| **title** | **subtitle** | **author** | **date** | **copyright** |
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| Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates | Version 3.X.0 |

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| CA/Browser Forum |

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**1. INTRODUCTION**

**1.1 Overview**

The Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted CodeSigning Certificates describe a subset of the requirements that a Certification Authority must meet to issue Code Signing Certificates.

The scope of these Requirements includes all "Code Signing Certificates", as defined below, and associated Timestamp Authorities, and all Certification Authorities technically capable of issuing Code Signing Certificates, including any Root CA that is publicly trusted for code signing and all other CAs that might serve to complete the validation path to such Root CA. These Requirements do not address the issuance, use, maintenance, or revocation of Certificates by enterprises that operate their own Public Key Infrastructure for internal purposes only, where the Root CA Certificate is not distributed by any Application Software Supplier (as defined in the Baseline Requirements).

The primary goal of these Requirements is to enable trusted signing of code intended for public distribution, while addressing user concerns about the trustworthiness of signed objects and accurately identifying the software publisher. The Requirements also serve to inform users about the purpose of signed code, help users make informed decisions when relying on Certificates, help establish the legitimacy of signed code, help maintain the trustworthiness of software Platforms, help users make informed software choices, and limit the spread of malware. Code Signing Certificates do not identify a particular software object, identifying only the publisher of software.

**1.2 Document name and identification**

The following Certificate Policy Identifier is reserved for use by CAs as a required means of asserting compliance with these Requirements for Non-EV Code Signing Certificates:

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140) certificate-policies(1) code-signing-requirements(4) code signing(1)} (2.23.140.1.4.1).

The following Certificate Policy Identifier is reserved for use by CAs as a required means of asserting compliance with these Requirements for EV Code Signing Certificates follows:

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140) certificate-policies(1) code-signing-requirements(3)}(2.23.140.1.3).

The following Certificate Policy Identifier is reserved for use by CAs as a required means of asserting compliance with these Requirements for Timestamp Certificates:

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140) certificate-policies(1) code-signing-requirements(4) timestamping(2)} (2.23.140.1.4.2).

**1.2.1 Revisions**

| **Ver.** | **Ballot** | **Description** | **Effective** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1.2 | CSC-1 | Adopt Baseline Requirements version 1.2 | 13 Aug 2019 |
| 2.0 | CSC-2 | Adopt combined EV and BR Code Signing Document | 2 Sept 2020 |
| 2.1 | CSC-4 | Move deadline for transition to RSA-3072 and SHA-2 timestamp tokens | 7 Nov 2020 |
| 2.2 | CSC-7 | Update to merge EV and non-EV clauses | 8 March 2021 |
| 2.3 | CSC-8 | Update to Revocation response mechanisms. key protection for EV certificates, and clean-up of 11.2.1 & Appendix B | 2 May 2021 |
| 2.4 | CSC-9 | Spring 2021 Clean-up and Clarification | 8 September 2021 |
| 2.5 | CSC-10 | WebTrust CSBR v2.0 Audit Criteria | 12 September 2021 |
| 2.6 | CSC-11 | Update to log data retention requirements | 3 November 2021 |
| 2.7 | CSC-12 | CRL Revocation Date Clarification | 3 December 2021 |
| 2.8 | CSC-13 | Update to Subscriber Key Protection Requirements | 6 May 2022 |
| 3.0 | CSC-14 | Convert Code Signing Baseline Requirements to RFC 3647 Framework | 29 June 2022 |
| 3.1 | CSC-15 | Summer 2022 Clean-up | 19 September 2022 |
| 3.2 | CSC-17 | Subscriber Private Key Protection Extension | 28 October 2022 |
| 3.3 | CSC-18 | Update Revocation Requirements | 29 June 2023 |
| 3.X | CSC-XX | Remove SSL BR References | XX August 2023 |

**1.2.2 Relevant Dates**

| **Compliance** | **Section(s)** | **Summary Description (See Full Text for Details)** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2021-06-01 | 6.1.5 | CAs SHALL support minimum RSA-3072 for Code Signing Certificates, Root Certificates and Subordinate CA Certificates. CAs SHALL NOT support SHA-1 digest algorithm for Code Signing Certificates. |
| 2021-06-01 | 5.3 | After 2021-06-01, the CA shall meet the requirements of EV Guidelines Section 14.1 for Non-EV and EV Code Signing Certificates. |
| 2021-06-01 | 6.2.7.4 | For EV Code Signing Certificates, Signing Services shall protect private keys in a FIPS 140-2 level 2 (or equivalent) crypto module. After 2021-06-01, the same protection requirements SHALL apply to Non EV Code Signing Certificates. |
| 2021-11-01 | 3.2.2.1 (5) | The method used to verify the identity of the Certificate Requester SHALL be per section 3.2.3. |
| 2022-03-31 | 7.1.6.3 | Subordinate CA Certificates issued for Subordinate CA that issues Timestamp Certificates and is an Affiliate of the Issuing CA must include the reserved identifier specified in Section 7.1.6.1. |
| 2022-04-30 | 7.1.3.2.1 | CAs SHALL NOT support SHA-1 digest algorithm for Timestamp tokens. |
| 2022-07-01 | 7.2.2 | For Code Signing Certificates, the time encoded in the Invalidity Date CRL entry extension MUST be equal to the time encoded in the revocationDate field of the CRL entry. |
| 2023-06-01 | 6.2.7.4.2 | Effective June 1, 2023, for Code Signing Certificates, CAs SHALL ensure that the Subscriber’s Private Key is generated, stored, and used in a suitable Hardware Crypto Module that meets or exceeds the requirements specified in section 6.2.7.4.1 (7-9). |
| 2023-06-01 | 6.2.7.4.2 | Effective June 1, 2023, for Code Signing Certificates, CAs SHALL ensure that the Subscriber’s Private Key is generated, stored, and used in a suitable Hardware Crypto Module that meets or exceeds the requirements specified in section 6.2.7.4.1 using one of the methods in 6.2.7.4.2. |
| 2023-06-01 | 6.2.7.4.2 | Any other method the CA uses to satisfy the Subscriber’s compliance with the private key protection requirements. The CA SHALL specify and describe in detail those other methods in its Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement, and SHALL propose those methods to the CA/Browser Forum Code Signing Working Group for inclusion into these requirements until June 1, 2023, using the questions@cabforum.org mailing list. After that date, the Code Signing Working Group will discuss the removal of this "any other method" and allow only CA/Browser Forum approved methods. |
| 2024-04-15 | 4.9.1 | This ballot updates the "Circumstances for revocation" in order to align it with the TLS and S/MIME BRs and set stricter requirements for revocation due to Private Key Compromise and use in Suspect Code. |

**1.3 PKI participants**

**1.3.1 Certification authorities**

**1.3.2 Registration authorities**

Except as stated in [Section 8](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#8-compliance-audit-and-other-assessments) (5), the CA MAY delegate the performance of all, or any part, of these Requirements to a Delegated Third Party, provided that the process as a whole fulfills all of the requirements of this document.

Before the CA authorizes a Delegated Third Party to perform a delegated function, the CA MUST contractually require the Delegated Third Party to:

1. Meet the qualification requirements of [Section 5.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#53-personnel-controls) when applicable to the delegated function,
2. Retain documentation in accordance with [Section 5.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#541-types-of-events-recorded),
3. Abide by the other provisions of these Requirements that are applicable to the delegated function, and
4. Comply with (a) the CA's Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement or (b) the Delegated Third Party's practice statement that the CA has verified complies with these Requirements.

The CA MUST verify that the Signing Service and any other Delegated Third Party's personnel involved in the issuance of a Certificate meet the training and skills requirements of [Section 5.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#53-personnel-controls) of this document and the document retention and event logging requirements of [Section 5.4](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#54-audit-logging-procedures) of this document.

If a Delegated Third Party fulfills any of the CA's obligations under [Section 4.2.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#421-performing-identification-and-authentication-functions) of this document, the CA MUST verify that the process used by the Delegated Third Party to identify and further verify High Risk Certificate Requests provides at least the same level of assurance as the CA's own processes.

**1.3.3 Subscribers**

**1.3.4 Relying parties**

**1.3.5 Other participants**

**1.4 Certificate usage**

**1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses**

The primary goal of these Requirements is to enable the secure distribution of signed Code, while addressing user concerns about the trustworthiness of Certificates. These Requirements also serve to inform users and help them to make informed decisions when relying on Certificates.

**1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses**

No stipulation.

**1.5 Policy administration**

The Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates present criteria established by the CA/Browser Forum for use by Certification Authorities when issuing, maintaining, and revoking publicly-trusted Code Signing Certificates. This document may be revised from time to time, as appropriate, in accordance with procedures adopted by the CA/Browser Forum. Because one of the primary beneficiaries of this document is the end user, the Forum openly invites anyone to make recommendations and suggestions by email to the CA/Browser Forum at questions@cabforum.org. The Forum members value all input, regardless of source, and will seriously consider all such input.

**1.5.1 Organization administering the document**

No stipulation.

**1.5.2 Contact person**

Contact information for the CA/Browser Forum is available here: <https://cabforum.org/leadership/>. In this section of a CA's CPS, the CA SHALL provide a link to a web page or an email address for contacting the person or persons responsible for operation of the CA.

**1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy**

No stipulation.

**1.5.4 CPS approval procedures**

No stipulation.

**1.6 Definitions and acronyms**

The Definitions found in the CA/Browser Forum's Network and Certificate System Security Requirements are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

**1.6.1 Definitions**

Capitalized Terms are as defined below and in the EV SSL Guidelines:

**Affiliate**: A corporation, partnership, joint venture or other entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with another entity, or an agency, department, political subdivision, or any entity operating under the direct control of a Government Entity.

**Applicant**: The natural person or Legal Entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate issues, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber. For Certificates issued to devices, the Applicant is the entity that controls or operates the device named in the Certificate, even if the device is sending the actual certificate request.

**Applicant Representative**: A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant:

1. who signs and submits, or approves a certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or
2. who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or
3. who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

**Anti-Malware Organization:** An entity that maintains information about Suspect Code and/or develops software used to prevent, detect, or remove malware.

**Application Software Supplier**: A supplier of software or other relying-party application software that displays or uses Code Signing Certificates, incorporates Root Certificates, and adopts these Requirements as all or part of its requirements for participation in a root store program.

**Attestation Letter**: A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct written by an accountant, lawyer, government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information.

**Audit Period**: In a period-of-time audit, the period between the first day (start) and the last day of operations (end) covered by the auditors in their engagement. (This is not the same as the period of time when the auditors are on-site at the CA.) The coverage rules and maximum length of audit periods are defined in [Section 8.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#81-frequency-or-circumstances-of-assessment).

**Audit Report**: A report from a Qualified Auditor stating the Qualified Auditor's opinion on whether an entity's processes and controls comply with the mandatory provisions of these Requirements.

**Baseline Requirements:** The Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates as published by the CA/Browser Forum.

**CA Key Pair**: A Key Pair where the Public Key appears as the Subject Public Key Info in one or more Root CA Certificate(s) and/or Subordinate CA Certificate(s).

**Certificate**: An electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key and an identity.

**Certificate Data**: Certificate requests and data related thereto (whether obtained from the Applicant or otherwise) in the CA's possession or control or to which the CA has access.

**Certificate Management Process**: Processes, practices, and procedures associated with the use of keys, software, and hardware, by which the CA verifies Certificate Data, issues Certificates, maintains a Repository, and revokes Certificates.

**Certificate Beneficiaries**: All Application Software Suppliers with whom the CA or its Root CA has entered into a contract for distribution of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Suppliers and all Relying Parties who reasonably rely on such a Certificate while a Code Signature associated with the Certificate is valid.

**Certificate Policy**: A set of rules that indicates the applicability of a named Certificate to a particular community and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.

**Certificate Policy Identifier:** As described in [Section 7.1.6](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#716-certificate-policy-object-identifier)

**Certificate Problem Report**: Complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates.

**Certificate Profile**: A set of documents or files that defines requirements for Certificate content and Certificate extensions in accordance with [Section 7](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7-certificate-crl-and-ocsp-profiles). e.g. a Section in a CA’s CPS or a certificate template file used by CA software.

**Certificate Revocation List**: A regularly updated time-stamped list of revoked Certificates that is created and digitally signed by the CA that issued the Certificates.

**Certification Authority:** An organization subject to these Requirements that is responsible for a Code Signing Certificate and, under these Requirements, oversees the creation, issuance, revocation, and management of Code Signing Certificates. Where the CA is also the Root CA, references to the CA are synonymous with Root CA.

**Certification Practice Statement**: One of several documents forming the governance framework in which Certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.

**Certificate Requester:** A natural person who is the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant, or the employee or agent of a third party (such as software publisher) who completes and submits a Certificate Request on behalf of the Applicant.

**Code**: A contiguous set of bits that has been or can be digitally signed with a Private Key that corresponds to a Code Signing Certificate.

