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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Mads,<br>
<br>
On 1/3/2014 11:49 AM, Mads Egil Henriksveen wrote:<br>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
lang="EN-US">The attack scenario assumes that the QC can be
chained to a root cert in a trusted CA root store. This
means that the CA should know the root store requirements
and should be aware of the risk issuing any cert that could
be used as an SSL certificate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
lang="EN-US">Buypass do issue both QC and SSL certificates
and with the DigiNotar attack back in 2011 we realized that
the browsers do accept a lot of certificates as SSL
certificates. Since then we have had strict controls to
ensure that no certificate is issued with an unverified
domain name. I guess most of the trusted QC issuers who also
issue SSL certificates are aware of this, I would not be
very concerned about this attack scenario. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
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What is the use case when in a QC we'd need a [any/unverified]
domain name? (aren't CAs responsible for the accuracy of information
in the QCs they issue?). <br>
<blockquote
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
lang="EN-US">However, I do support the idea of a technical
definition of an SSL certificate and I like the proposal
from Ryan Hurst requiring the BR/EV OIDs. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Under ETSI framework compliance assumes two things: compliance with
the corresponding requirements plus certificate profile compliance.
These two categories exist as separate documents (under their own
ETSI IDs).<br>
Ryan's proposal is definitely a good step forward, I'd vote with my
both hands if we go even further, and like ETSI, have separate BR/EV
profile specifications.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
M.D.<br>
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