<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Kelvin Yiu <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:kelviny@exchange.microsoft.com" target="_blank">kelviny@exchange.microsoft.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
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<p class="MsoNormal">This Netcraft post (<a href="http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2014/04/28/phishers-find-microsoft-azure-30-day-trial-irresistible.html" target="_blank">http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2014/04/28/phishers-find-microsoft-azure-30-day-trial-irresistible.html</a>)
has highlighted some questions for us about wildcard certificate requirements in the BR and how they apply to cloud operators.
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<p class="MsoNormal">Microsoft Azure customers can create sub domain names under specific MS registered domains (e.g. <a href="http://myservice.azurewebsites.net" target="_blank">myservice.azurewebsites.net</a>). Users can access these FQDNs using HTTPS, which is is secured with a wildcard certificate managed by Azure. Customers
do not have access to the private key of the wildcard certificate. Azure also maintains a process to monitor for fraudulent activities and will take down such sites. AFAIK, other cloud operators such as Google App Engine and Amazon Web Services uses wildcard
certificates in a similar way. <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Here are my questions to the forum:<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p><u></u><span>1.<span style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-size:7pt;line-height:normal;font-family:'Times New Roman'">
</span></span><u></u>Section 11.1.3 of the BR explicitly disallow wildcard certificates for registry controlled domains (e.g. *.com). The Mozilla maintained
<a href="http://publicsuffix.org" target="_blank">http://publicsuffix.org</a> is cited as an example of a public suffix list where Azure, GAE, and AWS domains can be found. Does the current usage of wildcard certificates by cloud operators violate the BR? If so, is this intentional
and what is the reason?</p></div></div></blockquote><div>The Public Suffix List is presently divided into two sections - ICANN-assigned suffices (eg: gTLDs, ccTLDs) and "Private" (enterprise) suffices, for which Azure falls under (as do many other hosted services, such as AWS and Google App Engine)</div>
<div><br></div><div>In both cases, things are fuzzy - in a know-it-when-I-see-it sort of way. That is, it's easy to say something like "*.com" should be invalid. For something like *.<a href="http://appspot.com">appspot.com</a> or *.<a href="http://azurewebsites.net">azurewebsites.net</a>, one would say that it should be invalid for "just anyone" to register, but it should be valid for Google/Microsoft (respectively) to register - as they have. So perhaps we'd say this is a "high-risk domain" and requires manual vetting, but it's hard to say as a general rule it should be prohibited.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Further, it gets more troubling with something like *.nike (as a hypothetical). If Nike doesn't allow third-party registrations, but instead fully operates the domain - much like *.<a href="http://appspot.com">appspot.com</a> or *.<a href="http://azurewebsites.net">azurewebsites.net</a> - should it be allowed to register a wildcard cert? Maybe, maybe not. (For the record, Chrome, in present form, would reject it, as it would any wildcard to an ICANN/IANA-assigned gTLD)</div>
<div><br></div><div>Note that Section 11.1.3 provides for registrations in *.<a href="http://azurewebsites.net">azurewebsites.net</a> and *.<a href="http://appspot.com">appspot.com</a> - as well as *.nike - in its present form, in the first sentence of the second paragraph:</div>
<div><br></div><div>"If a wildcard would fall within the label immediately to the left of a registry-controlled† or public suffix, CAs MUST refuse issuance unless the applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace."</div>
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<p><u></u><span>2.<span style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-size:7pt;line-height:normal;font-family:'Times New Roman'">
</span></span><u></u>Section 13.1.5 of the BR explicitly require wildcard certificates that were “used to authenticate fraudulently misleading subordinate FQDN” to be revoked within 24 hours. If the fraudulent sites never had access to the private key of
the wildcard certificate and the cloud operator has a process to take down fraudulent sites, should these wildcard certificates be required to be revoked?</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don't have a good answer for this, and will probably need to think more before responding. I can see positive and negative outcomes with either answer.</div>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Kelvin<u></u><u></u></p>
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