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    CT is required for EV in January, and most CAs are trying to get
    ready before the deadline.  Waiting for the Trans group isn't really
    an option anymore, especially if there is delay between any document
    adopted by Trans and the implementation date by Google. I also don't
    think we need to time-box on the language since (a) we don't have a
    timeline from Trans on when a standard will be adopted and (b) we
    don't have a timeline from Google on when any ideas from Trans will
    be adopted.   <br>
    <br>
    That said, we might want to clarify that the language about what
    constitutes a "pre-certificate".  Your definition seems reasonable.<br>
    <br>
    Jeremy<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/17/2014 9:55 PM, Brian Smith
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAFewVt4pesX907VP8RdGCBM5c43iKtgZi3cf8TgSABndo4ZQEQ@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
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          <div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 7:01 PM, <a
              moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com" target="_blank">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a>
            <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:kirk_hall@trendmicro.com" target="_blank">kirk_hall@trendmicro.com</a>></span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div link="blue" vlink="purple" lang="EN-US">
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"> <br>
                  </p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal">1. Amend the Definitions as
                    follows:</p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in">Valid
                    Certificate:<b> </b>A Certificate that passes the
                    validation procedure specified in RFC 5280
                    <b><i><u>(except for the limited exemption provided
                          in Appendix B).</u></i></b></p>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>This seems like a bad and unnecessary idea to me. The
              trans working group is already debating discussing the
              format of precertificates so that they are not
              syntactically-valid certificates for the standards-track
              CT mechanism. The version of CT Google and the CAs have
              implemented is an experiment, not a standard or proposed
              standard. The CAs can work around this issue by using the
              OCSP-based CT mechanism instead of the precertificate
              mechanism. Finally, IIUC, the only negative consequence of
              this that EV certificates </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>IMO, it makes more sense to change the experiment than
              it does to (effectively) change the fundamental standards
              that all CABForum work is based on.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Note that the use or non-use of a precertificate
              signing certificate has no bearing (IIUC) on whether the
              precertificate would be a duplicate of the final
              certificate, because the difference between Option 1 and
              Option 2 doesn't affect the issuer and serial number
              fields of the precertificate.</div>
            <div> <br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div link="blue" vlink="purple" lang="EN-US">
                <p class="MsoNormal"> 2. Amend Appendix B as follows:</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"
                  style="margin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none">Appendix
                  B – Certificate Extensions (Normative<i>)<u>;<b>
                        Limited Exemption from Compliance with RFC 5280</b></u></i></p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"
                  style="margin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none"><b> </b></p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"
                  style="margin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none">This
                  appendix specifies the requirements for Certificate
                  extensions for Certificates generated after the
                  Effective Date. ***</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"
                  style="margin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><b><u>(<i>5)
                        Limited Exemption from Compliance with RFC 5280</i></u></b></p>
                <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><b><i><u><span
                          style="text-decoration:none"> </span></u></i></b></p>
                <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><b><i><u>In
                        order to comply with the requirements of
                        Certificate Transparency, CAs may use
                        pre-certificates and certificates that contain
                        the same serial number and are issued from the
                        same Subordinate CA Certificate.</u></i></b></p>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>I think the language here should be cleaned up, because
              "pre-certificate" is not defined in the document. In
              particular, I suggest that you state the exemption in
              terms of the presence of the critical poison extension and
              that the two certificates must be bit-for-bit identical
              except for the poison extension, the SCT extension, and
              the signature, and the length fields of the tbsCertificate
              and tbsCertificate.extensions fields. This way, you avoid
              creating a giant and unintended loophole in the BRs.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Also, I suggest that you time-box the exemption so that
              it doesn't continue in perpetuity, past when CT is fixed.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Cheers,</div>
            <div>Brian</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
          </div>
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