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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>HI Rijt, <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>I think the certificates you mentioned will (and should) qualify under the BRs if are issued from a root that is included in one of the adopting browser’s trust stores.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Here’s my logic:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoListParagraph style='text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>1)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Certs that don’t have an EKU or that include the anyEKU can be used as SSL certs, regardless of their intended purposes and should (arguably) be under the BRs. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoListParagraph style='text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>2)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>However, as you mentioned, many certificates assert the anyEKU, have noEKU, or even contain the server authentication EKU that are never intended to be used on a server. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoListParagraph style='text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>3)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>I believe the certificates referenced typically lack an FQDN. Including these certificates under the BR umbrella is problematic because the certificates can’t function in the intended manner and comply with the BRs. The CN is an identifier for the equipment, which violates Section 9.2.2 of the BRs.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoListParagraph style='text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>4)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Requiring an FQDN for inclusion in the BRs is not a way forward since that would make the sections on internal server names out of scope of the BRs. In fact, the identifier in these certificates is indistinguishable from and qualifies as an internal name, meaning the certificate presents all of the concerns previously expressed by PayPal. Continuing to trust these certificates would be the same as not deprecating internal server name certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoListParagraph style='text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>5)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span></span><![endif]><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Therefore, these certificates must either be included in the BRs, and include an FQDN, or need to be issued off of a non-publicly trusted root certificate. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>The position you expressed is why I wanted to raise the issue and why I think we need to resolve what the BRs actually cover. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Jeremy<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> public-bounces@cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, August 01, 2013 3:05 AM<br><b>To:</b> 'CABFPub'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:black'>Although I understand the need for tightening the definition and I can follow the reasoning below to a certain point I feel that, instead of tightening it, the new definition seems to have broadened the scope. The vast majority of certificates issued under the Logius PKIoverheid root are not intended for the identification of SSL servers. However, roughly 90% of these certificates will now fall under this new definition. In the present version, the scope made clear that the BR only addressed certificates meant for servers.</span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:black'> </span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:black'>What about personal certificates on a SSCD that have no EKU or have an anyExtendedKeyUsage as a safetynet? Would these certificates suddenly by seen as SSL certificates although they are obviously not intended for servers? What about certificates issued to autonomous devices such as onboard computers in taxicabs or domestic gas meters, to name but two? Would these be considered SSL certificates if they have no EKU or the clientauth EKU in combination with anyExtendedKeyUsage? </span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:black'> </span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:black'>Regards, </span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='color:black'>Robert</span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal> <span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal> <span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> </span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>Van:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] <b>Namens </b>Ryan Sleevi<br><b>Verzonden:</b> maandag 29 juli 2013 22:</span><span lang=NL style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>57<br><b>Aan:</b> Kelvin Yiu<br><b>CC:</b> CABFPub<br><b>Onderwerp:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements</span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=NL> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=NL>They're still respected (for better or worse) by Apple, NSS, and Android.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span lang=NL>Even if that changed tomorrow, the fact that a significant portion of the deployed user base for those products may not upgrade immediately suggests it would be wise to keep them in scope - especially given that even few products implement Microsoft's EKU chaining behaviour for intermediates.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=NL>On Jul 29, 2013 1:52 PM, "Kelvin Yiu" <<a href="mailto:kelviny@exchange.microsoft.com">kelviny@exchange.microsoft.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=NL>I prefer to drop any mention of the MS or Netscape SGC OIDs. These OIDs have been obsolete for over a decade and have ceased to have any meaning on MS platforms since Windows 2000.<br><br>Kelvin<br><br>-----Original Message-----<br>From: <a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi<br>Sent: Friday, July 26, 2013 12:35 PM<br>To: jeremy rowley<br>Cc: CABFPub<br>Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements<br><br>Jeremy,<br><br>If I might suggest a slight modification to the wording, which still leaves things a little ambiguous. "All root and intermediate certificates included in a browser's trust store" - AIUI, none of the browsers are really accepting intermediates to the trust store at this point.<br><br>This was a sticky point when working on Mozilla's wording on this policy to. Luckily, the terminology for "Root CA" and "Subordinate CA"<br>may be sufficient here to help clarify.<br><br>"All root certificates included in a browser's trust store, all subordinate CA certificates signed by one of these root certificates, and all end-entity certificates that either lack any Extended Key Usage extension or contain an Extended Key Usage extension that contains one of the following:<br>- Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)<br>- anyExtendedKeyUsage (2.5.29.37.0)<br>- Netscape Server Gated Cryptography (2.16.840.1.113730.4.1)<br>- Microsoft Server Gated Cryptography (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.3) are expressly covered by these requirements."<br><br>Note that Appendix B, 3.F lists other values as SHOULD NOT. However, that presumably only applies when a certificate is 'in scope' of the BRs, hence the restatement of potential EKUs that are relevant.<br><br><br><br>On Fri, Jul 26, 2013 at 12:22 PM, Jeremy Rowley <<a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>> wrote:<br>> Hi everyone,<br>><br>><br>><br>> As mentioned on the phone call last week, CAs have claimed exemption<br>> from the BRs because the definition of a publicly-trusted SSL certificate is not<br>> clear. I would like to clarify the scope of the BRs to avoid confusion on<br>> what particular certificate contents are necessary to require<br>> compliance. I am looking for on endorser (Stephen Davidson has already endorsed).<br>><br>><br>><br>> The third paragraph of Section 1 of the baseline requirements is:<br>><br>> "This version of the Requirements only addresses Certificates intended<br>> to be used for authenticating servers accessible through the<br>> Internet. Similar requirements for code signing, S/MIME,<br>> time-stamping, VoIP, IM, Web services, etc. may be covered in future versions."<br>><br>><br>><br>> I'd like to replace the above text with the following:<br>><br>> "This version of the Baseline Requirements addresses all root,<br>> intermediate, and end entity certificates that can be used in<br>> publicly-trusted SSL handshakes. All root and intermediate<br>> certificates included in a browser's trust store and all end entity<br>> certificates containing an extended key usage extension of Server<br>> Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) are expressly covered by these<br>> requirements. Similar requirements for code signing, S/MIME,<br>> time-stamping, VoIP, IM, Web services, etc. may be covered in future versions."<br>><br>><br>><br>> I look forward to your comments.<br>><br>><br>><br>> Jeremy<br>><br>><br>> _______________________________________________<br>> Public mailing list<br>> <a href="mailto:Public@cabforum.org">Public@cabforum.org</a><br>> <a href="https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public</a><br>><br>_______________________________________________<br>Public mailing list<br><a href="mailto:Public@cabforum.org">Public@cabforum.org</a><br><a href="https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public" target="_blank">https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=NL><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=NL><hr size=2 width="100%" align=center></span></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=NL style='font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:gray'><br>Dit bericht kan informatie bevatten die niet voor u is bestemd. Indien u niet de geadresseerde bent of dit bericht abusievelijk aan u is toegezonden, wordt u verzocht dat aan de afzender te melden en het bericht te verwijderen. De Staat aanvaardt geen aansprakelijkheid voor schade, van welke aard ook, die verband houdt met risico's verbonden aan het elektronisch verzenden van berichten.<br>This message may contain information that is not intended for you. If you are not the addressee or if this message was sent to you by mistake, you are requested to inform the sender and delete the message. The State accepts no liability for damage of any kind resulting from the risks inherent in the electronic transmission of messages. .</span><span lang=NL><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></body></html>