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--></style></head><body lang=en-SE link="#467886" vlink=purple style='word-wrap:break-word'><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Hi Ian,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><br>I like that proposal. Perhaps a minor nit is that I’d suggest we replace “new” with “newly issued Subordinate CA certificates after that date with a validity…”.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>I’ll leave this open for discussion a few more days, and restart the discussion period sometime next week, unless there is further feedback.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Regards,<br><br>Martijn<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div id=mail-editor-reference-message-container><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>Ian McMillan <ianmcm@microsoft.com><br><b>Date: </b>Thursday, 4 April 2024 at 19:54<br><b>To: </b>Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerbarg@sectigo.com>, cscwg-public@cabforum.org <cscwg-public@cabforum.org>, Mohit Kumar <mohit.kumar@globalsign.com><br><b>Subject: </b>RE: [Cscwg-public] Timestamp Certificate and SubCA updates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div style='border:solid black 1.0pt;padding:2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:12.0pt;background:#FAFA03'><span lang=EN-US style='font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'>CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Hi Martijn and all,</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Thinking more about this requirement and the way folks are operating today and I can see with this requirement CA may be constrained when they encounter a need for greater agility to scale out. I’d like to propose a means to keep issuing CAs for time stamping end-entity certificates online when they are shorter-lived certificates (less than 72 months in validity). I agree that we need wording to say existing CAs are not required to adhere to these clarified requirements, but all new subCAs must meet the requirements. Here is my proposal…</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>“‘Effective April 15, 2025, a Timestamp Authority MUST protect all Private Keys associated with its Root CA certificates and <span style='color:red'>new</span> Subordinate CA certificates <span style='color:red'>with a validity period of greater than 72 months</span> containing the `id-kp-timeStamping` KeyPurposeId in the `extKeyUsage` extension (per section 7.1.2.2 g) and that issued Timestamp Certificates with the policyidentifier 2.23.140.1.4.2, in a Hardware Crypto Module conforming to the requirements specified in [Section 6.2.7.1](#6271-private-key-storage-for-CA-keys), maintained in a High Security Zone and in an offline state or air-gapped from all other networks.’</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>What my intent for this to mean is that all new subCAs issuing time stamp certificates will fall into two buckets….</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><ul style='margin-top:0cm' type=disc><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>SubCA Certificate validity greater than 72 months MUST/SHALL be secured offline</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></li><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>SubCA Certificate validity less than 72 months MAY be secured online (or ‘SHOULD be secured offline’)</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></li></ul><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>This is similar to a policy we’ve operated under internally with the risk of online issuing CAs where we need greater agility to scale out as the business needs for certificate issuance/fulfillment have higher volumes and latency requirements that offline CAs just cannot effectively meet. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Thanks,<br>Ian </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, April 4, 2024 6:07 AM<br><b>To:</b> Mohit Kumar <mohit.kumar@globalsign.com>; cscwg-public@cabforum.org<br><b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] Timestamp Certificate and SubCA updates</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Hi Mohit,</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>></span><span lang=EN-US> </span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Can I confirm that the proposal to protect private keys of Subordinate CAs in an offline state is applicable to only private keys generated for Roots/Subordinate CAs created after the effective date.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>You’re touching on a good point here. The way the requirement is written, can be interpreted as such that the CA would need to do this for existing SubCAs as well. I’m leaving out Root CAs here, since these even now, already are required to be in an offline state.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>But, making this a requirement for existing SubCAs may be an issue… while CAs may be able to migrate keys to an offline HSM, that’s not always a given. If that’s not an option, then key destruction would also not be an option, cause even if the CA wouldn’t use the SubCA is issue new timestamp certificates anymore, they would still need use the key for signing CRLs. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>I think it makes sense to make the requirement to be for any SubCA still used for the issuance of timestamp certificates going forward. If there’s no objection to that approach, I can update the ballot. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'><br>(I won’t be able to make todays call, but please feel free to discuss and let me know the outcome)</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>></span><span lang=EN-US> </span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Also, per my understanding, the scope of the proposal is limited to only Root/Subordinate CAs issuing Timestamp Certificates for Code Signing (i.e. with the OID 2.23.140.1.4.2). If yes, may be it would be better to clarify the same with the following language update</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Correct. I would expect Section 1.2 already makes clear that only TS certificates with this OID, assert compliance with the CSBRs. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>As far from a root store standpoint, it seems the the MS Root store policy requires the Policy OID to be included for TLS and Non-EV code signing, but there is no mentioning there about Timestamping certificates specifically.