<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=utf-8"><meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 14 (filtered medium)"><!--[if !mso]><style>v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
</style><![endif]--><style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
{font-family:Calibri;
panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
{font-family:Tahoma;
panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
{margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:blue;
text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:purple;
text-decoration:underline;}
p
{mso-style-priority:99;
mso-margin-top-alt:auto;
margin-right:0in;
mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:0in;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
p.MsoAcetate, li.MsoAcetate, div.MsoAcetate
{mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-link:"Balloon Text Char";
margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
span.BalloonTextChar
{mso-style-name:"Balloon Text Char";
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-link:"Balloon Text";
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";}
span.TextodegloboCar
{mso-style-name:"Texto de globo Car";
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-link:"Texto de globo";
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";}
p.Textodeglobo, li.Textodeglobo, div.Textodeglobo
{mso-style-name:"Texto de globo";
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-link:"Texto de globo Car";
margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
span.EmailStyle22
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle23
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle24
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle25
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle26
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle27
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle28
{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;
font-weight:normal;
font-style:normal;}
.MsoChpDefault
{mso-style-type:export-only;
font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
{size:8.5in 11.0in;
margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext="edit">
<o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>We had a related conversation months ago in the CABF (attached). I brought up an issue with some customers who were asking us for SSL certs that chained up to the US Government Federal Bridge CA (FBCA). I looked into it, and found that the FBCA policy OID was required in all certs in the chain, while the BRs required a policy OID in the end-entity only. I asked whether any browser did any strict policy flow-down checking that would break if the end-entity cert had two policy OIDs (BR and FBCA) while the intermediate (the one we use to issue FBCA) had only one (FBCA). As I recall, no browser said that they were doing strict policy OID checking. As far as I recall, the issue is still unresolved. We haven’t issued any such cert because we weren’t sure we’d be able to pass both our FBCA and BR audits.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>My point is that no browser seems to do strict policy OID checking, so the DV/OV OID change should not break anything, and CAs do not need to re-issue all the intermediates in their hierarchies.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>-Rick<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> public-bounces@cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Kelvin Yiu<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, October 07, 2014 2:40 PM<br><b>To:</b> Ben Wilson; Dean Coclin; i-barreira@izenpe.net; sleevi@google.com; public@cabforum.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I don’t have a problem if a CA chooses to use the BR OIDs instead of their own OIDs to identify BR related certificate policies as long as it is consistently used in the certificate chain. My concern is with cases that do not follow RFC 5280. For example, when BR OIDs are added to end entity certificates in addition to CA specific OIDs when the CA certificate explicitly contain only CA specific OIDs. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Kelvin<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'> Ben Wilson [<a href="mailto:ben.wilson@digicert.com">mailto:ben.wilson@digicert.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, October 7, 2014 12:56 PM<br><b>To:</b> Kelvin Yiu; Dean Coclin; <a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a>; <a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com">sleevi@google.com</a>; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I don’t think that the use of a policy OID in a certificate necessarily “ignores” “rules” around policy processing in RFC5280. I don’t think anyone has requested that we require a policy constraints extension. We’re only talking about putting a policy OID in a BR certificate, along with any other policy OIDs the CA cares to insert. The primary purpose of the CP OID is to assert the policy under which the certificate has been issued. It is not to build a path up the chain or constrain processing—those are secondary considerations. I agree about the necessity of putting the CP OID in your CPS and of being audited for compliance with the policy (the BRs and EVGs acknowledge that a point-in-time / readiness audit would be acceptable). <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>The BRs is the closest thing to a Certificate Policy that currently exists. It is “”A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements.” Section D.7.1.6 of the PKI Assessment Guidelines states, “The certificate policies extension is intended to convey policy information or references to policy information. Specifically, a PKI can place the object identifier of a certificate policy within the certificate policies extension. The object identifier can enable a relying party to configure its systems to cause its software to look for the OID of an acceptable certificate policy, permit the transaction to continue if the system finds the OID of an acceptable CP in the certificate, and halt the transaction if it does not.” So while it enables functionality, it doesn’t require it, in case that is a browser concern.