**Code Signature:** A Signature logically associated with a signed Code.

**Code Signing Certificate:** A digital certificate issued by a CA that contains a Code Signing EKU.

**Control**: "Control" (and its correlative meanings, "controlled by" and "under common control with") means possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to: (1) direct the management, personnel, finances, or plans of such entity; (2) control the election of a majority of the directors ; or (3) vote that portion of voting shares required for "control" under the law of the entity's Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration but in no case less than 10%.

**Country**: Either a member of the United Nations OR a geographic region recognized as a Sovereign State by at least two UN member nations.

**Cross Certificate**: A certificate that is used to establish a trust relationship between two Root CAs.

**CSPRNG**: A random number generator intended for use in cryptographic system.

**Delegated Third Party**: A natural person or Legal Entity that is not the CA but is authorized by the CA, and whose activities are not within the scope of the appropriate CA audits, to assist in the Certificate Management Process by performing or fulfilling one or more of the CA requirements found herein.

**Declaration of Identity**: A written document that consists of the following:

1. the identity of the person performing the verification,
2. a signature of the Applicant,
3. a unique identifying number from an identification document of the Applicant,
4. the date of the verification, and
5. a signature of the Verifying Person.

**EV Code Signing Certificate:** A Code Signing Certificate validated and issued in accordance the EV Code Signing requirements.

**EV Guidelines:** The CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates.

**Government Entity**: A government-operated legal entity, agency, department, ministry, branch, or similar element of the government of a country, or political subdivision within such country (such as a state, province, city, county, etc.).

**Hardware Crypto Module:** A tamper-resistant device, with a cryptography processor, used for the specific purpose of protecting the lifecycle of cryptographic keys (generating, managing, processing, and storing).

**High Risk Certificate Request:** A Request that the CA flags for additional scrutiny by reference to internal criteria and databases maintained by the CA, which may include names at higher risk for phishing or other fraudulent usage, names contained in previously rejected certificate requests or revoked Certificates, names listed on the Miller Smiles phishing list or the Google Safe Browsing list, or names that the CA identifies using its own risk-mitigation criteria.

**High Risk Region of Concern (HRRC):** As set forth in Appendix A, a geographic location where the detected number of Code Signing Certificates associated with signed Suspect Code exceeds 5% of the total number of detected Code Signing Certificates originating or associated with the same geographic area.

**Individual Applicant**: An Applicant who is a natural person and requests a Certificate that will list the Applicant's legal name as the Certificate's Subject.

**Issuing CA**: In relation to a particular Certificate, the CA that issued the Certificate. This could be either a Root CA or a Subordinate CA.

**Key Compromise**: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, or an unauthorized person has had access to it.

**Key Generation Script**: A documented plan of procedures for the generation of a CA Key Pair.

**Key Pair**: The Private Key and its associated Public Key.

**Legal Entity**: An association, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, trust, government entity or other entity with legal standing in a country's legal system.

**Lifetime Signing OID:** An optional extended key usage OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.13) used by Microsoft Authenticode to limit the lifetime of the code signature to the expiration of the code signing certificate.

**Object Identifier**: A unique alphanumeric or numeric identifier registered under the International Organization for Standardization's applicable standard for a specific object or object class.

**OCSP Responder**: An online server operated under the authority of the CA and connected to its Repository for processing Certificate status requests. See also, Online Certificate Status Protocol.

**Online Certificate Status Protocol**: An online Certificate-checking protocol that enables relying-party application software to determine the status of an identified Certificate. See also OCSP Responder.

**Organizational Applicant:** An Applicant that requests a Certificate with a name in the Subject field that is for an organization and not the name of an individual. Organizational Applicants include private and public corporations, LLCs, partnerships, government entities, non-profit organizations, trade associations, and other legal entities.

**Non-EV Code Signing Certificate:** Term used to signify requirements that are applicable to Code Signing Certificates which do not have to meet the EV requirements.

**Parent Company**: A company that Controls a Subsidiary Company.

**Platform:** The computing environment in which an Application Software Supplier uses Code Signing Certificates, incorporates Root Certificates, and adopts these Requirements.

**Private Key**: The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create Digital Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.

**Public Key**: The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify Digital Signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.

**Public Key Infrastructure**: A set of hardware, software, people, procedures, rules, policies, and obligations used to facilitate the trustworthy creation, issuance, management, and use of Certificates and keys based on Public Key Cryptography.

**Publicly-Trusted Certificate**: A Certificate that is trusted by virtue of the fact that its corresponding Root Certificate is distributed as a trust anchor in widely-available application software.

**Qualified Auditor**: A natural person or Legal Entity that meets the requirements of [Section 8.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#82-identityqualifications-of-assessor).

**Registration Authority (RA)**: Any Legal Entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of Certificates, but is not a CA, and hence does not sign or issue Certificates. An RA may assist in the certificate application process or revocation process or both. When "RA" is used as an adjective to describe a role or function, it does not necessarily imply a separate body, but can be part of the CA.

**Registration Identifier:** The unique code assigned to an Applicant by the Incorporating or Registration Agency in such entity's Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration.

**Reliable Data Source**: An identification document or source of data used to verify Subject Identity Information that is generally recognized among commercial enterprises and governments as reliable, and which was created by a third party for a purpose other than the Applicant obtaining a Certificate.

**Reliable Method of Communication**: A method of communication, such as a postal/courier delivery address, telephone number, or email address, that was verified using a source other than the Applicant Representative.

**Relying Party**: Any natural person or Legal Entity that relies on a Valid Certificate. An Application Software Supplier is not considered a Relying Party when software distributed by such Supplier merely displays information relating to a Certificate.

**Repository**: An online database containing publicly-disclosed PKI governance documents (such as Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements) and Certificate status information, either in the form of a CRL or an OCSP response.

**Requirements**: The Baseline Requirements found in this document.

**Root CA**: The top level Certification Authority whose Root Certificate is distributed by Application Software Suppliers and that issues Subordinate CA Certificates.

**Root Certificate**: The self-signed Certificate issued by the Root CA to identify itself and to facilitate verification of Certificates issued to its Subordinate CAs.

**Signature**: An encrypted electronic data file which is attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which (i) identifies and is uniquely linked to the signatory of the electronic data, (ii) is created using means that the signatory can maintain under its sole control, and (iii) is linked in a way so as to make any subsequent changes that have been made to the electronic data detectable.

**Signing Service**: An organization that signs Code on behalf of a Subscriber using a Private Key associated with a Code Signing Certificate.

**Sovereign State**: A state or country that administers its own government, and is not dependent upon, or subject to, another power.

**Subject**: The Subject of a Code Signing Certificate is the entity responsible for distributing the software but does not necessarily hold the copyright to the Code.

**Subject Identity Information**: Information that identifies the Certificate Subject.

**Subordinate CA**: A Certification Authority whose Certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another Subordinate CA.

**Subscriber:** A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Code Signing Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

**Subscriber Agreement**: An agreement between the CA and the Applicant/Subscriber that specifies the rights and responsibilities of the parties.

**Subsidiary Company**: A company that is controlled by a Parent Company.

**Suspect Code**: Code that contains malicious functionality or serious vulnerabilities, including spyware, malware and other code that installs without the user's consent and/or resists its own removal, code that compromises user security and/or code that can be exploited in ways not intended by its designers to compromise the trustworthiness of the Platforms on which it executes.

**Takeover Attack**: An attack where a Signing Service or Private Key associated with a Code Signing Certificate has been compromised by means of fraud, theft, intentional malicious act of the Subject's agent, or other illegal conduct.

**Terms of Use**: Provisions regarding the safekeeping and acceptable uses of a Certificate issued in accordance with these Requirements when the Applicant/Subscriber is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

**Timestamp Authority**: A service operated by the CA or a delegated third party for its own code signing certificate users that timestamps data using a certificate chained to a public root, thereby asserting that the data (or the data from which the data were derived via a secure hashing algorithm) existed at the specified time.

**Timestamp Certificate**: A certificate issued to a Timestamp Authority to use to timestamp data.

**Trusted Platform Module**: A microcontroller that stores keys, passwords and digital certificates, usually affixed to the motherboard of a computer, which due to its physical nature makes the information stored there more secure against external software attack or physical theft.

**Valid Certificate**: A Certificate that passes the validation procedure specified in RFC 5280.

**Validation Specialists**: Someone who performs the information verification duties specified by these Requirements.

**Validity Period**: The validity period is as defined within RFC 5280, Section 4.1.2.5: the period of time from notBefore through notAfter, inclusive.

**Verifying Person**: A notary, attorney, Latin notary, accountant, individual designated by a government agency as authorized to verify identities, or agent of the CA, who attests to the identity of an individual.

**1.6.2 Abbreviations and Acronyms**

| **Acronym** | **Meaning** |
| --- | --- |
| BIPM | International Bureau of Weights and Measures |
| BIS | (US Government) Bureau of Industry and Security |
| CA | Certification Authority |
| CEO | Chief Executive Officer |
| CFO | Chief Financial Officer |
| CIO | Chief Information Officer |
| CISO | Chief Information Security Officer |
| COO | Chief Operating Officer |
| CPA | Chartered Professional Accountant |
| CP | Certificate Policy |
| CPS | Certification Practice Statement |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
| CSO | Chief Security Officer |
| DBA | Doing Business As |
| EV | Extended Validation |
| FIPS | (US Government) Federal Information Processing Standard |
| IFAC | International Federation of Accountants |
| IRS | Internal Revenue Service |
| ISO | International Organization for Standardization |
| NIST | (US Government) National Institute of Standards and Technology |
| OCSP | Online Certificate Status Protocol |
| OID | Object Identifier |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| QGIS | Qualified Government Information Source |
| QTIS | Qualified Government Tax Information Source |
| QIIS | Qualified Independent Information Source |
| RA | Registration Authority |
| SEC | (US Government) Securities and Exchange Commission |
| UTC(k) | National realization of Coordinated Universal Time |

**1.6.3 References**

ETSI EN 319 403, Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trust Service Provider Conformity Assessment - Requirements for conformity assessment bodies assessing Trust Service Providers

ETSI EN 319 411-1, Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements

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WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Code Signing Baseline Requirements, available at <https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/business-and-accounting-resources/audit-and-assurance/overview-of-webtrust-services/principles-and-criteria>.

X.509, Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (08/2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005, Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks..

**1.6.4 Conventions**

Terms not otherwise defined in these Requirements are as defined in the CA's applicable agreements, user manuals, Certificate Policies, and Certification Practice Statements.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in these Requirements are used in accordance with RFC 2119.

By convention, this document omits time and timezones when listing effective requirements such as dates. Except when explicitly specified, the associated time with a date shall be 00:00:00 UTC.

**2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES**

The CA SHALL develop, implement, enforce, and annually update a Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement that describes in detail how the CA implements the latest version of these Requirements.

**2.1 Repositories**

The CA SHALL maintain an online 24x7 Repository that application software can use to automatically check the current status of Code Signing and Timestamp Certificates issued by the CA.

The CA SHALL make revocation information for Subordinate Certificates and Subscriber Certificates available in accordance with this Policy.

**2.2 Publication of certification information**

The CA and its Root CA MUST develop, implement, enforce, display prominently on its web site, and periodically update its policies and practices, including its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement, that implement the most current version of these Requirements. The Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement MUST specify the CA's (and applicable Root CA's) entire root certificate hierarchy including all roots that its Code Signing Certificates depend on for proof of those Code Signing Certificates' authenticity.

Each CA MUST represent that it has disclosed all Cross Certificates in its Certificate Policy/Certificate Practice Statement that identify the CA as the Subject, provided that the CA arranged for or accepted the establishment of the trust relationship (i.e. the Cross Certificate at issue).

Each CA, including Root CAs, MUST publicly disclose their policies and practices through an appropriate and readily accessible online means that is available on a 24x7 basis. The CA MUST publicly disclose its Certificate Practice Statement and/or Certificate Policies and structure the disclosures in accordance with RFC 3647.

Each CA MUST give public effect to these Requirements and represent that they will adhere to the latest published version by either (i) incorporating the Requirements directly into their respective Certification Practice Statements or (ii) by referencing the Requirements using a clause such as the following:

[Name of CA] conforms to the current version of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates published at [URL]. If there is any inconsistency between this document and those Requirements, those Requirements take precedence over this document.

In either case, each CA MUST include a link to the official version of these Requirements. In addition, each CA MUST include (directly or by reference) applicable parts of these Requirements in all contracts with Subordinate CAs, RAs, Signing Services and subcontractors, that involve or relate to the issuance or management of Certificates. CAs MUST enforce compliance with such terms.

**2.3 Time or frequency of publication**

The CA SHALL develop, implement, enforce, and annually update a Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement that describes in detail how the CA implements the latest version of these Requirements. The CA SHALL indicate conformance with this requirement by incrementing the version number and adding a dated changelog entry, even if no other changes are made to the document.

**2.4 Access controls on repositories**

The CA shall make its Repository publicly available in a read-only manner.