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Regards,<br><br>Martijn</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div id=mail-editor-reference-message-container><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>Mohit Kumar <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:mohit.kumar@globalsign.com"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>mohit.kumar@globalsign.com</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>><br><b>Date: </b>Thursday, 4 April 2024 at 04:19<br><b>To: </b>Martijn Katerbarg <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:martijn.katerbarg@sectigo.com"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>martijn.katerbarg@sectigo.com</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>>, </span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'> <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>><br><b>Subject: </b>RE: [Cscwg-public] Timestamp Certificate and SubCA updates</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US>Hi Martijn,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US>Can I confirm that the proposal to protect private keys of Subordinate CAs in an offline state is applicable to only private keys generated for Roots/Subordinate CAs created after the effective date.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US>Also, per my understanding, the scope of the proposal is limited to only Root/Subordinate CAs issuing Timestamp Certificates for Code Signing (i.e. with the OID 2.23.140.1.4.2). If yes, may be it would be better to clarify the same with the following language update<o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US>‘Effective April 15, 2025, a Timestamp Authority MUST protect Private Keys associated with its Root CA certificates and Subordinate CA certificates containing the `id-kp-timeStamping` KeyPurposeId in the `extKeyUsage` extension (per section 7.1.2.2 g) and that issued Timestamp Certificates with the policyidentifier 2.23.140.1.4.2<span style='color:#CD5937'>, </span>in a Hardware Crypto Module conforming to the requirements specified in [Section 6.2.7.1](#6271-private-key-storage-for-CA-keys), maintained in a High Security Zone and in an offline state or air-gapped from all other networks.’<o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US>Thanks <o:p></o:p></span></p><p style='mso-margin-top-alt:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:30.0pt'><span lang=EN-US>Mohit<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> Cscwg-public <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 19, 2024 5:04 AM<br><b>To:</b> </span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr"><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>dzacharo@harica.gr</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cscwg-public] Timestamp Certificate and SubCA updates</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>The language (</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F34&data=05%7C02%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C6b3466de38b944c4e95508dc54d04b7f%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638478500818433702%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=bvH%2B3sXZ2FajBydG%2BKx%2FPq2IGaDyaMUBjpE%2FI5tOw3A%3D&reserved=0"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/34</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> ) has been further updated (</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F34%2Fcommits%2F9288f7ec376b4bbd139dcb596bcb2d1bf9bd7683&data=05%7C02%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C6b3466de38b944c4e95508dc54d04b7f%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638478500818443934%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=gijk9MMkc%2FBgJ1ixouYmXL%2B6ELmREaVwDy%2BlvODTNb0%3D&reserved=0"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/34/commits/9288f7ec376b4bbd139dcb596bcb2d1bf9bd7683</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>) based on the below. </span><span lang=EN-US><a id=OWAAM1110A1362D438B4BADD95FD51E9651CD href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr"><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif;text-decoration:none'>@Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> I replaced “deleted” with “destroyed” in your proposal, as I believe it would fit better in that section.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Are there any further comments? If not I will start the official discussion period in the next few days.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Regards,<br><br>Martijn</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div id=mail-editor-reference-message-container><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>Cscwg-public <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>> on behalf of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>><br><b>Date: </b>Monday, 11 March 2024 at 09:51<br><b>To: </b>Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>dzacharo@harica.gr</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>>, </span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'> <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>><br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [Cscwg-public] Timestamp Certificate and SubCA updates</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div style='border:solid black 1.0pt;padding:2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:12.0pt;background:#FAFA03'><span lang=EN-US style='font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'>CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Works for me on both fronts. I’ll leave the discussion open for a bit so others can add on.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div id=mail-editor-reference-message-container><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>dzacharo@harica.gr</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>><br><b>Date: </b>Monday, 11 March 2024 at 09:48<br><b>To: </b>Martijn Katerbarg <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:martijn.katerbarg@sectigo.com"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>martijn.katerbarg@sectigo.com</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>>, </span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'> <</span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>><br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [Cscwg-public] Timestamp Certificate and SubCA updates</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div style='border:solid black 1.0pt;padding:2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:12.0pt;background:#FAFA03'><span lang=EN-US style='font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'>CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>On 11/3/2024 10:32 π.μ., Martijn Katerbarg wrote:</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Thanks Dimitris, I’ve reviewed and accepted the suggestions. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>> witnessed by members of two different Trusted Roles (not by two Trusted Role Members, i.e. you can't use two persons of the same Trusted Role).</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>TBH, I’m not sure why it couldn’t be two persons of the same Trusted Role?</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></blockquote><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'><br>I'm not a native English speaker but I think "Roles" (plural) points to the different types of Roles, while "Trusted Role members" would point to different Members in any Trusted Role. If the intent is to have a 4-eye principle control from any Trusted Role, we can make it clearer by using the "Trusted Role members" phrase.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>> In general, a "key destruction" ceremony includes the deletion of all copies of the key, including copies that reside in backups. If we require a "key destruction" ceremony, the "restore key" case is nonsensical. We probably need to work on this some more so that we all have the same understanding and expectations.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>> It's ok to keep the keys in backups but if you happen to restore them in an HSM, you must not use them to sign anything. If a CA/TSA can also "destroy" the key, meaning that all copies of that private key can be unequivocally/securely deleted (i.e. without a way to recover the key), including any instance of the key as part of a backup, the better!</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Agreed in general regarding the Key Destruction ceremony. However having to also destroy the backup of the key, and do this again for any next key every 18 months, can be a lengthy procedure, specially if backups are stored securely and offline in different places around the world. That’s why for this case we specifically call out that backups don’t need to be destroyed. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>But your point on an HSM restoring an entire partition and that violating the requirement, is valid. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>For reference, the current proposed language is:</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>The CA MAY maintain existing backup sets containing the Private Key corresponding to a Timestamp Certificate. The CA MUST NOT restore the Private Key corresponding to a Timestamp Certificate contained within the backup if the Timestamp Certificate was issued more than 15 months prior to restoration of the backup.</span></i><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span></i><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>What about we once more use the NSR language and state:</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>The CA MAY maintain existing backup sets containing the Private Key corresponding to a Timestamp Certificate. The CA SHOULD NOT restore the Private Key corresponding to a Timestamp Certificate contained within the backup if the Timestamp Certificate was issued more than 15 months prior to restoration of the backup. If the CA does restore such a Private Key, the CA SHALL only restore the Private Key in a suitable HSM while it’s maintained in a High Security Zone and in an offline state or air-gapped from all other networks and perform a new key destruction ceremony prior to the HSM being brought to an online state.</span></i><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span></i><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Thoughts? </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></blockquote><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'><br>If we want to allow the existence of a key in a backup, IMHO we should avoid using the "key destruction" language. How about the following:<br><br>Modify</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal><i><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'>For Timestamp Certificates issued on or after June 1, 2024, the CA SHALL log the removal of the Private Key from the Hardware Crypto Module through means of a key destruction ceremony performed by the CA and witnessed and signed-off by at least two Trusted Roles.</span></i><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'><br>to</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal><i><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'>For Timestamp Certificates issued on or after June 1, 2024, the CA SHALL log the removal of the Private Key from the Hardware Crypto Module through means of a key <span style='color:blue'>deletion </span>ceremony performed by the CA and witnessed and signed-off by at least two <span style='color:blue'>Trusted Role members</span>. <span style='color:blue'>The CA MAY also perform a key destruction ceremony, </span></span></i><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt;color:blue'>meaning that all copies of that private key are unequivocally/securely deleted (i.e. without a way to recover the key), including any instance of the key as part of a backup, to satisfy this requirement</span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'>.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'><br>Thanks,<br>Dimitris.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=MsoNormal><i><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span></i><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>As a side-note, I wonder if there’s a task for the NSWG (or Definitions WG once it’s setup) to define terms for online and offline HSMs</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div id=mail-editor-reference-message-container><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>Cscwg-public </span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'><cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org></span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'> on behalf of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public </span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'><cscwg-public@cabforum.org></span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'><br><b>Date: </b>Sunday, 10 March 2024 at 10:30<br><b>To: </b></span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>cscwg-public@cabforum.org</span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'> </span><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'><cscwg-public@cabforum.org></span></a></span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt;color:black'><br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [Cscwg-public] Timestamp Certificate and SubCA updates</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div style='border:solid black 1.0pt;padding:2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:12.0pt;background:#FAFA03'><span lang=EN-US style='font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:black'>CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Hi Martijn,<br><br>Two suggestions submitted on GitHub.