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Kelvin Yiu<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, October 7, 2014 1:03 PM<br><b>To:</b> Dean Coclin; <a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a>; <a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com">sleevi@google.com</a>; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>FWIW, Microsoft provides an API on Windows 7 and later to determine whether a certificate is EV or not, according to Microsoft’s root CA program.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa377163(v=vs.85).aspx">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa377163(v=vs.85).aspx</a> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I think it is a bad idea to assert BR OIDs for xV compliance by ignoring the rules around certificate policies processing in RFC 5280. While I understand the desire to have a source of information to identify xV certificates, the value is questionable to me unless the information is also in the CPS and the appropriate audit has taken place. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Kelvin<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'> <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Dean Coclin<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, October 7, 2014 9:12 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a>; <a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com">sleevi@google.com</a>; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Hi Inigo,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Yes, I did create such a sheet and I’ve enclosed it here. And I think it proves my point that the current situation exacerbates the problem, making it difficult for one to programmatically determine what type of cert they are encountering. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Dean<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> <a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a> [<a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, October 07, 2014 12:44 AM<br><b>To:</b> Dean Coclin; <a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com">sleevi@google.com</a>; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Dean, time ago you created an Excel sheet with those CAs that use their own OIDs for DV and OV, similar to what was done with EV. The intention of that list was to also have another “source” of information for considering those certs as DV or OV for the browsers in case they need it.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>BTW, Izenpe uses their own OIDs plus the CABF ones.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in;line-height:9.75pt'><b><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-size:8.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>Iñigo Barreira</span></b><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-size:8.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'><br>Responsable del Área técnica<br><a href="mailto:i-barreira@izenpe.net">i-barreira@izenpe.net</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-size:8.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>945067705</span><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span lang=ES style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><img border=0 width=585 height=111 id="Imagen_x0020_1" src="cid:image001.png@01CFE23E.FD9D06D0" alt="Descripción: cid:image001.png@01CE3152.B4804EB0"></span><span lang=ES-TRAD style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in;line-height:9.75pt'><span lang=ES style='font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:#888888;mso-fareast-language:ES-TRAD'>ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada (helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ!</span><span lang=ES style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#888888;mso-fareast-language:ES-TRAD'><br></span><span lang=ES style='font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:#888888;mso-fareast-language:ES-TRAD'>ATENCION! Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o confidencial a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el destinatario. Si usted lo recibe por error le agradeceriamos que no hiciera uso de la informacion y que se pusiese en contacto con el remitente.</span><span lang=ES style='font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:navy;mso-fareast-language:ES-TRAD'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span lang=ES style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b><span lang=ES style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>De:</span></b><span lang=ES style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] <b>En nombre de </b>Dean Coclin<br><b>Enviado el:</b> lunes, 06 de octubre de 2014 21:17<br><b>Para:</b> Ryan Sleevi; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Asunto:</b> Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span lang=ES><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>So I get the part that Chrome (and likely other browsers in the CA/B forum) don’t intend to distinguish DV and OV certs in any way. Got that. Not a point of contention. In fact, I knew that when I started this thread. So no need to go down that path anymore. Having different OIDs does not oblige a browser do anything. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I would have expected more negative commentary from CAs but so far there has been none. And only 1 browser has chimed in.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>However, browsers are not the only application that use SSL certificates. There are others out there and I distinctly recall a conversation about 2-3 years ago where Paypal (a CA/B member) explicitly asked that these OIDs be mandatory. Brad stated that their security group had deemed DV certs to be a security threat to their ecosystem and wanted an easy programmatic way to distinguish them. At the time, there was some pushback (I don’t believe from browsers) and the OIDs ended up being optional. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>It looks as if some CAs do use OIDs in their DV and OV certs but some don’t use the CA/B Forum OIDs (rather their own). This makes it difficult to apply a uniform decision process. