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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Jeremy,<br>
<br>
1. ETSI TS 101 862 V1.3.3 (2006-01) Qualified Certificate profile<br>
2. ETSI EN 319 412-5 V1.1.1 (2013-01) Electronic Signatures and
Infrastructures (ESI); Profiles for Trust Service Providers
issuing certificates; Part 5: Extension for Qualified Certificate
profile<br>
<br>
also have a look: <br>
<br>
ETSI TS 119 412-2 V1.1.1 (2012-04) Electronic Signatures and
Infrastructures (ESI); Profiles for Trust Service Providers
issuing certificates; Part 2: Certificate Profile for certificates
issued to natural persons.<br>
<br>
Search and download here:<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp">http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp</a><br>
<br>
need to register, its free.<br>
<br>
Thanks.<br>
M.D.<br>
<br>
On 8/1/2013 7:18 PM, Jeremy Rowley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:03f001ce8ed2$d4f6e630$7ee4b290$@digicert.com"
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<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Do
you have a link for the profile? None of the qualified
cert profile recommendations or requirements I am aware of
require the anyEKU or omission of the EKU. They all say
EKUS MUST be set in accordance with 5280. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Jeremy<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext">
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
[<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Moudrick
M. Dadashov<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, August 01, 2013 9:25 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Ryan Hurst<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'CABFPub'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying the
scope of the baseline requirements<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">I see potential problem for ETSI
Qualified SSL certificates, if key usage requirements remain
mandatory as it is now with the Qualified el. signature
certs. <br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
M.D.<br>
<br>
On 8/1/2013 5:28 PM, Ryan Hurst wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">There
is nothing in the RFC that requires applications to treat
the presence of the EKU as mandatory:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> Certificate using</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> applications MAY
require that the extended key usage extension be</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> present and that
a particular purpose be indicated in order for the</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> certificate to be
acceptable to that application.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">In
fact the processing semantics defined in the RFC result in
the behavior you see in all browsers today. That is if
extended key usage is present the certificate is good for
all usages, that if any key usage is present the
certificate is only good for the specified usages.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> If the extension
is present, then the certificate MUST only be used</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> for one of the
purposes indicated. If multiple purposes are</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> indicated the
application need not recognize all purposes indicated,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> as long as the
intended purpose is present.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">While
this behavior does require CAs to be mindful of what
applications require to understand the implications of
their certificate profiles it is both standards compliant
and the way things have been since the introduction of
this extension.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">As
for key usage; most libraries (certainly CryptoAPI) don’t
pay attention to the key usage extension; that is with the
exception of keyCertSign. Additionally its perfectly
legitimate for an application to ignore the Key Usage
field:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> This extension
indicates one or more purposes for which the certified</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> public key may be
used, in addition to or in place of the basic</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> purposes
indicated in the key usage extension.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">And
the specification of the EKU of server authentication
includes a set of specific KUs that are consistent with
the extension:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif"">
id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp
1 }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> -- TLS WWW server
authentication</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> -- Key usage bits
that may be consistent: digitalSignature,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New
;color:black","serif""> --
keyEncipherment or keyAgreement</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Given
these facts I do not think it makes sense to include KU as
part of the definition of scope.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Ryan</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
[<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) -
Logius<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, August 01, 2013 5:09 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>;
'Steve Roylance'<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'CABFPub'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying
the scope of the baseline requirements</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">Ideally,
only certificates that explicitly contain an EKU with
serverauth would be considered SSL certs. All other
certs should be dismissed. That would be in line with
the RFC, but I realize this proposal might even be more
impractical.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">I
would suggest though to add to the current definition
that only certificates that contain a KeyUsage with the
digitalsignature and keyEncipherment and / or </span><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN">keyAgreement</span><span
style="font-size:10.0pt" lang="EN"> </span><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">bits
set, would be considered SSL certificates. It just does
not make sense to mandate that a personal certificate on
a SSCD with KeyUsage non-repudation and no EKU would be
considered an SSL certificate. That is not how I have
interpreted RFC 5280.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">If
the proposed definition is accepted all certificates
with noEKU or </span><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB">anyEKU bits set will be governed by the BR.