**3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION**

**3.1 Naming**

**3.1.1 Types of names**

**3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful**

**3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers**

**3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms**

**3.1.5 Uniqueness of names**

**3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks**

**3.2 Initial identity validation**

**3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key**

**3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity**

The CA SHALL verify the identity of the Applicant, and the authenticity of the Applicant Representative's certificate request using a verification process meeting the requirements of [Section 3.2.2.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#3221-Authentication-of-organization-identity-for-Non-EV-Code-Signing-Certificates) or [Section 3.2.2.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#3222-Authentication-of-organization-identity-for-EV-Code-Signing-Certificates) and that is described in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement. The CA SHALL inspect any document relied upon under this Section for alteration or falsification.

**3.2.2.1 Authentication of organization identity for Non-EV Code Signing Certificates**

Prior to issuing a Code Signing Certificate to an Organizational Applicant, the CA MUST:

1. Verify the Subject's legal identity, including any DBA proposed for inclusion in a Certificate, in accordance with [Section 3.2.2.1.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32211-identity) and [Section 3.2.2.1.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32212-dbatradename). The CA MUST also obtain, whenever available, a specific Registration Identifier assigned to the Applicant by a government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant's legal creation, existence, or recognition,
2. Verify the Subject's address in accordance with [Section 3.2.2.1.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32211-identity),
3. Verify the Certificate Requester's authority to request a Code Signing Certificate and the authenticity of the Certificate Request using a Reliable Method of Communication in accordance with [Section 3.2.5](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#325-validation-of-authority), and
4. If the Subject's or Subject's Affiliate's, Parent Company's, or Subsidiary Company's date of formation, as indicated by either a QIIS or QGIS, was less than three years prior to the date of the Certificate Request, verify the identity of the Certificate Requester. Effective 1 November 2021, the method used to verify the identity of the Certificate Requester SHALL be per [Section 3.2.3.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#3231-individual-identity-verification).

**3.2.2.1.1 Identity**

If the Subject Identity Information is to include the name or address of an organization, the CA SHALL verify the identity and address of the organization and that the address is the Applicant's address of existence or operation. The CA SHALL verify the identity and address of the Applicant using documentation provided by, or through communication with, at least one of the following:

1. A government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant's legal creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A third party database that is periodically updated and considered a Reliable Data Source;
3. A site visit by the CA or a third party who is acting as an agent for the CA; or
4. An Attestation Letter.

The CA MAY use the same documentation or communication described in 1 through 4 above to verify both the Applicant's identity and address.

Alternatively, the CA MAY verify the address of the Applicant (but not the identity of the Applicant) using a utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement, government-issued tax document, or other form of identification that the CA determines to be reliable.

**3.2.2.1.2 DBA/Tradename**

If the Subject Identity Information is to include a DBA or tradename, the CA SHALL verify the Applicant's right to use the DBA/tradename using at least one of the following:

1. Documentation provided by, or communication with, a government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant's legal creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A Reliable Data Source;
3. Communication with a government agency responsible for the management of such DBAs or trade names;
4. An Attestation Letter accompanied by documentary support; or
5. A utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement, government-issued tax document, or other form of identification that the CA determines to be reliable.

**3.2.2.2 Authentication of organization identity for EV Code Signing Certificates**

Before issuing a EV Code Signing Certificate, the CA MUST ensure that all Subject organization information to be included in the EV Code Signing Certificate conforms to the requirements of, and is verified in accordance with the EV Guidelines and matches the information confirmed and documented by the CA pursuant to its verification processes. Such verification processes are intended to accomplish the following:

1. Verify Applicant's existence and identity, including; a. Verify the Applicant's legal existence and identity (as more fully set forth in [Section 3.2.2.2.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32221-verification-of-applicants-legal-existence-and-identity) herein), b. Verify the Applicant's physical existence (business presence at a physical address), and c. Verify the Applicant's operational existence (business activity).
2. Verify the Applicant's authorization for the EV Code Signing Certificate, including; a. Verify the name, title, and authority of the Contract Signer, Certificate Approver, and Certificate Requester, b. Verify that a Contract Signer signed the Subscriber Agreement or that a duly authorized Applicant Representative acknowledged and agreed to the Terms of Use; and c. Verify that a Certificate Approver has signed or otherwise approved the EV Code Signing Certificate Request.

As a general rule, the CA is responsible for taking all verification steps reasonably necessary to satisfy each of the Verification Requirements set forth in the subsections below. The Acceptable Methods of Verification are set forth in the EV Guidelines. In all cases, however, the CA is responsible for taking any additional verification steps that may be reasonably necessary under the circumstances to satisfy the applicable Verification Requirement.

Roles are specified in EV Guidelines Section 10.1.2.

**3.2.2.2.1 Verification of Applicant's Legal Existence and Identity**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.2.

**3.2.2.2.2 Verification of Applicant's Legal Existence and Identity -- Assumed Name**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.3.

**3.2.2.2.3 Verification of Applicant's Physical Existence**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.4.

**3.2.2.2.4 Verified Method of Communication**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.5.

**3.2.2.2.5 Verification of Applicant's Operational Existence**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.6.

**3.2.2.2.6 Verification of Applicant's Domain Name**

Code Signing Certificates SHALL NOT include a Domain Name.

**3.2.2.2.7 Verification of Name, Title, and Authority of Contract Signer and Certificate Approver**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.8.

**3.2.2.2.8 Verification of Signature on Subscriber Agreement and EV Code Signing Certificate Requests**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.9.

**3.2.2.2.9 Verification of Approval of EV Code Signing Certificate Request**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.10.

**3.2.2.2.10 Verification of Certain Information Sources**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.11.

**3.2.2.2.11 Parent/Subsidiary/Affiliate Relationship**

As specified in EV Guidelines Section 11.12.3.

**3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity**

Prior to issuing a Code Signing Certificate to an Individual Applicant, the CA MUST verify the Subject's Identity and authenticity of the Identity as follows.

**3.2.3.1 Individual identity verification**

The CA MUST verify the Applicant's identity using one of the following processes:

1. The CA MUST obtain a legible copy, which discernibly shows the Certificate Requester's face, of at least one currently valid government-issued photo ID (passport, driver's license, military ID, national ID, or equivalent document type). The CA MUST inspect the copy for any indication of alteration or falsification. The CA MUST also verify the address of the Certificate Requester using (i) a government-issued photo ID, (ii) a QIIS or QGIS, or (iii) an access code to activate the Certificate where the access code was physically mailed to the Certificate Requester; OR
2. The CA MUST have the Certificate Requester digitally sign the Certificate Request using a valid personal Certificate that was issued under one of the following adopted standards: Qualified Certificates issued pursuant to ETSI TS 101 862, IGTF, Adobe Signing Certificate issued under the AATL or CDS program, the Kantara identity assurance framework at level 2, NIST SP 800-63 at level 2, or the FBCA CP at Basic or higher assurance.

**3.2.3.2 Authenticity of Certificate requests for Individual Applicants**

The CA MUST verify the authenticity of the Certificate Request using one of the following:

1. Having the Certificate Requester provide a photo of the Certificate Requester holding the submitted government-issued photo ID where the photo is of sufficient quality to read both the name listed on the photo ID and the issuing authority; OR
2. Having the CA perform an in-person or web camera-based verification of the Certificate Requester where an employee or contractor of the CA can see the Certificate Requester, review the Certificate Requester's photo ID, and confirm that the Certificate Requester is the individual identified in the submitted photo ID; OR
3. Having the CA obtain an executed Declaration of Identity of the Certificate Requester that includes at least one unique biometric identifier (such as a fingerprint or handwritten signature). The CA MUST confirm the document's authenticity directly with the Verifying Person using contact information confirmed with a QIIS or QGIS; OR
4. Verifying that the digital signature used to sign the Request under item (2) of [Section 3.2.3.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#3231-individual-identity-verification) is a valid signature and originated from a Certificate issued at the appropriate level of assurance as evidenced by the certificate chain. Acceptable verification under this section includes validation that the Certificate was issued by a CA qualified by the entity responsible for adopting, enforcing, or maintaining the adopted standard and chains to an intermediate certificate or root certificate designated as complying with such standard.

**3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information**

**3.2.5 Validation of authority**

If the Applicant for a Certificate containing Subject Identity Information is an organization, the CA SHALL use a Reliable Method of Communication to verify the authenticity of the Applicant Representative's certificate request.

The CA MAY use the sources listed in [Section 3.2.2.1.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32211-identity) to verify the Reliable Method of Communication. Provided that the CA uses a Reliable Method of Communication, the CA MAY establish the authenticity of the certificate request directly with the Applicant Representative or with an authoritative source within the Applicant's organization, such as the Applicant's main business offices, corporate offices, human resource offices, information technology offices, or other department that the CA deems appropriate.

In addition, the CA SHALL establish a process that allows an Applicant to specify the individuals who may request Certificates. If an Applicant specifies, in writing, the individuals who may request a Certificate, then the CA SHALL NOT accept any certificate requests that are outside this specification. The CA SHALL provide an Applicant with a list of its authorized certificate requesters upon the Applicant's verified written request.

**3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation**

The CA SHOULD issue Code Signing and Timestamp Certificates that allow Application Software Suppliers to test their software with Certificates that chain up to each publicly trusted Root Certificate. At a minimum, the CA SHOULD issue and make available to Application Software Suppliers upon request Code Signing and Timestamp Certificates that are valid (non-revoked and unexpired).

**3.2.7 Data source accuracy**

Prior to using any data source as a Reliable Data Source, the CA SHALL evaluate the source for its reliability, accuracy, and resistance to alteration or falsification. The CA SHOULD consider the following during its evaluation:

1. The age of the information provided,
2. The frequency of updates to the information source,
3. The data provider and purpose of the data collection,
4. The public accessibility of the data availability, and
5. The relative difficulty in falsifying or altering the data.

Databases maintained by the CA, its owner, or its affiliated companies do not qualify as a Reliable Data Source if the primary purpose of the database is to collect information for the purpose of fulfilling the validation requirements under this [Section 3.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32-initial-identity-validation).

**3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests**

**3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key**

**3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation**

**3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request**

**4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

**4.1 Certificate Application**

**4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application**

For EV Code Signing Certificates, the CA MAY only issue to Applicants that meet the requirements specified in Section 8.5 of the EV Guidelines. The CA SHALL implement procedures to identify suspicious certificate requests as defined in EV Guidelines Section 11.12.2.

**4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities**

Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, the CA MUST obtain from the Applicant a request for a certificate in a form prescribed by the CA and that complies with these Requirements. One request MAY suffice for multiple Certificates to be issued to the same Applicant, subject to the aging and updating requirement in [Section 4.2.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#421-performing-identification-and-authentication-functions), provided that each Certificate is supported by a valid, current request signed by the appropriate Applicant Representative on behalf of the Applicant. The request MAY be made, submitted and/or signed electronically.

Prior to signing Code, the Signing Service MUST obtain from the Applicant a signing request in a form prescribed by the Signing Service and that complies with these Requirements. One signing request MAY suffice for multiple Code Signatures for the same Applicant, subject to the requirements specified herein. The signing request MAY be made, submitted and/or signed electronically.

The certificate requestor signing request MUST contain a request from, or on behalf of, the Applicant and a certification by, or on behalf of, the Applicant that all of the information contained therein is correct.

**4.2 Certificate application processing**

**4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions**

The certificate request or signing request MAY include all factual information about the Applicant necessary to issue the Certificate or sign the Code, and such additional information as is necessary for the CA or Signing Service to obtain from the Applicant in order to comply with these Requirements and the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement. In cases where the certificate request or signing request does not contain all the necessary information about the Applicant, the CA or Signing Service MUST obtain the remaining information from the Applicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, independent, third-party data source, confirm it with the Applicant. The CA or Signing Service MUST establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant.

Prior to issuing a Code Signing Certificate, each CA SHOULD check at least one database containing information about known or suspected producers, publishers, or distributors of Suspect Code, as identified or indicated by an Anti-Malware Organization and any database of deceptive names maintained by an Application Software Provider. The CA MUST determine whether the entity is identified as requesting a Code Signing Certificate from a High Risk Region of Concern. The CA MUST also maintain and check an internal database listing Certificates revoked due to Code Signatures on Suspect Code and previous certificate requests rejected by the CA.

A CA identifying a high risk application under this section MUST follow the additional procedures defined in [Section 4.2.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#422-approval-or-rejection-of-certificate-applications) of this document to ensure that the applicant will protect its Private Keys and not sign Suspect Code.

[These requirements do not specify a particular database and leave the decision of qualifying databases to the implementers.]

Prior to issuing Code Signing Certificates, the CA SHALL perform "due diligence" verification as specified in EV Guidelines 11.13.

Methods 4, 5 and 7 of [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection) may be reused if Subscriber Private Key protection has been validated no more than 13 months prior to issuing the Code Signing Certificate.