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Certs conforming to policy and issued correctly are one aspect that some folks are looking for. The type of certificate is another. One that has not been vetted is different from one that has some vetting completed (other security issues being equal). Perhaps that benefit is not tangible to some but it certainly is to others. I can spew some stats on DV cert use and fraud but that will just muddle this thread so I’ll save it for another day. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Why do browsers care one way or the other if other parties want to make this distinction? The CA/B Forum has defined different baseline standards for these types of certs. Why not make transparency around those standards easy for those that want to draw a distinction?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Certainly would love to hear from some other interested parties.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Dean<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Ryan Sleevi <a href="mailto:[mailto:sleevi@google.com]">[mailto:sleevi@google.com]</a> <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, October 02, 2014 8:56 PM<br><b>To:</b> Dean Coclin<br><b>Cc:</b> <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 5:31 PM, Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:Dean_Coclin@symantec.com" target="_blank">Dean_Coclin@symantec.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Thanks for the response and pointers. I’ve read through the threads but still have additional questions/comments. I’ll readily admit that I don’t understand all the commentary in the Mozilla threads so I apologize if these questions sound somewhat naïve. Happy to be educated:</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>You've heard repeatedly from several browsers about an explicit non-goal of distinguishing DV and OV. As the Forum is comprised of CAs and Browsers, do we have any Browsers that wish to make such a distinction? If not, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Forum to require it.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>>>I haven’t heard of any browsers that want to make that distinction (yet). It is my understanding that the Forum BRs do require an OID for EV certs. So why is it “inappropriate” for the Forum to require OIDs for DV/OV?</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>Browsers have agreed to make a distinction between EV and !EV, so have required there be a way to detect that.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>Browsers have not agreed that there is a distinction between DV or OV, nor is there a need to detect the difference.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>That the browsers have required (effectively all stores at this point, AFAIK) is that the root program members be BR compliant. So any new certs issued (technically, independent of the notBefore, and we know CAs regularly backdate from time of issuance, but it's a rough heuristic) are, by definition, BR compliant.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>If there are non-browser relying parties interested in such distinctions, the CA can always provide such distinctions themselves.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>>>Can you elaborate on what you mean by this? If there’s another way to accomplish the end result, happy to explore further. But it would have to be uniform among all CAs that issue these certs.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>I don't see why it needs to be uniform.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><br>The requirement as to what shape it takes is dictated by the relying party applications.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>The browsers, as relying party applications, do not and have not yet cared about the shape of DV and OV, and as per our recent F2F, aren't really keen to either.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>So having the browsers dictate the shape of the solution seems unnecessary, and an issue for these relying party applications (e.g. Netcraft) to work with CAs.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>As someone very keen on programatic checks and detection for misissuance, there's no question that this would NOT meaningfully help address the concerns we see.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>>>I wasn’t suggesting that this addition would in any way help you with your programmatic checks for mis-issuance. Rather, it would make the task for organizations like Netcraft, EFF or others that tabulate statistics on various types of certificates easier to do. Is that not the case?</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>Not really. These organizations are interested in the same discussions and distinctions we are - what are the certificates being issued and do they conform to the policies that they're supposed to.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>We've established that there's no 'uniform' definition of what constitutes OV, only that the BR requires certain vetting steps for certain subject fields that are OPTIONAL. CAs have taken these and marketed them as OV, but there's no such distinction as a level, nor a particular profile spelled out in the appendices as to what constitutes a "DV" vs "OV".<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>If that was the only degree of distinction required, it's just as easy as checking the Subject fields for any of the OPTIONAL fields.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>That is, there would need to be an OID _per revision_ of the BRs, to indicate "which" version of the BRs something was complying to. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>>>Fully admit that I don’t understand how this works. But wouldn’t that also be the case for EV (which currently requires this OID)?</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>YES! And it's one of the many reasons why EV is somewhat muddled for programatic checks or distinctions. And yet this is also necessary because any change in policy, by definition, necessitates a change in OID to (meaningfully) reflect that. And that constitutes rolling a new hierarchy (and updating browsers' lists of recognized EV OIDs)<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I’m just trying to suggest a way that someone can say: X is a DV cert, Y is an OV cert, Z is an EV cert without a doubt. If OIDs are not the place to do that, is there another mechanism available?