[cabfpub] Proposal for modified Google SHA-1 deprecation policy
Adriano Santoni - Actalis S.p.A.
adriano.santoni at staff.aruba.it
Fri Aug 29 06:57:13 UTC 2014
Ryan,
apart from the discussion, it would be a good thing if you published
your plan on some Google's web site (like e.g.
http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy)
It would be easier for CAs to show their customers in a more convincing
way what Google is going to do.
In other words, publishing your intent on a web site would have a little
bit more officiality -- that would help CAs.
How about that?
Thank you
Adriano
Il 29/08/2014 04:13, Ryan Sleevi ha scritto:
>
> Hi Kirk,
>
> I feel like I have sufficiently explained our concerns and motivations
> throughout this thread, with both you and other CAs, that it should be
> readily apparent that this neither meets our goals nor helps our users.
>
> I appreciate your thoughtful consideration in writing it.
>
> Best,
> Ryan
>
> On Aug 28, 2014 7:04 PM, "kirk_hall at trendmicro.com
> <mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>" <kirk_hall at trendmicro.com
> <mailto:kirk_hall at trendmicro.com>> wrote:
>
> Ryan and Chris – here is a serious proposal for a modified Google
> SHA-1 policy. It meets all of your stated goals. Please give it
> some consideration.
>
> 1. SHA-1 certs issued on or after [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or
> after January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google upon
> issuance – red slash and nasty click-throughs. (This will stop
> issuance of 2017 SHA-1 certs this fall.)
>
> 2. SHA-1 certs issued before [Nov. 1, 2014] that expire on or
> after January 1, 2017 get a double whammy bad UI in Google
> starting [March 1, 2015] – red slash only and nasty
> click-throughs. (This will force existing websites with 2017
> SHA-1 certs to change them within the next six months).
>
> Result: All 2017 SHA-1 certs will be gone by next March 2015 –
> which certainly meets your goals. Customers with existing 2017
> certs can get through this holiday season, CAs can get the message
> out.
>
> Advantages:
>
> 1. CAs that have never issued 2017 certs, and never will (like
> Trend Micro) and their customers are not affected – that’s
> appropriate, as we have never been a part of this problem.
>
> 2. CAs that have issued three year SHA-1 certs expiring in 2017
> will stop by this fall.
>
> 3. CAs that have issued 2017 certs in the past (and their
> customers) will be affected, but will have six months to adjust.
> That will be a much smaller number of customers affected than if
> those with 2016 certs are forced to change their certs twice (in
> 2014 and again in 2015).
>
> 4. All SHA-1 certs will likely be gone by next spring.
>
> I don’t think Google should spend much time worrying about how CAs
> communicate with their customers about the need to move to SHA-256
> before 2017 – that’s for us to worry about, and we are all
> strongly incentivized to get the message out (selling a 2017 cert
> that doesn’t work creates legal problems, and none of us wants to
> be dealing with angry SHA-1 customers in late 2016 who have to
> switch to SHA-256). We may also be able to get behind Google’s
> policy if it is revised – something that isn’t the case today.
>
> You mentioned somewhere that you worried that simply deprecating
> SHA-1 certs as of 2017 could create a big customer service burden
> on Google as of late 2016 or early 2017. I don’t think that’s the
> case with this new proposed policy, as all the negative UI effects
> will happen in 2014-15. Plus, I predict Google will be deluged
> with customer service complaints under your current policy, when
> thousands of websites start showing as “untrusted” in the next
> 6-12 weeks. Why not make life easier for Google with a revised
> policy?
>
> So what do you think? Can we make a change to the policy that is
> focused on the real problem (2017 certs)?
>
> Thanks for your consideration.
>
> */Kirk R. Hall/*
>
> Operations Director, Trust Services
>
> Trend Micro
>
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