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<p class="MsoNormal">The purpose of this email is just to place a reminder for us or get the conversation going if anyone wants to discuss this suggestion from a call I was on today –
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Could the CA/B Forum (and Browser root programs) revise/update its response to the 2008 Sotirov MD5 pre-image attack?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The commenter’s point was that today there are other ways to reduce the risk of this pre-image attack in addition to 20-bit entropy in serial numbers (which we specify in the Baseline Requirements for SSL and the Code Signing draft). Those
include- variable issuance/expiration times (e.g. minutes, seconds, etc.) and better hash algorithms (not SHA1).<o:p></o:p></p>
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