For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates, the CA MAY use the documents and data provided in [Section 3.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32-initial-identity-validation) to verify certificate information, or may reuse previous validations themselves, provided that the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under [Section 3.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32-initial-identity-validation) or completed the validation itself no more than 825 days prior to issuing the Certificate.

For EV Code Signing Certificates, use of documents, data, and previous validations performed per [Section 3.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32-initial-identity-validation) SHALL be governed by the usage periods as defined in EV Guidelines Section 11.14.

**4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications**

CAs MUST not issue new or replacement Code Signing Certificates to an entity that the CA determined intentionally signed Suspect Code. The CA MUST keep meta-data about the reason for revoking a Code Signing Certificate as proof that the Code Signing Certificate was not revoked because the Applicant was intentionally signing Suspect Code.

CAs MAY issue new or replacement Code Signing Certificates to an entity who is the victim of a documented Takeover Attack, resulting in either a loss of control of their code-signing service or loss of the Private Key associated with their Code Signing Certificate.

If the CA is aware that the Applicant was the victim of a Takeover Attack, the CA MUST verify that the Applicant is protecting its Code Signing Private Keys under [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection)(1) or [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection)(2). The CA MUST verify the Applicant's compliance with [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection)(1) or [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection)(2) through:

1. Technical means that confirm the Private Keys are protected using the method described in [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection)(1) or [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection)(2); or
2. Relying on a report provided by the Applicant that is signed by an auditor who is approved by the CA and who has IT and security training or is a CISA.

Documentation of a Takeover Attack MAY include a police report (validated by the CA) or public news report that admits that the attack took place. The Subscriber MUST provide a report from an auditor with IT and security training or a CISA that provides information on how the Subscriber was storing and using Private keys and how the intended solution for better security meets the guidelines for improved security.

Except where issuance is expressly authorized by the Application Software Supplier, CAs MUST not issue new Code Signing Certificates to an entity where the CA is aware that the entity has been the victim of two Takeover Attacks or where the CA is aware that entity breached a requirement under this Section to protect Private Keys under [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection)(1) or [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection)(2).

**4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications**

No stipulation.

**4.3 Certificate issuance**

**4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance**

Certificate issuance by the Root CA MUST require an individual authorized by the CA (i.e. the CA system operator, system officer, or PKI administrator) to deliberately issue a direct command in order for the Root CA to perform a certificate signing operation.

**4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate**

No stipulation.

**4.4 Certificate acceptance**

**4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance**

No stipulation.

**4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

**4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulation.

**4.5 Key pair and certificate usage**

**4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage**

See [Section 9.6.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#963-subscriber-representations-and-warranties), provisions 2. and 4.

**4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage**

No stipulation.

**4.6 Certificate renewal**

**4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal**

No stipulation.

**4.6.2 Who may request renewal**

No stipulation.

**4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests**

No stipulation.

**4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

No stipulation.

**4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate**

No stipulation.

**4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

**4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulation.

**4.7 Certificate re-key**

**4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key**

No stipulation.

**4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key**

No stipulation.

**4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests**

No stipulation.

**4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

No stipulation.

**4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate**

No stipulation.

**4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

**4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulation.

**4.8 Certificate modification**

**4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification**

No stipulation.

**4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification**

No stipulation.

**4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests**

No stipulation.

**4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

No stipulation.

**4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate**

No stipulation.

**4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

**4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulation.

**4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension**

Prior to 2024-04-15, the CA SHALL treat revocation of Certificates in accordance with the requirements specified in Section 4.9 of these Requirements or Section 4.9 specified in version 3.2.0 of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates. Effective 2024-04-15, the CA SHALL treat revocation of Certificates in accordance with Section 4.9 specified in these Requirements.

**4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation**

When revocation of a Subscriber Certificate is done due to a Key Compromise or use in Suspect Code the CA SHALL determine an appropriate value for the revocationDate based on its own investigation. The CA SHALL set a historic date as revocationDate if deemed appropriate.

**4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate**

The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs:

1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate;
2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise;
4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate;
5. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber’s Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed; or
6. The CA has reasonable assurance that a Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code.

The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and SHALL revoke a Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs:

1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6;
2. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused.
3. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.
4. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate.
5. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement.
6. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate.
7. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository.
8. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement.

The CA MAY delay revocation based on a request from Application Software Suppliers where immediate revocation has a potentially large negative impact to the ecosystem.

**Note:** Nothing herein prohibits a CA from revoking a Code Signing Certificate prior to these time frames.

**4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate**

The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:

1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of [Section 6.1.5](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#615-key-sizes) and [Section 6.1.6](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#616-public-key-parameters-generation-and-quality-checking);
4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with this document or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement;
6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate;
8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; or
9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement.

**4.9.2 Who can request revocation**

The CA MUST provide Anti-Malware Organizations, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions on how they can report suspected private key compromise, Certificate misuse, Certificates used to sign Suspect Code, Takeover Attacks, or other types of possible fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates. The CA MUST publicly disclose the instructions on its website.

**4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request**

The CA SHALL provide a process for Subscribers to request revocation of their own Certificates. The process MUST be described in the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement. The CA SHALL maintain a continuous 24x7 ability to accept and respond to revocation requests and Certificate Problem Reports.

The CA SHALL provide Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions for reporting suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates. The CA SHALL publicly disclose the instructions through a readily accessible online means and in Section 1.5.2 of their CPS.

**4.9.4 Revocation request grace period**

**4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request**

The CA MUST maintain a continuous 24x7 ability to communicate with Anti-Malware Organizations, Application Software Suppliers, and law enforcement agencies and respond to high-priority Certificate Problem Reports, such as reports requesting revocation of Certificates used to sign malicious code, fraud, or other illegal conduct.

The CA MUST acknowledge receipt of plausible notices about Suspect Code signed with a certificate issued by the CA or a Subordinate CA.

The CA MUST begin investigating Certificate Problem Reports within twenty-four hours of receipt, and decide whether revocation or other appropriate action is warranted based on at least the following criteria:

1. The nature of the alleged problem (adware, spyware, malware, software bug, etc.),
2. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber,
3. The entity making the report (for example, a notification from an Anti-Malware Organization or law enforcement agency carries more weight than an anonymous complaint), and
4. Relevant legislation.

When revoking a Certificate, the CA SHOULD work with the Subscriber to estimate a date of when the revocation should occur in order to mitigate the impact of revocation on validly signed Code. For key compromise events, this date SHOULD be the earliest date of suspected compromise.

**4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties**

A Certificate MAY have a one-to-one relationship or one-to-many relationship with the signed Code. Regardless, revocation of a Certificate may invalidate the Code Signatures on all signed Code, some of which could be perfectly sound. Because of this, the CA MAY specify the time at which the Certificate is first considered to be invalid in the revocationDate field of a CRL entry or the revocationTime field of an OCSP response to time-bind the set of software affected by the revocation[1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#user-content-fn-*-f82c2e242ddfd9b3ab6cfdb4e2c30fd9), and software should continue to treat objects containing a timestamp dated before the revocation date as valid.

**4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency**

For the status of Subordinate CA Certificates:

* The Issuing CA SHALL publish a CRL, then update and reissue a CRL at least once every twelve months and within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate. The nextUpdate field MUST NOT be more than twelve months beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

For the status of Code Signing Certificates:

* The Subordinate CA SHALL publish a CRL, then update and reissue a CRL at least once every seven days, and the value of the nextUpdate field MUST NOT be more than ten days beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

For the status of Timestamp Certificates:

* The Subordinate CA SHALL update and reissue CRLs at least once every twelve months and within 24 hours after revoking a Timestamp Certificate, and the value of the nextUpdate field MUST NOT be more than twelve months beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

**4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs**

No stipulation.

**4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability**

OCSP responses MUST conform to RFC6960 and/or RFC5019. OCSP responses MUST either:

1. Be signed by the CA that issued the Certificates whose revocation status is being checked, or
2. Be signed by an OCSP Responder whose Certificate is signed by the CA that issued the Certificate whose revocation status is being checked.

In the latter case, the OCSP signing Certificate MUST contain an extension of type id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck, as defined by RFC6960.

**4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements**

Effective 2023-09-15, OCSP responders operated by the CA SHALL support the HTTP GET method, as described in RFC 6960 and/or RFC 5019.

Effective 2023-09-15, the validity interval of an OCSP response is the difference in time between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate field, inclusive. For purposes of computing differences, a difference of 3,600 seconds shall be equal to one hour, and a difference of 86,400 seconds shall be equal to one day, ignoring leap-seconds.

CAs MAY provide OCSP responses for Code Signing Certificates and Timestamp Certificates for the time period specified in their CPS, which MAY be at least 10 years after the expiration of the certificate.

If the CA provides OCSP responses, the CA SHALL support an OCSP capability using the GET method for Certificates issued in accordance with these Requirements.

For the status of Subordinate CA Certificates:

* If the Issuing CA provides OCSP responses, the Issuing CA SHALL update information provided via an OCSP response at least every twelve months and within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate.

For the status of Code Signing Certificates:

* If the Subordinate CA provides OCSP responses, the CA SHALL update information provided via an OCSP response at least every four days. OCSP responses from this service MUST have a maximum expiration time of ten days.

For the status of Timestamp Certificates:

* If the Subordinate CA provides OCSP responses, the Subordinate CA SHALL update information provided via an OCSP response at least every twelve months and within 24 hours after revoking a Timestamp Certificate.

A certificate serial number within an OCSP request is "assigned" if a Certificate with that serial number has been issued by the Issuing CA, using any current or previous key associated with that CA subject.

If the OCSP responder receives a request for the status of a certificate serial number that is not "assigned", then the responder MUST NOT respond with a "good" status.

**4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available**

Because some Application Software Suppliers utilize non-standard revocation mechanisms, CAs MUST, if requested by the Application Software Supplier and using a method of communication specified by the Application Software Vendor, notify the Application Software Supplier whenever the CA revokes a Code Signing Certificate because (i) the CA mis-issued the Certificate, (ii) the Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code, or (iii) there is a suspected or actual compromise of the Applicant's or CA's Private Key.

**4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise**

See [Section 4.9.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#491-circumstances-for-revocation).

**4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension**

Effective 2023-09-15, the Repository MUST NOT include entries that indicate that a Certificate is suspended.

**4.9.14 Who can request suspension**

Not applicable.

**4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request**

Not applicable.

**4.9.16 Limits on suspension period**

Not applicable.

**4.10 Certificate status services**

**4.10.1 Operational characteristics**

Revocation entries on an OCSP response MUST remain for the same amount of time as for the CRL entries, as described in [Section 7.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#72-CRL-profile).

**4.10.2 Service availability**

The CA SHALL operate and maintain its CRL and OCSP capability with resources sufficient to provide a response time of ten seconds or less under normal operating conditions.

**4.10.3 Optional features**

No stipulation.

**4.11 End of subscription**

No stipulation.

**4.12 Key escrow and recovery**

**4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices**

No stipulation.

**4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices**

Not applicable.

**5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS**

The CA/Browser Forum's Network and Certificate System Security Requirements are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

The CA SHALL develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive security program designed to:

1. Protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes;
2. Protect against anticipated threats or hazards to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes;
3. Protect against unauthorized or unlawful access, use, disclosure, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes;
4. Protect against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes; and
5. Comply with all other security requirements applicable to the CA by law.

The Certificate Management Process MUST include:

1. physical security and environmental controls;
2. system integrity controls, including configuration management, integrity maintenance of trusted code, and malware detection/prevention;
3. network security and firewall management, including port restrictions and IP address filtering;
4. user management, separate trusted-role assignments, education, awareness, and training; and
5. logical access controls, activity logging, and inactivity time-outs to provide individual accountability.

The CA's security program MUST include an annual risk assessment that:

1. Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes;
2. Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes; and
3. Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements that the CA has in place to counter such threats.

Based on the risk assessment, the CA SHALL develop, implement, and maintain a security plan consisting of security procedures, measures, and products designed to achieve the objectives set forth above and to manage and control the risks identified during the risk assessment, commensurate with the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes. The security plan MUST include administrative, organizational, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes. The security plan MUST also take into account then-available technology and the cost of implementing the specific measures, and SHALL implement a reasonable level of security appropriate to the harm that might result from a breach of security and the nature of the data to be protected.

**5.1 Physical controls**

**5.1.1 Site location and construction**

**5.1.2 Physical access**

**5.1.3 Power and air conditioning**

**5.1.4 Water exposures**

**5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection**

**5.1.6 Media storage**

**5.1.7 Waste disposal**

**5.1.8 Off-site backup**

**5.2 Procedural controls**

**5.2.1 Trusted roles**

**5.2.2 Number of persons required per task**

The CA Private Key SHALL be backed up, stored, and recovered only by personnel in trusted roles using, at least, dual control in a physically secured environment.