<br><br>Regarding the prohibition of restoring a private key of a Timestamp Certificate, I'm not sure how universal this can be because some HSMs restore an entire slot/partition, which might contain Private Keys associated with obsolete Timestamp Certificates. As the ballot is written, such an action would be a violation.<br><br>In general, a "key destruction" ceremony includes the deletion of all copies of the key, including copies that reside in backups. If we require a "key destruction" ceremony, the "restore key" case is nonsensical. We probably need to work on this some more so that we all have the same understanding and expectations.<br><br>Let me restate the intent of this requirement as discussed all this time, and please correct me if I'm wrong.<br><br>IMO, the goal is to put the keys associated with Timestamp Certificates out of use, 15 months after the <i>notBefore </i>of the Timestamp Certificate. <br><br>In order to achieve some level of assurance for this action, the proposal is to delete the keys from the HSM 18 months after the <i>notBefore </i>of the Timestamp Certificate, in an audited way, witnessed by members of two different Trusted Roles (not by two Trusted Role Members, i.e. you can't use two persons of the same Trusted Role). <br><br>It's ok to keep the keys in backups but if you happen to restore them in an HSM, you must not use them to sign anything. If a CA/TSA can also "destroy" the key, meaning that all copies of that private key can be unequivocally/securely deleted (i.e. without a way to recover the key), including any instance of the key as part of a backup, the better!<br><br>Thoughts?<br><br>Dimitris.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>On 6/3/2024 2:07 μ.μ., Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public wrote:</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>All,</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>As discussed last week, I’d send out the draft language for this ballot once more before starting the discussion period. The latest version can be found in </span><span lang=EN-US><a href="https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F34&data=05%7C02%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C6b3466de38b944c4e95508dc54d04b7f%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638478500818451355%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=xFI1fEshQ6bVGbv7Fkhiq50yu3aQVtlnHsItYzjbHnc%3D&reserved=0"><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/34</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>I’ve made changes this morning to add 3 effective dates, these are:</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>For the removal of private keys associated with timestamp certificates, effective June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2024, CAs will need to properly log the removal of said key. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></li></ol><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l5 level2 lfo3'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>While I expect CAs to already properly log this for audit purposes even now, there may be exceptions for when this has not been done, for example a private key or timestamp certificate that was signed maybe 20 years ago. This language is added to avoid any confusion on from what point there needs to be an audit trail</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></li></ol></ol><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo4'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Effective April 15, 2025, private keys associated with SubCAs containing the “Time Stamping” EKU will need to be placed in offline HSMs.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></li></ol><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l4 level2 lfo5'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>I believe a roughly one year effective date is appropriate here, since CAs may need to move keys from one HSM to another.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></li></ol></ol><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l6 level1 lfo6'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>For private keys associated with timestamp certificates that were issued for greater than 15 months, CAs will need to remove the private keys 18 months after certificate issuance, starting April 15, 2025.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></li></ol><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><ol style='margin-top:0cm' start=1 type=1><li class=MsoListParagraph style='margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l3 level2 lfo7'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Likewise, I feel like anything involving HSM process changes, should have a longer effective date, and it makes sense to align this with the effective date above.</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></li></ol></ol><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>I’ll start a ballot on this early next week, unless there is concern with the above. </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'>Regards,<br><br>Martijn</span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:11.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p><pre><span lang=EN-US>_______________________________________________<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span lang=EN-US>Cscwg-public mailing list<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span lang=EN-US><a href="mailto:Cscwg-public@cabforum.org">Cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a><o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span lang=EN-US><a href="https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.cabforum.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fcscwg-public&data=05%7C02%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C6b3466de38b944c4e95508dc54d04b7f%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638478500818457689%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=auRwiJgcdQwhLAicHeqXhVIawOMAwJkM6odGMr%2BRYOY%3D&reserved=0">https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/cscwg-public</a><o:p></o:p></span></pre></blockquote><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></div></blockquote><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'> </span><span lang=EN-US><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>