That means that all client certificates with those bits
set, SSL or otherwise, will be governed by the rules of
the BR. This in turn means that a client certificate
must contain a FQDN, which it obviously cannot. In my
view, adopting the proposed definition would lead to a
situation where no client certificates can be issued
under the roots present in the root programs, unless the
burden of change is placed on those CAs issuing client
certificates, forcing them to add keyusage bits to their
certificates that are not compulsory through the RFCs.
Furthermore, in many cases the anyEKU is relied on by
software using client certificates.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">Regards,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">Robert
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
lang="NL"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
lang="NL"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif""
lang="NL">Van:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif""
lang="NL"> Jeremy Rowley [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>]
<br>
<b>Verzonden:</b> donderdag 1 augustus 2013 14:06<br>
<b>Aan:</b> 'Steve Roylance'; Rijt, R.A. van de
(Robert) - Logius<br>
<b>CC:</b> 'CABFPub'<br>
<b>Onderwerp:</b> RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 108:
Clarifying the scope of the baseline requirements</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="NL"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">That
is likely the way forward. Mozilla can enable roots for
“Web, code, or client” . I assume the other browsers
probably have a similar designation. If the root is
disabled for “web” then the cert could not perform SSL
and would not be considered enabled in the browser’s
trust store (for SSL/TLS). The tweak to the proposed
language would be nominal.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
[<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Steve Roylance<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, August 01, 2013 5:25 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius<br>
<b>Cc:</b> CABFPub<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108: Clarifying
the scope of the baseline requirements</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Hi Robert.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Root program's have the ability to
mark specific roots for specific uses therefore you can
still offer public trust but for a specific need. Maybe
that's a way forward? As with Name Constraints it makes
roots (or Subordinate CAs) less attractive as targets as
their value to an attacker is decreased.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Regards Steve<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
Sent from my iPhone<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
On 1 Aug 2013, at 12:04, "Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) -
Logius" <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:robert.vande.rijt@logius.nl">robert.vande.rijt@logius.nl</a>>
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">For
qualified certificates under ETSI that need to be
publicly trusted, a private root would not be an
option. Moreover, developing a private,
not-publicly trusted root and rolling out
end-entity certificates takes time. I am talking
about a year at least.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">I
wonder if everyone else is realizing the impact on
“non-SSL” certificates. Especially the CA’s not
participating in the CABforum because they do not
issue SSL certs (or thought they did not), but do
have a publicly trusted root. </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Robert</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">Van:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">
Jeremy Rowley [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>]
<br>
<b>Verzonden:</b> donderdag 1 augustus 2013
12:56<br>
<b>Aan:</b> Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) -
Logius; 'Ryan Hurst'<br>
<b>CC:</b> 'CABFPub'<br>
<b>Onderwerp:</b> RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 108:
Clarifying the scope of the baseline
requirements</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Which
is why you will now have to issue these off a root
not trusted by a participating browser. The
safetynet is the problem since makes them an SSL
cert. I don’t think you can both have a safetynet
like this and issue the cert from a trusted root.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D">Jeremy</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">
Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) - Logius [<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:robert.vande.rijt@logius.nl">mailto:robert.vande.rijt@logius.nl</a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, August 01, 2013 4:53 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Ryan Hurst; <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a><br>
<b>Cc:</b> CABFPub<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 108:
Clarifying the scope of the baseline
requirements</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">Thanks
for your reply, Jeremy. I conclude that with
this new definition: </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">1.
We are forcing everyone with public certificates
to use the EKU;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">2.