**5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role**

**5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties**

1. The CA MUST enforce rigorous control procedures for the separation of validation duties to ensure that no one person can single-handedly validate and authorize the issuance of an EV Certificate. The Final Cross-Correlation and Due Diligence steps, as outlined in Section 11.13 of the EV Guidelines, MAY be performed by one of the persons. For example, one Validation Specialist MAY review and verify all the Applicant information and a second Validation Specialist MAY approve issuance of the EV Certificate.
2. Such controls MUST be auditable.

**5.3 Personnel controls**

**5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements**

Prior to the engagement of any person in the Certificate Management Process, whether as an employee, agent, or an independent contractor of the CA, the CA SHALL verify the identity and trustworthiness of such person.

**5.3.2 Background check procedures**

Prior to the commencement of employment of any person by the CA for engagement in the EV Processes, whether as an employee, agent, or an independent contractor of the CA, the CA MUST:

1. **Verify the identity of such person**: Verification of identity MUST be performed through:

A. The personal (physical) presence of such person before trusted persons who perform human resource or security functions, and B. The verification of well-recognized forms of government-issued photo identification (e.g., passports and/or drivers licenses);

and

1. **Verify the trustworthiness of such person**: Verification of trustworthiness SHALL include background checks, which address at least the following, or their equivalent:

A. Confirmation of previous employment, B. Check of professional references; C. Confirmation of the highest or most-relevant educational qualification obtained; D. Search of criminal records (local, state or provincial, and national) where allowed by the jurisdiction in which the person will be employed;

and

1. In the case of employees already in the employ of the CA at the time of adoption of these Guidelines whose identity and background has not previously been verified as set forth above, the CA SHALL conduct such verification within three months of the date of adoption of these Guidelines.

**5.3.3 Training requirements and procedures**

The CA SHALL provide all personnel performing information verification duties with skills-training that covers basic Public Key Infrastructure knowledge, authentication and vetting policies and procedures (including the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement), common threats to the information verification process (including phishing and other social engineering tactics), and these Requirements.

The CA SHALL maintain records of such training and ensure that personnel entrusted with Validation Specialist duties maintain a skill level that enables them to perform such duties satisfactorily.

The CA SHALL document that each Validation Specialist possesses the skills required by a task before allowing the Validation Specialist to perform that task.

The CA SHALL require all Validation Specialists to pass an examination provided by the CA on the information verification requirements outlined in these Requirements.

If a Validation Specialist is to be engaged in the EV Processes, the required internal examination must relate to the EV Certificate validation criteria outlined in the EV Guidelines.

**5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements**

All personnel in Trusted roles SHALL maintain skill levels consistent with the CA's training and performance programs.

**5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence**

**5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions**

**5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements**

The CA SHALL verify that the Delegated Third Party's personnel involved in the issuance of a Certificate meet the training and skills requirements of [Section 5.3.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#533-training-requirements-and-procedures) and the document retention and event logging requirements of [Section 5.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#541-types-of-events-recorded).

**5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel**

**5.4 Audit logging procedures**

**5.4.1 Types of events recorded**

**5.4.1.1 Types of events recorded for CAs**

The CA and each Delegated Third Party SHALL record details of the actions taken to process a certificate request and to issue a certificate, including all information generated and documentation received in connection with the certificate request; the time and date; and the personnel involved. The CA SHALL make these records available to its Qualified Auditor as proof of the CA’s compliance with these Requirements.

The CA SHALL record at least the following events:

1. CA certificate and key lifecycle management events, including:
	1. Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and destruction;
	2. Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;
	3. Approval and rejection of certificate requests ;
	4. Cryptographic device lifecycle management events;
	5. Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists
	6. Signing of OCSP Responses (as described in [Section 4.9](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#49-certificate-revocation-and-suspension) and [Section 4.10](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#410-certificate-status-services)); and
	7. Introduction of new Certificate Profiles and retirement of existing Certificate Profiles
2. CA and Subscriber lifecycle management events, including:
	1. Certificate requests, renewals, re-key requests, and revocation;
	2. All verification activities stipulated in these Requirements and the CA’s Certification Practice Statement (CPS);
	3. Acceptance and rejection of certificate requests;
	4. Issuance of Certificates;
	5. Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists and OCSP entries; and
	6. Signing of OCSP Responses (as described in [Section 4.9](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#49-certificate-revocation-and-suspension) and [Section 4.10](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#410-certificate-status-services)).
3. Security events, including:
4. Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;
5. PKI and security system actions performed;
6. Security profile changes;
7. System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;
8. Firewall and router activities; and
9. Entries to and exits from the CA facility.

Log records MUST include the following elements:

1. Date and time of event;
2. Identity of the person making the journal record; and
3. Description of the event.

**5.4.1.2 Types of events recorded for Timestamp Authorities**

The Timestamp Authority MUST log the following information and make these records available to its Qualified Auditor as proof of the Timestamp Authority’s compliance with these Requirements:

1. Physical or remote access to a timestamp server, including the time of the access and the identity of the individual accessing the server,
2. History of the timestamp server configuration,
3. Any attempt to delete or modify timestamp logs,
4. Security events, including: a. Successful and unsuccessful Timestamp Authority access attempts; b. Timestamp Authority server actions performed; c. Security profile changes; d. System crashes and other anomalies; and e. Firewall and router activities;
5. Revocation of a timestamp certificate,
6. Major changes to the timestamp server's time, and
7. System startup and shutdown.

**5.4.2 Frequency of processing log**

**5.4.3 Retention period for audit log**

The CA, Delegated Third Parties, and Timestamp Authority MUST retain, for at least two (2) years:

1. CA certificate and key lifecycle management event records (as set forth in [Section 5.4.1.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#5411-types-of-events-recorded-for-cas))(1) after the later occurrence of: a. the destruction of the CA Private Key; or b. the revocation or expiration of the final CA Certificate in that set of Certificates that have an X.509v3 basicConstraints extension with the cA field set to true and which share a common Public Key corresponding to the CA Private Key;
2. Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management event records (as set forth in [Section 5.4.1.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#5412-types-of-events-recorded-for-timestamp-authorities))(2) after the revocation or expiration of the Subscriber Certificate;
3. Timestamp Authority data records (as set forth in [Section 5.4.1.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#5412-types-of-events-recorded-for-timestamp-authorities)) after the revocation or renewal of the Timestamp Certificate private key (as set forth in [Section 6.3.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#632-certificate-operational-periods-and-key-pair-usage-periods));
4. Any security event records (as set forth in [Section 5.4.1.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#5412-types-of-events-recorded-for-timestamp-authorities)(3) and for Timestamp Authority security event records set forth in [Section 5.4.1.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#5412-types-of-events-recorded-for-timestamp-authorities)(3)) after the event occurred

**Note**: While these Requirements set the minimum retention period, the CA, Delegated Third Parties, and Timestamp Authority may choose a greater value as more appropriate in order to be able to investigate possible security or other types of incidents that will require retrospection and examination of past events.

**5.4.4 Protection of audit log**

**5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures**

**5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)**

**5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject**

**5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments**

Additionally, the CA's security program MUST include an annual risk assessment that:

1. Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes;
2. Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes; and
3. Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements that the CA has in place to counter such threats.

**5.5 Records archival**

**5.5.1 Types of records archived**

The CA and each Delegated Third Party SHALL archive all audit logs (as set forth in [Section 5.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#541-types-of-events-recorded)).

Additionally, the CA and each Delegated Third Party SHALL archive:

1. Documentation related to the security of their Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Root CA Systems, and Delegated Third Party Systems; and
2. Documentation related to their verification, issuance, and revocation of certificate requests and Certificates.

**5.5.2 Retention period for archive**

Archived audit logs (as set forth in [Section 5.5.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#551-types-of-records-archived) SHALL be retained for a period of at least two (2) years from their record creation timestamp, or as long as they are required to be retained per [Section 5.4.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#543-retention-period-for-audit-log), whichever is longer.

Additionally, the CA and each Delegated Third Party SHALL retain, for at least two (2) years:

1. All archived documentation related to the security of Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Root CA Systems and Delegated Third Party Systems (as set forth in [Section 5.5.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#551-types-of-records-archived)); and
2. All archived documentation relating to the verification, issuance, and revocation of certificate requests and Certificates (as set forth in [Section 5.5.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#551-types-of-records-archived)) after the later occurrence of:
	1. such records and documentation were last relied upon in the verification, issuance, or revocation of certificate requests and Certificates; or
	2. the expiration of the Subscriber Certificates relying upon such records and documentation.

Note: While these Requirements set the minimum retention period, the CA MAY choose a greater value as more appropriate in order to be able to investigate possible security or other types of incidents that will require retrospection and examination of past records archived.

**5.5.3 Protection of archive**

**5.5.4 Archive backup procedures**

**5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records**

**5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)**

**5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information**

**5.6 Key changeover**

**5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery**

**5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures**

CA organizations shall have an incident response plan and a disaster recovery plan.

The CA SHALL document a business continuity and disaster recovery procedures designed to notify and reasonably protect Application Software Suppliers, Subscribers, and Relying Parties in the event of a disaster, security compromise, or business failure. The CA is not required to publicly disclose its business continuity plans but SHALL make its business continuity plan and security plans available to the CA's auditors upon request. The CA SHALL annually test, review, and update these procedures.

The business continuity plan MUST include:

1. The conditions for activating the plan,
2. Emergency procedures,
3. Fallback procedures,
4. Resumption procedures,
5. A maintenance schedule for the plan;
6. Awareness and education requirements;
7. The responsibilities of the individuals;
8. Recovery time objective (RTO);
9. Regular testing of contingency plans.
10. The CA's plan to maintain or restore the CA's business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes
11. A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location;
12. What constitutes an acceptable system outage and recovery time
13. How frequently backup copies of essential business information and software are taken;
14. The distance of recovery facilities to the CA's main site; and
15. Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster and prior to restoring a secure environment either at the original or a remote site.

**5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted**

**5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures**

**5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster**

**5.8 CA or RA termination**

If the CA wishes to stop supporting validation of Code Signing Certificates or Timestamp Certificates prior to the date specified in its Certificate Policy/Certificate Practice Statement, the CA MUST give 90 days' prior notice to all Application Software Suppliers relying on the root certificate and permit the Application Software Suppliers sufficient time to take appropriate action as determined by the Application Software Supplier.

**6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

**6.1 Key pair generation and installation**

**6.1.1 Key pair generation**

**6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation**

For CA Key Pairs that are either

i. used as a CA Key Pair for a Root Certificate or ii. used as a CA Key Pair for a Subordinate CA Certificate, where the Subordinate CA is not the operator of the Root CA or an Affiliate of the Root CA,

the CA SHALL:

1. prepare and follow a Key Generation Script,
2. have a Qualified Auditor witness the CA Key Pair generation process or record a video of the entire CA Key Pair generation process, and
3. have a Qualified Auditor issue a report opining that the CA followed its key ceremony during its Key and Certificate generation process and the controls used to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the Key Pair.

For other CA Key Pairs that are for the operator of the Root CA or an Affiliate of the Root CA, the CA SHOULD:

1. prepare and follow a Key Generation Script and
2. have a Qualified Auditor witness the CA Key Pair generation process or record a video of the entire CA Key Pair generation process.

In all cases, the CA SHALL:

1. generate the CA Key Pair in a physically secured environment as described in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;
2. generate the CA Key Pair using personnel in Trusted Roles under the principles of multiple person control and split knowledge;
3. generate the CA Key Pair within cryptographic modules meeting the applicable technical and business requirements as disclosed in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;
4. log its CA Key Pair generation activities; and
5. maintain effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the Private Key was generated and protected in conformance with the procedures described in its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement and (if applicable) its Key Generation Script.

**6.1.1.2 RA Key Pair Generation**

**6.1.1.3 Subscriber Key Pair Generation**

The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more of the following conditions are met:

1. The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth in [Section 6.1.5](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#615-key-sizes) and/or [Section 6.1.6](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#616-public-key-parameters-generation-and-quality-checking);
2. There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed;
3. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Applicant's Private Key to compromise;
4. The CA has previously been made aware that the Applicant's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of [Section 4.9.1.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate);
5. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method to easily compute the Applicant's Private Key based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see <https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>).

**6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber**

If the CA or any Delegated Third Party is generating the Private Key on behalf of the Subscriber where the Private Keys will be transported to the Subscriber outside of the Signing Service's secure infrastructure, then the entity generating the Private Key MUST either transport the Private Key in hardware with an activation method that is equivalent to 128 bits of encryption or encrypt the Private Key with at least 128 bits of encryption strength. Allowed methods include using a 128-bit AES key to wrap the private key or storing the key in a PKCS 12 file encrypted with a randomly generated password of more than 16 characters containing uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols for transport.

Parties other than the Subscriber SHALL NOT archive the Subscriber Private Key without authorization by the Subscriber.

