<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"><meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 14 (filtered medium)"><style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
{font-family:"Cambria Math";
panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
{font-family:Calibri;
panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
{font-family:Tahoma;
panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
{margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";
color:black;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:blue;
text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:purple;
text-decoration:underline;}
p
{mso-style-priority:99;
mso-margin-top-alt:auto;
margin-right:0in;
mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:0in;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";
color:black;}
p.MsoAcetate, li.MsoAcetate, div.MsoAcetate
{mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-link:"Balloon Text Char";
margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:8.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";
color:black;}
span.BalloonTextChar
{mso-style-name:"Balloon Text Char";
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-link:"Balloon Text";
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";}
span.EmailStyle20
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle21
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle22
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle23
{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
.MsoChpDefault
{mso-style-type:export-only;
font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
{size:8.5in 11.0in;
margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext="edit">
<o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body bgcolor=white lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Many of the trusted QC issuers (and other community issuers) are not involved in the CAB Forum. Although you are aware of the requirements, I don’t think this knowledge is global. For example, I don’t think the NIST CP or FBCA CP ever mentions domain validation. A CA following either CP for client certs wouldn’t necessarily validate an included domain.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Jeremy<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'> public-bounces@cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Mads Egil Henriksveen<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, January 03, 2014 4:52 AM<br><b>To:</b> Moudrick M. Dadashov; Jeremy Rowley; public@cabforum.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Hi Moudrick<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>There might not be a real use case for including a domain name in a QC, but as a trusted CA we take the responsibility for the accuracy of information in all certs we issue. And that was my point and why I am not very concerned about the described attack scenario. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Regards<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Mads<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'> <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Moudrick M. Dadashov<br><b>Sent:</b> 3. januar 2014 11:51<br><b>To:</b> Mads Egil Henriksveen; Jeremy Rowley; <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org">public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Definition of an SSL certificate<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=NO-BOK><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=NO-BOK>Mads,<br><br>On 1/3/2014 11:49 AM, Mads Egil Henriksveen wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><span lang=NO-BOK><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>The attack scenario assumes that the QC can be chained to a root cert in a trusted CA root store. This means that the CA should know the root store requirements and should be aware of the risk issuing any cert that could be used as an SSL certificate. </span><span lang=NO-BOK><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><span lang=NO-BOK><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Buypass do issue both QC and SSL certificates and with the DigiNotar attack back in 2011 we realized that the browsers do accept a lot of certificates as SSL certificates. Since then we have had strict controls to ensure that no certificate is issued with an unverified domain name. I guess most of the trusted QC issuers who also issue SSL certificates are aware of this, I would not be very concerned about this attack scenario. </span><span lang=NO-BOK><o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=NO-BOK>What is the use case when in a QC we'd need a [any/unverified] domain name? (aren't CAs responsible for the accuracy of information in the QCs they issue?). <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><span lang=NO-BOK><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>However, I do support the idea of a technical definition of an SSL certificate and I like the proposal from Ryan Hurst requiring the BR/EV OIDs. </span><span lang=NO-BOK><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=NO-BOK>Under ETSI framework compliance assumes two things: compliance with the corresponding requirements plus certificate profile compliance. These two categories exist as separate documents (under their own ETSI IDs).<br>Ryan's proposal is definitely a good step forward, I'd vote with my both hands if we go even further, and like ETSI, have separate BR/EV profile specifications.<br><br>Thanks,<br>M.D.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></body></html>