We are forcing everyone with public certificates
not to use the </span><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB">anyExtendedKeyUsage unless it is a
SSL certificate; </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB">3. thereby forcing everyone to
spell out all the applicable EKUs one–by-one. My
experience is that a lot of software cannot
handle this</span><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
lang="EN-GB">,</span><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB"> so the certificate cannot be used
for the function intended. That is why the
anyExtendedKeyUsage is often used as a
safetynet.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB">Robert</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">Van:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">
Ryan Hurst [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:ryan.hurst@globalsign.com">mailto:ryan.hurst@globalsign.com</a>]
<br>
<b>Verzonden:</b> donderdag 1 augustus 2013
12:45<br>
<b>Aan:</b> <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a><br>
<b>CC:</b> Rijt, R.A. van de (Robert) -
Logius; CABFPub<br>
<b>Onderwerp:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108:
Clarifying the scope of the baseline
requirements</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">I concur with Jeremy's
analysis.<br>
<br>
Ryan Hurst<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Chief Technology Officer<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">GMO Globalsign<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">twitter: @rmhrisk<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">email: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:ryan.hurst@globalsign.com">ryan.hurst@globalsign.com</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">phone: 206-650-7926<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Sent from my phone,
please forgive the brevity.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
On Aug 1, 2013, at 1:12 PM, "Jeremy Rowley" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>>
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote
style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">HI
Rijt, </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif""> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">I
think the certificates you mentioned will
(and should) qualify under the BRs if are
issued from a root that is included in one
of the adopting browser’s trust stores.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif""> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">Here’s
my logic:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph"
style="text-indent:-.25in">1)<span
style="font-size:7.0pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">Certs
that don’t have an EKU or that include the
anyEKU can be used as SSL certs, regardless
of their intended purposes and should
(arguably) be under the BRs. </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph"
style="text-indent:-.25in">2)<span
style="font-size:7.0pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">However,
as you mentioned, many certificates assert
the anyEKU, have noEKU, or even contain the
server authentication EKU that are never
intended to be used on a server. </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph"
style="text-indent:-.25in">3)<span
style="font-size:7.0pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">I
believe the certificates referenced
typically lack an FQDN. Including these
certificates under the BR umbrella is
problematic because the certificates can’t
function in the intended manner and comply
with the BRs. The CN is an identifier for
the equipment, which violates Section 9.2.2
of the BRs.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph"
style="text-indent:-.25in">4)<span
style="font-size:7.0pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">Requiring
an FQDN for inclusion in the BRs is not a
way forward since that would make the
sections on internal server names out of
scope of the BRs. In fact, the identifier in
these certificates is indistinguishable from
and qualifies as an internal name, meaning
the certificate presents all of the concerns
previously expressed by PayPal. Continuing
to trust these certificates would be the
same as not deprecating internal server name
certificates</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph"
style="text-indent:-.25in">5)<span
style="font-size:7.0pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">Therefore,
these certificates must either be included
in the BRs, and include an FQDN, or need to
be issued off of a non-publicly trusted root
certificate. </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif""> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">The
position you expressed is why I wanted to
raise the issue and why I think we need to
resolve what the BRs actually cover. </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif""> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"">Jeremy</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid
#B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
[<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Rijt, R.A. van de
(Robert) - Logius<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, August 01, 2013
3:05 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> 'CABFPub'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Ballot
108: Clarifying the scope of the
baseline requirements</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB">Although I understand the
need for tightening the definition and I
can follow the reasoning below to a
certain point I feel that, instead of
tightening it, the new definition seems to
have broadened the scope. The vast
majority of certificates issued under the
Logius PKIoverheid root are not intended
for the identification of SSL servers.
However, roughly 90% of these certificates
will now fall under this new definition.