If the CA or any of its designated RAs become aware that a Subscriber's Private Key has been communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not affiliated with the Subscriber, then the CA SHALL revoke all certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the communicated Private Key.

**6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer**

**6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties**

**6.1.5 Key sizes**

**6.1.5.1 Root and Subordinate CA key sizes**

For Keys corresponding to Root and Subordinate CAs:

* If the Key is RSA, then the modulus MUST be at least 4096 bits in length. [2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#user-content-fn-legacy_key_length-f82c2e242ddfd9b3ab6cfdb4e2c30fd9)
* If the Key is ECDSA, then the curve MUST be one of NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521.
* If the Key is DSA, then one of the following key parameter options MUST be used:
	+ Key length (L) of 2048 bits and modulus length (N) of 224 bits
	+ Key length (L) of 2048 bits and modulus length (N) of 256 bits

**6.1.5.2 Code signing Certificate and Timestamp Authority key sizes**

For Keys corresponding to Subscriber code signing and Timestamp Authority Certificates:

* If the Key is RSA, then the modulus MUST be at least 3072 bits in length.
* If the Key is ECDSA, then the curve MUST be one of NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521.
* If the Key is DSA, then one of the following key parameter options MUST be used:
	+ Key length (L) of 2048 bits and modulus length (N) of 224 bits
	+ Key length (L) of 2048 bits and modulus length (N) of 256 bits

**6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking**

RSA: The CA SHALL confirm that the value of the public exponent is an odd number equal to 3 or more. Additionally, the public exponent SHOULD be in the range between 2^16 + 1 and 2^256 - 1. The modulus SHOULD also have the following characteristics: an odd number, not the power of a prime, and have no factors smaller than 752. [Source: Section 5.3.3, NIST SP 800-89]

ECDSA: The CA SHOULD confirm the validity of all keys using either the ECC Full Public Key Validation Routine or the ECC Partial Public Key Validation Routine. [Source: Sections 5.6.2.3.2 and 5.6.2.3.3, respectively, of NIST SP 800-56A: Revision 2]

**6.1.7 Key usage purposes**

Private Keys corresponding to Root Certificates MUST NOT be used to sign Certificates or create other Signatures except in the following cases:

1. Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root CA itself;
2. Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates;
3. Certificates for infrastructure purposes (administrative role certificates, internal CA operational device certificates);
4. Certificates for OCSP Response verification; and
5. Signatures for OCSP Responses.

**6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls**

The CA SHALL implement physical and logical safeguards to prevent unauthorized certificate issuance. Protection of the CA Private Key outside the validated system or device specified above MUST consist of physical security, encryption, or a combination of both, implemented in a manner that prevents disclosure of the Private Key. The CA SHALL encrypt its Private Key with an algorithm and key-length that, according to the state of the art, are capable of withstanding cryptanalytic attacks for the residual life of the encrypted key or key part.

**6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls**

**6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control**

**6.2.3 Private key escrow**

**6.2.4 Private key backup**

See [Section 5.2.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#522-number-of-persons-required-per-task).

**6.2.5 Private key archival**

Parties other than the Subordinate CA SHALL NOT archive the Subordinate CA Private Keys without authorization by the Subordinate CA.

**6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module**

If the Issuing CA generated the Private Key on behalf of the Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL encrypt the Private Key for transport to the Subordinate CA. If the Issuing CA becomes aware that a Subordinate CA's Private Key has been communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not affiliated with the Subordinate CA, then the Issuing CA SHALL revoke all certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the communicated Private Key.

For Certificates transported outside of a Signing Service's secure infrastructure, the CA or Signing Service MUST require, by contract, each Subscriber to generate their own Private Key and protect the Private Key in accordance with [Section 6.2.7.4](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#6274-subscriber-private-key-protection-and-verification).

**6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module**

**6.2.7.1 Private key storage for CA keys**

The CA SHALL protect its Private Key in a system or device that has been validated as meeting at least FIPS 140-2 level 3, FIPS 140-3 level 3, or an appropriate Common Criteria Protection Profile or Security Target, EAL 4 (or higher), which includes requirements to protect the Private Key and other assets against known threats.

**6.2.7.2 Private key storage for Timestamp Authorities**

A Timestamp Authority MUST protect its Private Key in offline Hardware Crypto Module conforming to FIPS 140-2 level 3, Common Criteria EAL 4+ (ALC\_FLR.2), or higher. The Timestamp Authority MUST protect its signing operations in accordance with the CA/Browser Forum's Network and Certificate System Security Requirements.

**6.2.7.3 Private key storage for Signing Services**

The Signing Service MUST ensure that a Subscriber's Private Key is generated, stored, and used in a secure environment that has controls to prevent theft or misuse. A Signing Service MUST enforce multi-factor authentication to access and authorize Code Signing and obtain a representation from the Subscriber that they will securely store the tokens required for multi-factor access. A system used to host a Signing Service MUST NOT be used for web browsing. The Signing Service MUST run a regularly updated antivirus solution to scan the service for possible virus infection. The Signing Service MUST comply with the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements as a "Delegated Third Party".

For Code Signing Certificates, Signing Services shall protect Private Keys in a Hardware Crypto Module conforming to at least FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+.

Techniques that MAY be used to satisfy this requirement include:

1. Use of an HSM, verified by means of a manufacturer's certificate;
2. A cloud-based key generation and protection solution with the following requirements: a. Key creation, storage, and usage of Private Key must remain within the security boundaries of the cloud solution’s Hardware Crypto Module that conforms to the specified requirements; b. Subscription at the level that manages the Private Key must be configured to log all access, operations, and configuration changes on the resources securing the Private Key.
3. A Hardware Crypto Module provided by the CA;
4. Contractual terms in the Subscriber Agreement requiring the Subscriber to protect the Private Key to a standard of at least FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ and with compliance being confirmed by means of an audit.

**6.2.7.4 Subscriber Private Key protection and verification**

**6.2.7.4.1 Subscriber Private Key protection**

For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to June 1, 2023, the CA MUST obtain a representation from the Subscriber that the Subscriber will use one of the following options to generate and protect their Code Signing Certificate Private Keys:

1. A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that generates and secures a Key Pair and that can document the Subscriber’s Private Key protection through a TPM key attestation.
2. A suitable Hardware Crypto Module with a unit design form factor certified as conforming to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2, Common Criteria EAL 4+, or equivalent.
3. Another type of hardware storage token with a unit design form factor of SD Card or USB token (not necessarily certified as conformant with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+). The Subscriber MUST also warrant that it will keep the token physically separate from the device that hosts the code signing function until a signing session is begun.

For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to June 1, 2023, a CA MUST recommend that the Subscriber protect Private Keys using the method described in Section 6.2.7.4.1(1) or 6.2.7.4.1(2) over the method described in Section 6.2.7.4.1(3) and obligate the Subscriber to protect Private Keys in accordance with [Section 9.6.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#963-subscriber-representations-and-warranties) (2).

For EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to June 1, 2023, CAs SHALL ensure that the Subscriber’s Private Key is generated, stored and used in a Hardware Crypto Module that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+. Acceptable methods of satisfying this requirement include (but are not limited to) the following:

1. The CA ships a suitable Hardware Crypto Module, with a preinstalled Private Key, in the form of a smartcard or USB device or similar;
2. The Subscriber counter-signs certificate requests that can be verified by using a manufacturer’s certificate indicating that the Private Key is managed in a suitable Hardware Crypto Module;
3. The Subscriber provides a suitable IT audit indicating that its operating environment achieves a level of security at least equivalent to that of FIPS 140-2 level 2.

Effective June 1, 2023, Subscriber Private Keys for Code Signing Certificates SHALL be protected per the following requirements. The CA MUST obtain a contractual representation from the Subscriber that the Subscriber will use one of the following options to generate and protect their Code Signing Certificate Private Keys in a Hardware Crypto Module with a unit design form factor certified as conforming to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+:

1. Subscriber uses a Hardware Crypto Module meeting the specified requirement;
2. Subscriber uses a cloud-base key generation and protection solution with the following requirements: a. Key creation, storage, and usage of Private Key must remain within the security boundaries of the cloud solution’s Hardware Crypto Module that conforms to the specified requirements; b. Subscription at the level that manages the Private Key must be configured to log all access, operations, and configuration changes on the resources securing the Private Key.
3. Subscriber uses a Signing Service which meets the requirements of [Section 6.2.7.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#6273-private-key-storage-for-signing-services).

**6.2.7.4.2 Subscriber Private Key verification**

Effective June 1, 2023, for Code Signing Certificates, CAs SHALL ensure that the Subscriber’s Private Key is generated, stored, and used in a suitable Hardware Crypto Module that meets or exceeds the requirements specified in [Section 6.2.7.4.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#62741-subscriber-private-key-protection). One of the following methods MUST be employed to satisfy this requirement:

1. The CA ships a suitable Hardware Crypto Module, with one or more pre-generated Key Pairs that the CA has generated using the Hardware Crypto Module;
2. The Subscriber counter-signs certificate requests that can be verified by using a manufacturer’s certificate, commonly known as key attestation, indicating that the Private Key was generated in a non-exportable way using a suitable Hardware Crypto Module;
3. The Subscriber uses a CA prescribed crypto library and a suitable Hardware Crypto Module combination for the Key Pair generation and storage;
4. The Subscriber provides an internal or external IT audit indicating that it is only using a suitable Hardware Crypto Module to generate Key Pairs to be associated with Code Signing Certificates;
5. The Subscriber provides a suitable report from the cloud-based key protection solution subscription and resources configuration protecting the Private Key in a suitable Hardware Crypto Module;
6. The CA relies on a report provided by the Applicant that is signed by an auditor who is approved by the CA and who has IT and security training or is a CISA witnesses the Key Pair creation in a suitable Hardware Crypto Module solution including a cloud-based key generation and protection solution;
7. The Subscriber provides an agreement that they use a Signing Service meeting the requirements of [Section 6.2.7.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#6273-private-key-storage-for-signing-services);
8. Any other method the CA uses to satisfy this requirement. The CA SHALL specify and describe in detail those other methods in its Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement, and SHALL propose those methods to the CA/Browser Forum Code Signing Working Group for inclusion into these requirements until June 1, 2023, using the questions@cabforum.org mailing list. After that date, the Code Signing Working Group will discuss the removal of this "any other method" and allow only CA/Browser Forum-approved methods.

**6.2.8 Method of activating private key**

**6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key**

**6.2.10 Method of destroying private key**

**6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating**

**6.3 Other aspects of key pair management**

**6.3.1 Public key archival**

**6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods**

Subscribers and Signing Services MAY sign Code at any point in the development or distribution process. Code Signatures may be verified at any time, including during download, unpacking, installation, reinstallation, or execution, or during a forensic investigation.

The validity period for a Code Signing Certificate issued to a Subscriber or Signing Service MUST NOT exceed 39 months.

The Timestamp Certificate validity period must not exceed 135 months. The Timestamp Certificate Key Pair MUST meet the requirements in [Section 6.1.5](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#615-key-sizes). The Timestamp Authority Private Key usage period is no greater than 15 months from the date of Timestamp Certificate issuance. Private Keys for Timestamp Certificates issued for greater than 15 months MUST be destroyed with 18 months from date of Timestamp Certificate issuance.

**6.4 Activation data**

**6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation**

**6.4.2 Activation data protection**

**6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data**

**6.5 Computer security controls**

**6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements**

The CA SHALL enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance.

**6.5.2 Computer security rating**

**6.6 Life cycle technical controls**

**6.6.1 System development controls**

**6.6.2 Security management controls**

**6.6.3 Life cycle security controls**

**6.7 Network security controls**

**6.8 Time-stamping**

If the CA issues Code Signing Certificates, then the CA MUST operate a Timestamp Authority that complies with RFC 3161. CAs MUST recommend to Subscribers that they use the CA's Timestamp Authority to timestamp signed code.

The Timestamp Authority MUST ensure that clock synchronization is maintained when a leap second occurs. A Timestamp Authority MUST synchronize its timestamp server at least every 24 hours with a UTC(k) time source. The timestamp server MUST automatically detect and report on clock drifts or jumps out of synchronization with UTC. Clock adjustments of one second or greater MUST be auditable events. Any changes to its signing process MUST be an auditable event.

The Timestamp Authority SHALL reject timestamp requests signed with SHA-1 digest algorithms.

The digest algorithm used to sign Timestamp tokens must match the digest algorithm used to sign the Timestamp Certificate.

**7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES**

**7.1 Certificate profile**

The CA SHALL meet the technical requirements set forth in [Section 2.2 - Publication of certification information](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#22-Publication-of-certification-information), [Section 6.1.5 - Key Sizes](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#615-key-sizes), and [Section 6.1.6 - Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#616-public-key-parameters-generation-and-quality-checking).

CAs SHALL generate non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

**7.1.1 Version number(s)**

Certificates MUST be of type X.509 v3.

**7.1.2 Certificate extensions**

This section specifies the additional requirements for Certificate content and extensions for Certificates.

