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    On 12/18/2013 08:11 PM, From Ryan Sleevi:
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              <div>Auditors are not equivalent to site operators. Site
                operators carry great risk in pinning and getting it
                right <br>
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    Site operators don't do pinning I guess...<br>
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              <div>Pinning offers the ability for anyone, without risk
                to their operational capability, to look to examine for
                misissuance - past or present.</div>
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    I think you meant something else here...<br>
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              <div>Every single public CA security incident we have seen
                in the past 3 years would have been detected immediately
                from a system like CT.</div>
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    Maybe...it's just another layer really. <br>
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              <div>Trustwave, Diginotar, Turktrust, and most recently,
                ANSSI were all detected through luck and vigilance, and
                only because they happened to affect a large site whose
                engineers are using every means capable to them to
                attempt to detect such mis-issuance.</div>
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    I assume it was detected because said large site also produces a
    browser and used pinning to detect it.<br>
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              <div>For all we know, there may be thousands of other
                misissuances from existing CAs</div>
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    Probably exaggerated, but there might be a couple more...<br>
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              <div>CT makes it possible for anyone - from Joe Schmo on
                the street with his $10 certificate, to the
                multi-billion dollar multi-national with engineers
                committed to dealing with just this issue - to detect
                misissuance.</div>
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    It gives the potential, yes. Pinning could do the same...<br>
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              <div>I think you're pretty grossly understating the
                benefit here.</div>
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                  IMO pinning can achieve the same way cheaper (for me).
                  And again, if we could combine revocation for example,
                  the benefit would be much bigger and trade off the
                  expenses/efforts...</div>
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              <div>Assume the cost of pinning is $100/year/site.</div>
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    How did you arrive at that sum? Pinning shouldn't really cost
    anything once the code is in the browsers. I also assume that code
    changes for CT wouldn't be any cheaper than that.<br>
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              <div>Assume the cost of CT is $10,000/year/CA.</div>
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    And you vastly underestimate that. My over-the-top calculation looks
    fairly different - for a CA budgeting more tightly than others, this
    could be a game changer.<br>
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            <td colspan="2">Regards </td>
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            <td colspan="2"> </td>
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            <td>Signer: </td>
            <td>Eddy Nigg, COO/CTO</td>
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            <td> </td>
            <td><a href="http://www.startcom.org">StartCom Ltd.</a></td>
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            <td>XMPP: </td>
            <td><a href="xmpp:startcom@startcom.org">startcom@startcom.org</a></td>
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            <td>Blog: </td>
            <td><a href="http://blog.startcom.org">Join the Revolution!</a></td>
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            <td>Twitter: </td>
            <td><a href="http://twitter.com/eddy_nigg">Follow Me</a></td>
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