In the present version, the scope made
clear that the BR only addressed
certificates meant for servers.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB">What about personal
certificates on a SSCD that have no EKU or
have an anyExtendedKeyUsage as a
safetynet? Would these certificates
suddenly by seen as SSL certificates
although they are obviously not intended
for servers? What about certificates
issued to autonomous devices such as
onboard computers in taxicabs or domestic
gas meters, to name but two? Would these
be considered SSL certificates if they
have no EKU or the clientauth EKU in
combination with anyExtendedKeyUsage? </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif""
lang="EN-GB"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif"">Regards,
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Robert<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
lang="EN"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana","sans-serif";color:#1F497D"
lang="EN"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid
#B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">Van:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
[<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]
<b>Namens </b>Ryan Sleevi<br>
<b>Verzonden:</b> maandag 29 juli 2013
22:57<br>
<b>Aan:</b> Kelvin Yiu<br>
<b>CC:</b> CABFPub<br>
<b>Onderwerp:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Ballot
108: Clarifying the scope of the
baseline requirements</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p>They're still respected (for better or
worse) by Apple, NSS, and Android.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Even if that changed tomorrow, the fact
that a significant portion of the deployed
user base for those products may not upgrade
immediately suggests it would be wise to
keep them in scope - especially given that
even few products implement Microsoft's EKU
chaining behaviour for intermediates.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">On Jul 29, 2013 1:52
PM, "Kelvin Yiu" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:kelviny@exchange.microsoft.com">kelviny@exchange.microsoft.com</a>>
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">I prefer to
drop any mention of the MS or Netscape SGC
OIDs. These OIDs have been obsolete for
over a decade and have ceased to have any
meaning on MS platforms since Windows
2000.<br>
<br>
Kelvin<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>
[mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org">public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi<br>
Sent: Friday, July 26, 2013 12:35 PM<br>
To: jeremy rowley<br>
Cc: CABFPub<br>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 108:
Clarifying the scope of the baseline
requirements<br>
<br>
Jeremy,<br>
<br>
If I might suggest a slight modification
to the wording, which still leaves things
a little ambiguous. "All root and
intermediate certificates included in a
browser's trust store" - AIUI, none of the
browsers are really accepting
intermediates to the trust store at this
point.<br>
<br>
This was a sticky point when working on
Mozilla's wording on this policy to.
Luckily, the terminology for "Root CA" and
"Subordinate CA"<br>
may be sufficient here to help clarify.<br>
<br>
"All root certificates included in a
browser's trust store, all subordinate CA
certificates signed by one of these root
certificates, and all end-entity
certificates that either lack any Extended
Key Usage extension or contain an Extended
Key Usage extension that contains one of
the following:<br>
- Server Authentication
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)<br>
- anyExtendedKeyUsage (2.5.29.37.0)<br>
- Netscape Server Gated Cryptography
(2.16.840.1.113730.4.1)<br>
- Microsoft Server Gated Cryptography
(1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.3) are expressly
covered by these requirements."<br>
<br>
Note that Appendix B, 3.F lists other
values as SHOULD NOT. However, that
presumably only applies when a certificate
is 'in scope' of the BRs, hence the
restatement of potential EKUs that are
relevant.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Fri, Jul 26, 2013 at 12:22 PM, Jeremy
Rowley <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
> Hi everyone,<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> As mentioned on the phone call last
week, CAs have claimed exemption<br>
> from the BRs because the definition
of a publicly-trusted SSL certificate is
not<br>
> clear. I would like to clarify the
scope of the BRs to avoid confusion on<br>
> what particular certificate contents
are necessary to require<br>
> compliance. I am looking for on
endorser (Stephen Davidson has already
endorsed).<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> The third paragraph of Section 1 of
the baseline requirements is:<br>
><br>
> "This version of the Requirements
only addresses Certificates intended<br>
> to be used for authenticating servers
accessible through the<br>
> Internet. Similar requirements for
code signing, S/MIME,<br>
> time-stamping, VoIP, IM, Web
services, etc. may be covered in future
versions."<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> I'd like to replace the above text
with the following:<br>
><br>
> "This version of the Baseline
Requirements addresses all root,<br>
> intermediate, and end entity
certificates that can be used in<br>
> publicly-trusted SSL handshakes. All
root and intermediate<br>
> certificates included in a browser's
trust store and all end entity<br>
> certificates containing an extended
key usage extension of Server<br>
> Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
are expressly covered by these<br>
> requirements. Similar requirements
for code signing, S/MIME,<br>
> time-stamping, VoIP, IM, Web
services, etc. may be covered in future
versions."<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> I look forward to your comments.<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> Jeremy<br>
><br>
><br>
>
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