**7.1.2.1 Root CA Certificate**

a. basicConstraints

This extension MUST appear as a critical extension. The cA field MUST be set true. The pathLenConstraint field SHOULD NOT be present.

b. keyUsage

This extension MUST be present and MUST be marked critical. Bit positions for keyCertSign and cRLSign MUST be set. If the Root CA Private Key is used for signing OCSP responses, then the digitalSignature bit MUST be set.

c. certificatePolicies

This extension SHOULD NOT be present.

d. extKeyUsage

This extension MUST NOT be present.

**7.1.2.2 Subordinate CA Certificate**

a. certificatePolicies

This extension MUST be present and SHOULD NOT be marked critical.

certificatePolicies:policyIdentifier Required; see [Section 7.1.6.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7163-subordinate-ca-certificates) for requirements on Policy Identifiers.

The following fields MUST be present if the Subordinate CA is not an Affiliate of the entity that controls the Root CA.

* certificatePolicies:policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId (Optional)

id-qt 1 [RFC5280].

* certificatePolicies:policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri (Optional)

HTTP URL for the Root CA's Certificate Policies, Certification Practice Statement, Relying Party agreement, or other pointer to online policy information provided by the CA.

b. cRLDistributionPoints

This extension MUST be present and MUST NOT be marked critical. It MUST contain the HTTP URL of the CA's CRL service.

c. authorityInformationAccess

This extension MUST be present. It MUST NOT be marked critical.

It MUST contain the HTTP URL of the Issuing CA's certificate (accessMethod = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2). If the CA provides OCSP responses, it MUST contain the HTTP URL of the Issuing CA's OCSP responder (accessMethod = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1).

d. basicConstraints

This extension MUST be present and MUST be marked critical. The cA field MUST be set true. The pathLenConstraint field MAY be present.

e. keyUsage

This extension MUST be present and MUST be marked critical. Bit positions for keyCertSign and cRLSign MUST be set. If the Subordinate CA Private Key is used for signing OCSP responses, then the digitalSignature bit MUST be set.

g. extKeyUsage

This extension MUST be present and SHOULD NOT be marked critical.

If the Subordinate CA will be used to issue Code Signing Certificates:

* id-kp-codeSigning MUST be present.
* id-kp-timeStamping MUST NOT be present.

If the Subordinate CA will be used to issue Timestamp Certificates:

* id-kp-timeStamping MUST be present.
* id-kp-codeSigning MUST NOT be present.

Additionally, the following EKUs MUST NOT be present:

* anyExtendedKeyUsage
* id-kp-serverAuth
* id-kp-emailProtection

Other values SHOULD NOT be present. If any other value is present, the CA MUST have a business agreement with a Platform vendor requiring that EKU in order to issue a Platform-specific code signing certificate with that EKU.

h. authorityKeyIdentifier

This extension MUST be present and MUST NOT be marked critical.

**7.1.2.3 Code signing and Timestamp Certificate**

a. certificatePolicies

This extension MUST be present and SHOULD NOT be marked critical.

* certificatePolicies:policyIdentifier (Required)

A Policy Identifier, defined by the issuing CA, that indicates a Certificate Policy asserting the issuing CA's adherence to and compliance with these Requirements.

The following fields MAY be present:

* certificatePolicies:policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId (Recommended)

id-qt 1 [RFC 5280].

* certificatePolicies:policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri (Optional)

HTTP URL for the Subordinate CA's Certification Practice Statement, Relying Party agreement or other pointer to online information provided by the CA.

b. cRLDistributionPoints

This extension MUST be present. It MUST NOT be marked critical, and it MUST contain the HTTP URL of the CA's CRL service.

c. authorityInformationAccess

This extension MUST be present. It MUST NOT be marked critical.

It MUST contain the HTTP URL of the Issuing CA's certificate (accessMethod = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2). If the CA provides OCSP responses, it MUST contain the HTTP URL of the Issuing CA's OCSP responder (accessMethod = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1).

d. basicConstraints (optional)

The cA field MUST NOT be true.

e. keyUsage

This extension MUST be present and MUST be marked critical.

The bit position for digitalSignature MUST be set. Bit positions for keyCertSign and cRLSign MUST NOT be set. All other bit positions SHOULD NOT be set.

f. extKeyUsage

If the Certificate is a Code Signing Certificate, then id-kp-codeSigning MUST be present and the following EKUs MAY be present:

* Lifetime Signing OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.13)
* id-kp-emailProtection
* Document Signing (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.3.10.3.12)

If the Certificate is a Timestamp Certificate, then id-kp-timeStamping MUST be present and MUST be marked critical.

Additionally, the following EKUs MUST NOT be present:

* anyExtendedKeyUsage
* id-kp-serverAuth

Other values SHOULD NOT be present. If any other value is present, the CA MUST have a business agreement with a Platform vendor requiring that EKU in order to issue a Platform-specific code signing certificate with that EKU.

g. authorityKeyIdentifier

This extension MUST be present and MUST NOT be marked critical.

**7.1.2.4 All Certificates**

All other fields and extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280. The CA SHALL NOT issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage flag, extKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not specified in [Section 7.1.2.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7121-root-ca-certificate), [Section 7.1.2.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7122-subordinate-ca-certificate), or [Section 7.1.2.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7123-code-signing-and-timestamp-certificate) unless the CA is aware of a reason for including the data in the Certificate.

CAs SHALL NOT issue a Certificate with:

a. Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet (such as an extKeyUsage value for a service that is only valid in the context of a privately managed network), unless: i. such value falls within an OID arc for which the Applicant demonstrates ownership, or ii. the Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data in a public context; or b. semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party about the certificate information verified by the CA (such as including an extKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to verify that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due to remote issuance).

**7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers**

**7.1.3.1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo**

As defined in [Section 6.1.5](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#615-key-sizes).

**7.1.3.2 Signature AlgorithmIdentifier**

All objects signed by a CA Private Key MUST conform to these requirements on the use of the AlgorithmIdentifier or AlgorithmIdentifier-derived type in the context of signatures.

In particular, it applies to all of the following objects and fields:

* The signatureAlgorithm field of a Certificate.
* The signature field of a TBSCertificate.
* The signatureAlgorithm field of a CertificateList
* The signature field of a TBSCertList
* The signatureAlgorithm field of a BasicOCSPResponse
* The digestAlgorithms field of a SignedData corresponding to a Timestamp token

**7.1.3.2.1 RSA**

The CA SHALL use one of the following signature algorithms:

* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 with SHA-256
* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 with SHA-384
* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 with SHA-512
* RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256
* RSASSA-PSS with SHA-384
* RSASSA-PSS with SHA-512

In addition, the CA MAY use RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 with SHA-1 if one of the following conditions are met:

* It is used within Timestamp Authority Certificate and the date of the notBefore field is not greater than 2022-04-30; or,
* It is used within an OCSP response; or,
* It is used within a CRL; or,
* It is used within a Timestamp Token and the date of the genTime field is not greater than 2022-04-30.

**7.1.3.2.2 ECDSA**

The CA SHALL use one of the following signature algorithms:

* ECDSA with SHA-256
* ECDSA with SHA-384
* ECDSA with SHA-512

**7.1.3.2.3 DSA**

The CA SHALL use the following signature algorithm:

* DSA with SHA-256

In addition, the CA MAY use DSA with SHA-1 if one of the following conditions are met:

* It is used within Timestamp Authority Certificate and the date of the notBefore field is not greater than 2022-04-30; or,
* It is used within an OCSP response; or,
* It is used within a CRL; or,
* It is used within a Timestamp Token and the date of the genTime field is not greater than 2022-04-30.

**7.1.4 Name forms**

**7.1.4.1 Name encoding**

The following requirements SHOULD be met by all newly-issued Subordinate CA Certificates that are not used to issue TLS certificates, as defined in [Section 7.1.2.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7122-subordinate-ca-certificate), and MUST be met for all other Certificates, regardless of whether the Certificate is a CA Certificate or a Subscriber Certificate.

For every valid Certification Path (as defined by RFC 5280, Section 6):

* For each Certificate in the Certification Path, the encoded content of the Issuer Distinguished Name field of a Certificate SHALL be byte-for-byte identical with the encoded form of the Subject Distinguished Name field of the Issuing CA certificate.
* For each CA Certificate in the Certification Path, the encoded content of the Subject Distinguished Name field of a Certificate SHALL be byte-for-byte identical among all Certificates whose Subject Distinguished Names can be compared as equal according to RFC 5280, Section 7.1, and including expired and revoked Certificates.

**7.1.4.2 Subject information - Subscriber Certificates**

**7.1.4.2.1 Subject alternative name extension**

No stipulation.

**7.1.4.2.2 Subject distinguished name fields - EV and Non-EV Code Signing Certificates**

a. **Certificate Field:** subject:commonName (OID 2.5.4.3)
**Required/Optional:** Required
**Contents:** This field MUST contain the Subject's legal name as verified under [Section 3.2.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#322-authentication-of-organization-identity) or [3.2.3](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#323-authentication-of-individual-identity).

b. **Certificate Field:** subject:organizationalUnitName (OID 2.5.4.11)
**Required/Optional:** Optional
**Contents:** The CA MUST implement a process that prevents an OU attribute from including a name, DBA, tradename, trademark, address, location, or other text that refers to a specific natural person or Legal Entity unless the CA has verified this information in accordance with [Section 3.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32-initial-identity-validation).

c. **Certificate Field:** subject:domainComponent (OID 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25)
**Required/Optional:** Prohibited
**Contents:** This field MUST not be present in a Code Signing Certificate.

d. **Certificate Field:** Other subject attributes
**Required/Optional:** Optional **Contents:** Other attributes MAY be present within the subject field. If present, other attributes MUST contain information that has been verified by the CA. Subject attributes MUST NOT contain only metadata such as '.', '-', and ' ' (i.e. space) characters, and/or any other indication that the value is absent, incomplete, or not applicable.

**7.1.4.2.3 Subject distinguished name field - Non-EV Code Signing Certificates**

a. **Certificate Field:** subject:organizationName (OID 2.5.4.10)
**Required/Optional:** Required
**Contents:** The subject:organizationName field MUST contain either the Subject's name or DBA as verified under BR Section 3.2. The CA MAY include information in this field that differs slightly from the verified name, such as common variations or abbreviations, provided that the CA documents the difference and any abbreviations used are locally accepted abbreviations; e.g., if the official record shows "Company Name Incorporated", the CA MAY use "Company Name Inc." or "Company Name". Because subject name attributes for individuals (e.g. subject:givenName (2.5.4.42) and subject:surname (2.5.4.4)) are not broadly supported by application software, the CA MAY use the subject:organizationName field to convey a natural person Subject's name or DBA. The CA MUST have a documented process for verifying that the information included in the subject:organizationName field is not misleading to a Relying Party.

b. **Certificate Field:** subject:streetAddress (OID: 2.5.4.9)
**Required/Optional:** Optional
**Contents:** If present, the subject:streetAddress field MUST contain the Subject's street address information as verified under BR Section 3.2.2.1 or 3.2.3.

c. **Certificate Field:** subject:localityName (OID: 2.5.4.7)
**Required/Optional:** Required if the subject:stateOrProvinceName field is absent. Optional if the subject:stateOrProvinceName field is present.
**Contents:** If present, the subject:localityName field MUST contain the Subject's locality information as verified under BR Section 3.2. If the subject:countryName field specifies the ISO 3166-1 user-assigned code of XX in accordance with BR Section 7.1.4.2.2.h., the subject:localityName field MAY contain the Subject's locality and/or state or province information as verified under BR Section 3.2.2.1 or 3.2.3.

d. **Certificate Field:** subject:stateOrProvinceName (OID: 2.5.4.8)
**Required/Optional:** Required if the subject:localityName field is absent. Optional if the subject:localityName field is present.
**Contents:** If present, the subject:stateOrProvinceName field MUST contain the Subject's state or province information as verified under BR Section 3.2.2.1 or 3.2.3. If the subject:countryName field specifies the ISO 3166-1 user-assigned code of XX in accordance with BR Section 7.1.4.2.2.h., the subject:stateOrProvinceName field MAY contain the full name of the Subject's country information as verified under BR Section 3.2.2.1 or 3.2.3.

e. **Certificate Field:** subject:postalCode (OID: 2.5.4.17)
**Required/Optional:** Optional
**Contents:** If present, the subject:postalCode field MUST contain the Subject's zip or postal information as verified under BR Section 3.2.2.1 or 3.2.3.

f. **Certificate Field:** subject:countryName (OID: 2.5.4.6)
**Required/Optional:** Required
**Contents:** The subject:countryName MUST contain the two-letter ISO 3166-1 country code associated with the location of the Subject verified under BR Section 3.2.2.3. If a Country is not represented by an official ISO 3166-1 country code, the CA MAY specify the ISO 3166-1 user-assigned code of XX indicating that an official ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code has not been assigned.

