<div dir="ltr">
<div>Also, in working on this, I recalled that Daymion when he was at
Google had requested that we define the scope of the requirements.</div><div>Excerpted below:<br></div><div><br></div><div>
<p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" id="gmail-m_2512273482120699101gmail-docs-internal-guid-ca080c0f-7fff-dd5f-ae47-e85026593b82"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Add below section to the “Scope and Applicability” to define scope of PKI Trusted Environment and to read as follows:</span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> </span></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">The network security requirements apply to all system components included in or connected to the publicly trusted certificate authority (CA) environment. The CA environment is comprised of people, processes and technologies that store, process, or transmit CA data. “System components” include network devices, servers, hardware security modules (HSM), computing devices, and applications residing within the CA environment. Examples of system components include, but are not limited to the following:</span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">a. Systems that provide security services (for example, authentication servers), facilitate segmentation (for example, internal firewalls), or may impact the security of (for example, name resolution or web redirection servers).</span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">b. Virtualization components such as virtual machines, virtual switches/routers, virtual appliances, virtual applications/desktops, and hypervisors.</span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">c. Network components including but not limited to firewalls, switches, routers, network appliances, IPMI remote management cards, HSM and other security appliances.</span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">d. Server types including but not limited to web, application, database, authentication, mail, proxy, Network Time Protocol (NTP), and Domain Name System (DNS).</span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">e. Applications including all purchased and custom applications.</span></p><br><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">f. Any other component or device located within the CA environment.</span></p></div>
</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 1:01 PM Ben Wilson <<a href="mailto:bwilson@mozilla.com">bwilson@mozilla.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">I'll work on a re-draft, hopefully this afternoon, and re-circulate it.<br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:53 PM Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:Bruce.Morton@entrustdatacard.com" target="_blank">Bruce.Morton@entrustdatacard.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div lang="EN-US">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">I would assume that if we did not amend the BRs, then it would look like the security requirements were being reduced. So yes, I think that the BRs should be changed at the same time.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Bruce.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Ben Wilson <<a href="mailto:bwilson@mozilla.com" target="_blank">bwilson@mozilla.com</a>> <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 28, 2020 2:45 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:Bruce.Morton@entrustdatacard.com" target="_blank">Bruce.Morton@entrustdatacard.com</a>><br>
<b>Cc:</b> Neil Dunbar <<a href="mailto:ndunbar@trustcorsystems.com" target="_blank">ndunbar@trustcorsystems.com</a>>; CABF Network Security List <<a href="mailto:netsec@cabforum.org" target="_blank">netsec@cabforum.org</a>><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabf_netsec] "Zones" Ballot Endorsers<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">I'm open to discussion on this. Would we want to amend section 5.1 of the BRs with the same ballot?<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:33 PM Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:Bruce.Morton@entrustdatacard.com" target="_blank">Bruce.Morton@entrustdatacard.com</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentcolor rgb(204,204,204);border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium medium medium 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
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<p class="MsoNormal">Hi Ben,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thanks for all the work on this ballot. I am wondering if we should try to remove physical security and physical access requirements from the NetSec document. Physical Security
requirements could be put into BR 5.1 in a section called Physical Security Controls.
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For instance, item 1.c. states “Maintain Root CA Systems in a Physically Secure Environment and in an offline state or air-gapped from all other networks.” This could be changed
so that 1.c. states “Maintain Root CA Systems in an offline state or air-gapped from all other networks” and BR 5.1 could state “Maintain CA Systems in a physically secure environment.”<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It also seems that now that the old zone definitions have been combined and now Physically Secure Environment now covers both physical and logical environments. If we eliminate
physical security, then we could just address logical security which could be better applied to the NetSec document.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In a future ballot, we might want to push some of the Trusted Role requirements into BR 5.2.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thanks, Bruce.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div style="border-style:solid none none;border-width:1pt medium medium;padding:3pt 0in 0in;border-color:currentcolor">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Netsec <<a href="mailto:netsec-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">netsec-bounces@cabforum.org</a>>
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Neil Dunbar via Netsec<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, May 26, 2020 7:42 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:netsec@cabforum.org" target="_blank">netsec@cabforum.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabf_netsec] "Zones" Ballot Endorsers<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><strong><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:red">WARNING:</span></strong> This email originated outside of Entrust Datacard.<br>
<strong><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:red">DO NOT CLICK</span></strong> links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:center" align="center">
<hr width="100%" size="2" align="center">
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<p>I'm happy to endorse, Ben. Trev and David also said they would be good to endorse the ballot.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Neil<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">On 13/05/2020 20:58, Ben Wilson via Netsec wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
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<blockquote style="margin-top:5pt;margin-bottom:5pt">
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">I can't remember whether there were people who volunteered to be endorsers of the "Zones" ballot.
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">See below:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Ballot and Explanation -
<a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Xlbg-0Hg1A3Px1Gj8XCQFSal5V_84hBjtVwohbXqiqM/edit?usp=sharing" target="_blank">
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Xlbg-0Hg1A3Px1Gj8XCQFSal5V_84hBjtVwohbXqiqM/edit?usp=sharing</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Redlined version of NCSSRs -
<a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n6LPNN0WJY9Cdw5qOl2-fFzQxBiZtw-q/view?usp=sharing" target="_blank">
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n6LPNN0WJY9Cdw5qOl2-fFzQxBiZtw-q/view?usp=sharing</a><u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12pt"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<pre>_______________________________________________<u></u><u></u></pre>
<pre>Netsec mailing list<u></u><u></u></pre>
<pre><a href="mailto:Netsec@cabforum.org" target="_blank">Netsec@cabforum.org</a><u></u><u></u></pre>
<pre><a href="http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/netsec" target="_blank">http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/netsec</a><u></u><u></u></pre>
</blockquote>
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</blockquote>
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</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>