<br>I’m sure you are familiar with Ryan Hurst’s blog on how difficult the task currently is.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>I am (you're talking about <a href="http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=203">http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=203</a> in particular). But I'm also not supportive of encouraging a distinction that we neither recognize nor have plans to recognize, and especially not supportive of mandating such distinctions.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>This is especially true, as these distinctions don't offer any tangible security benefits to the Web, as previously discussed.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>If we go to the point of mandating anything additional in certificates, which requires a variety of changes in processes, profiles, and CPSes, I want it to have meaningful security value. This change - which, as has been shown by the development of audit standards and then the eventual incorporation of those audit standards into the root programs, and then FINALLY the <b>enforcement</b> of those audit standards of the root programs - would take several years, at BEST, to deploy, and would communicate nothing of actionable value. It's a hard sell.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><br>Thanks,<br>Dean</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Ryan Sleevi<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, October 02, 2014 3:37 PM<br><b>To:</b> Dean Coclin<br><b>Cc:</b> <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] OIDs for DV and OV</span><o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 10:33 AM, Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:Dean_Coclin@symantec.com" target="_blank">Dean_Coclin@symantec.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>Further to today’s discussion on our call, I’d like to get more feedback on a proposal to make a unique standardized OID mandatory for DV and OV certificates in the Baseline Requirements. Currently we have a mandatory OID for EV certificates but optional for OV and DV. This makes things difficult for at least two groups of constituents:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin-left:.5in'>1.<span style='font-size:7.0pt'> </span>Relying parties that would like to distinguish between these certificates<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>You've heard repeatedly from several browsers about an explicit non-goal of distinguishing DV and OV. As the Forum is comprised of CAs and Browsers, do we have have any Browsers that wish to make such a distinction?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>If not, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Forum to require it. If there are non-browser relying parties interested in such distinctions, the CA can always provide such distinctions themselves.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p style='margin-left:.5in'>2.<span style='font-size:7.0pt'> </span>Analysts that report on SSL certificate data who have had to issue revised reports because of cert misclassification<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>As mentioned on the call, this has been discussed with Mozilla in the past - <a href="https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/hEOQK-ubGRcJ" target="_blank">https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/hEOQK-ubGRcJ</a><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>As someone very keen on programatic checks and detection for misissuance, there's no question that this would NOT meaningfully help address the concerns we see.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>That is, there would need to be an OID _per revision_ of the BRs, to indicate "which" version of the BRs something was complying to. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>I would hope that <a href="https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/2tRUS444krwJ" target="_blank">https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/-mCAK5zfhFQ/2tRUS444krwJ</a> would capture some of these concerns more fully.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>Finally, to do anything meaningful with this in all major clients, it would require that CAs redo their certificate hierarchy, as policy OIDs are inherited. That's a silly thing, especially when CAs are still struggling to migrate from SHA-1 to SHA-256 in their intermediates.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>My proposal is for CAs to put in OID X if it’s a DV certificate and OID Y if it’s an OV certificate.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>As Rick reminded me on the call, we currently have something like this for EV certificates (except that CAs are free to use the standard OID or define one of their own).<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>I’d like to hear pros/cons of this. Ryan S indicated that Google would not support such a proposal but we didn’t have time to discuss the reasons.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'>I’m sure there are both technical and policy reasons. Personally I’d like to focus on the latter but remarks on both are welcome. This proposal doesn’t require anyone to do anything with this data (i.e relying parties can choose whether or not to utilize it).<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><br>Thanks,<br>Dean<o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><p style='margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:.5in'><br>_______________________________________________<br>Public mailing list<br><a href="mailto:Public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Public@cabforum.org</a><br><a href="https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public</a><o:p></o:p></p></blockquote></div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'> <o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p> </o:p></p></div></div></div></body></html>