and over
                  time (maybe quickly) would go down.<br>
                  <br>
                  Having said that, Trend Micro is not yet convinced
                  this is a good idea for the reasons stated by others
                  -- but the browsers don't have to wait if they think
                  the risk from eliminating revocation checking for
                  short lived certs is acceptable.<br>
                  <br>
                  -----Original Message-----<br>
                  From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
                  [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]
                  On Behalf Of Gervase Markham<br>
                  Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 12:33 PM<br>
                  To: Tim Hollebeek; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
                  Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot - Short-Life
                  Certificates<br>
                  <br>
                  On 27/10/14 14:14, Tim Hollebeek wrote:<br>
                  <br>
                  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt">What
                  does not having the revocation information in the cert
                  actually solve?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt"><br>
                  I've covered this earlier in the thread :-)<br>
                  <br>
                  Gerv<br>
                  _______________________________________________<br>
                  <br>
                  On 24/10/14 13:40, Rich Smith wrote:<br>
                  <br>
                  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt">I keep
                  coming back to this same question every time this
                  comes up, and<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
                  I have not received a satisfactory answer yet:<br>
                  Why MUST a short lived certificate be issued without
                  containing<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
                  revocation information?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt"><br>
                  And I keep asking it every time you ask: because
                  putting in revocation information eliminates 90% of
                  their advantage, because there is then no advantage in
                  all the currently-existing clients. A short-lived cert
                  with revocation pointers will still incur the delay of
                  revocation checking, even though (this is the
                  argument, and the argument with which I hope you will
                  engage) it's not necessary to provide them because the
                  security properties of a 3-day cert are broadly
                  comparable to a 1-year cert with 10-day, 5-day or
                  3-day-expiry OCSP responses.<br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt">The
                  simple fact of the matter is that revocation info in
                  the<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
                  certificate MAY help SOME users IF the certificate
                  gets revoked, and I<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
                  have yet to see anyone offer up any decent argument
                  for why the<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
                  revocation info absolutely MUST NOT be present for
                  short-lived certs to work.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt"><br>
                  No one is arguing that it MUST NOT be present for
                  short-lived certificates to "work". But if a site and
                  a CA are together considering deploying such a
                  technology, they will look at the costs and benefits.<br>
                  There will be significant costs in setting up the
                  system; if the benefits are only in 5% or 10% of
                  clients, it may well be judged not to be worth it.<br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt">I'm
                  open<br>
                  to such an argument, but until I see it I remain
                  opposed to a ballot<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
                  to allow any certificate to be issued without
                  revocation information.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt"><br>
                  I don't understand this position. Surely the
                  acceptability or not of short-lived certificates
                  should depend on whether their security properties are
                  broadly comparable to existing solutions, not on
                  whether I can construct an argument that shows it's
                  required to remove the revocation information for it
                  to be technically feasible to deploy them?<br>
                  <br>
                  Gerv<br>
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                  and may be subject to copyright or other intellectual
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                    class="apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
                  If you are not the intended recipient, you are not
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          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        </blockquote>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
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