**7.1.4.2.4 Subject distinguished name fields - EV Code Signing Certificates**

a. **Certificate Field:** subject:organizationName (OID 2.5.4.10)
**Required/Optional:** Required
**Contents:** As specified in Section 9.2.1 of the EV Guidelines.

b. **Certificate Field:** subject:businessCategory (OID 2.5.4.15)
**Required/Optional:** Required
**Contents:** As specified in Section 9.2.3 of the EV Guidelines.

c. **Certificate Field:** Subject Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration Fields
**Required/Optional:** Required
**Contents:** As specified in Section 9.2.4 of the EV Guidelines.

d. **Certificate Field:** subject:serialNumber (2.5.4.5)
**Required/Optional:** Required
**Contents**: As specified in Section 9.2.5 of the EV Guidelines.

e. **Certificate Field:** Subject Physical Address of Place of Business Fields
**Required/Optional:** Required
**Contents**: As specified in Section 9.2.6 of the EV Guidelines.

**7.1.5 Name constraints**

**7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier**

This section sets forth minimum requirements for the content of the Subscriber, Subordinate CA, and Root CA Certificates, as they relate to the identification of Certificate Policy.

**7.1.6.1 Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers**

The following Certificate Policy Identifier is reserved for use by CAs as a required means of asserting compliance with these Requirements for Non-EV Code Signing Certificates:

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140) certificate-policies(1) code-signing-requirements(4) code signing(1)} (2.23.140.1.4.1)

The following Certificate Policy Identifier is reserved for use by CAs as a required means of asserting compliance with these Requirements for EV Code Signing Certificates follows:

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140) certificate-policies(1) code-signing-requirements(3)} (2.23.140.1.3)

The following Certificate Policy Identifier is reserved for use by CAs as a required means of asserting compliance with these Requirements for Timestamp Certificates:

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140) certificate-policies(1) code-signing-requirements(4) timestamping(2)} (2.23.140.1.4.2)

**7.1.6.2 Root CA Certificates**

A Root CA Certificate SHOULD NOT contain the certificatePolicies extension.

**7.1.6.3 Subordinate CA Certificates**

A Certificate issued to a Subordinate CA that is not an Affiliate of the Issuing CA:

1. MUST include the policy identifier that indicates the Subordinate CA's adherence to and compliance with these Requirements (i.e. either the CA/Browser Forum reserved identifiers as specified in [Section 7.1.6.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7161-reserved-certificate-policy-identifiers) or identifiers defined by the CA in its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement), and
2. MUST NOT contain the "anyPolicy" identifier (2.5.29.32.0).

A Certificate issued to a Subordinate CA that issues Code Signing Certificates and is an Affiliate of the Issuing CA:

1. MUST include the CA/Browser Forum reserved identifier specified in [Section 7.1.6.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7161-reserved-certificate-policy-identifiers) to indicate the Subordinate CA's compliance with these Requirements, and
2. MAY contain the "anyPolicy" identifier (2.5.29.32.0) in place of an explicit policy identifier.

A Certificate issued after 31 March 2022 to a Subordinate CA that issues Timestamp Certificates and is an Affiliate of the Issuing CA:

1. MUST include the CA/Browser Forum reserved identifier specified in [Section 7.1.6.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7161-reserved-certificate-policy-identifiers) to indicate the Subordinate CA’s compliance with these Requirements, and
2. MAY contain the “anyPolicy” identifier (2.5.29.32.0) in place of an explicit policy identifier.

A Subordinate CA MUST represent, in its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement, that all Certificates containing a policy identifier indicating compliance with these Requirements are issued and managed in accordance with these Requirements.

**7.1.6.4 Subscriber Certificates**

A Certificate issued to a Subscriber MUST contain one or more policy identifier(s), defined by the CA, in the Certificate's certificatePolicies extension that indicates adherence to and compliance with these Requirements. CAs complying with these Requirements MAY also assert the reserved policy OIDs in such Certificates.

The CA MUST document in its Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement that the Certificates it issues containing the specified policy identifier(s) are managed in accordance with these Requirements.

**7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension**

**7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics**

**7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension**

**7.2 CRL profile**

The serial number of a revoked Certificate MUST remain on the CRL for at least 10 years after the expiration of the Certificate. Application Software Suppliers MAY require the CA to support a longer life-time in its contract with the CA. If a Code Signing Certificate contains the Lifetime Signing OID, the Code Signature becomes invalid when the Code Signing Certificate expires, even if the Code Signature is timestamped. Because the Lifetime Signing OID is intended to be used with test purposes only, a CA MAY cease maintaining revocation information for a Code Signing Certificate with the Lifetime Signing OID after the Code Signing Certificate expires.

If a Code Signing Certificate previously has been revoked, and the CA later becomes aware of a more appropriate revocation date, then the CA MAY use that revocation date in subsequent CRL entries for that Code Signing Certificate.

**7.2.1 Version number(s)**

**7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions**

If a CRL has a thisUpdate field value of 2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC or later and the CA includes the Invalidity Date CRL entry extension in a CRL entry for a Code Signing Certificate, then the time encoded in the Invalidity Date CRL extension SHALL be equal to the time encoded in the revocationDate field of the CRL entry.

**7.3 OCSP profile**

If a Code Signing Certificate previously has been revoked, and the CA later becomes aware of a more appropriate revocation date, then the CA MAY use that revocation date in subsequent OCSP responses for that Code Signing Certificate.

**7.3.1 Version number(s)**

**7.3.2 OCSP extensions**

**8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS**

The CA and/or all Signing Services MUST, at all times:

1. Comply with all laws applicable to its business and the Certificates it issues in each jurisdiction where it operates,
2. Comply with these Requirements,
3. Comply with the audit requirements set forth in this section, and
4. If a CA, be licensed as a CA in each jurisdiction where it operates, if licensing is required by the law of such jurisdiction for the issuance of Certificates.
5. In all cases, the CA MUST contractually obligate each Delegated Third Party to comply with all applicable requirements in these Requirements and to perform them as required of the CA itself. The CA MUST enforce these obligations and internally audit each Delegated Third Party’s compliance with these Requirements on an annual basis.

**8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment**

Certificates that are capable of being used to issue new certificates MUST be fully audited in line with all remaining requirements from this section. A Certificate is deemed as capable of being used to issue new certificates if it contains an X.509v3 basicConstraints extension, with the cA boolean set to true and is therefore by definition a Root CA Certificate or a Subordinate CA Certificate.

The period during which the CA issues Certificates SHALL be divided into an unbroken sequence of audit periods. An audit period MUST NOT exceed one year in duration.

If the CA has a currently valid Audit Report indicating compliance with an audit scheme listed in [Section 8.4](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#84-topics-covered-by-assessment), then no pre-issuance readiness assessment is necessary.

If the CA does not have a currently valid Audit Report indicating compliance with one of the audit schemes listed in [Section 8.4](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#84-topics-covered-by-assessment), then, before issuing Code Signing Certificates, the CA MUST successfully complete a point-in-time readiness assessment performed in accordance with applicable standards under one of the audit schemes listed in [Section 8.4](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#84-topics-covered-by-assessment). The point-in-time readiness assessment MUST be completed no earlier than twelve (12) months prior to issuing Code Signing Certificates and MUST be followed by a complete audit under such scheme within ninety (90) days of issuing the first Code Signing Certificate.

Audits MUST be conducted for all obligations under these Guidelines, including timestamping and signing services, regardless of whether they are performed directly by the CA or by a Delegated Third Party. Functions performed by a Delegated Third Party MUST be included in the CA's audit or the CA MUST obtain an audit report from the Delegated Third Party. If the opinion is that the Delegated Third Party does not comply, then the CA MUST not allow the Delegated Third Party to continue performing delegated functions.

The audit period for the Delegated Third Party MUST NOT exceed one year (ideally aligned with the CA's audit).

**8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor**

The CA's audit SHALL be performed by a Qualified Auditor. A Qualified Auditor means a natural person, Legal Entity, or group of natural persons or Legal Entities that collectively possess the following qualifications and skills:

1. Independence from the subject of the audit;
2. The ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria specified in an Eligible Audit Scheme (see [Section 8.4](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#84-topics-covered-by-assessment));
3. Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining Public Key Infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and the third-party attestation function;
4. (For audits conducted in accordance with any one of the ETSI standards) accredited in accordance with ISO 17065 applying the requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 403;
5. (For audits conducted in accordance with the WebTrust standard) licensed by WebTrust;
6. Bound by law, government regulation, or professional code of ethics; and
7. Except in the case of an Internal Government Auditing Agency, maintains Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with policy limits of at least one million US dollars in coverage.

**8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity**

**8.4 Topics covered by assessment**

The CA MUST undergo a conformity assessment audit for compliance with these Requirements performed in accordance with one of the following schemes:

1. For Audit Periods starting before November 1st, 2020: "WebTrust for CAs v2.0 or newer" AND "WebTrust for Certification Authorities -- Publicly Trusted Code Signing Certificates v1.0.1 or newer"; or
2. For Audit Periods starting before November 1st, 2020: "WebTrust for CAs v2.0 or newer" AND "WebTrust for Certification Authorities -- Extended Validation Code Signing v1.4.1 or newer"; or
3. “WebTrust for CAs v2.0 or newer” AND “WebTrust for Certification Authorities – Code Signing Baseline Requirements v2.0 or newer”; or
4. ETSI EN 319 411-1, which includes normative references to ETSI EN 319 401 (the latest version of the referenced ETSI documents should be applied); or
5. If a government CA is required by its Certificate Policy to use a different internal audit scheme, it MAY use such scheme provided that the audit either (a) encompasses all requirements of one of the above schemes or (b) consists of comparable criteria that are available for public review.

Whichever scheme is chosen, it MUST incorporate periodic monitoring and/or accountability procedures to ensure that its audits continue to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the scheme.

The audit MUST be conducted by a Qualified Auditor, as specified in [Section 8.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#82-identityqualifications-of-assessor).

The audit MUST cover all CA obligations under these Guidelines regardless of whether they are performed directly by the CA, an RA, or subcontractor.

**8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency**

**8.6 Communication of results**

The Audit Report SHALL state explicitly that it covers the relevant systems and processes used in the issuance of all Certificates that assert one or more of the policy identifiers listed in [Section 7.1.6.1](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#7161-reserved-certificate-policy-identifiers). The CA SHALL make the Audit Report publicly available.

The CA MUST make its Audit Report publicly available no later than three months after the end of the audit period. In the event of a delay greater than three months, the CA SHALL provide an explanatory letter signed by the Qualified Auditor.

The Audit Report MUST contain at least the following clearly-labelled information:

1. name of the organization being audited;
2. name and address of the organization performing the audit;
3. the SHA-256 fingerprint of all Roots and Subordinate CA Certificates, including Cross Certificates, that were in-scope of the audit;
4. audit criteria, with version number(s), that were used to audit each of the certificates (and associated keys);
5. a list of the CA policy documents, with version numbers, referenced during the audit;
6. whether the audit assessed a period of time or a point in time;
7. the start date and end date of the Audit Period, for those that cover a period of time;
8. the point in time date, for those that are for a point in time;
9. the date the report was issued, which will necessarily be after the end date or point in time date; and
10. (for audits conducted in accordance with any of the ETSI standards) a statement to indicate if the audit was a full audit or a surveillance audit, and which portions of the criteria were applied and evaluated, e.g. DVCP, OVCP, NCP, NCP+, LCP, EVCP, EVCP+, QCP-w, Part 1 (General Requirements), and/or Part 2 (Requirements for Trust Service Providers).
11. (for audits conducted in accordance with any of the ETSI standards) a statement to indicate that the auditor referenced the applicable CA/Browser Forum criteria, such as this document, and the version used.

An authoritative English language version of the publicly available audit information MUST be provided by the Qualified Auditor and the CA SHALL ensure it is publicly available.

The Audit Report MUST be available as a PDF, and SHALL be text searchable for all information required. Each SHA-256 fingerprint within the Audit Report MUST be uppercase letters and MUST NOT contain colons, spaces, or line feeds.

**8.7 Self-audits**

CAs must abide by the self-audit requirements of these Guidelines. During the period in which it issues Code Signing Certificates, the CA MUST strictly control its service quality by performing ongoing self-audits against a randomly selected sample of at least three percent of the Non-EV Code Signing Certificates and at least three percent of the EV Code Signing Certificates it has issued in the period beginning immediately after the last sample was taken. For all Code Signing Certificates where the final cross-correlation and due diligence requirements of Section 8 of these Guidelines is performed by an RA, the CA MUST strictly control its service quality by performing ongoing self-audits against a randomly selected sample of at least six percent of the Non-EV Code Signing Certificates and at least six percent of the EV Code Signing Certificates it has issued in the period beginning immediately after the last sample was taken.

**9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS**

**9.1 Fees**

**9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees**

**9.1.2 Certificate access fees**

**9.1.3 Revocation or status information access fees**

**9.1.4 Fees for other services**

**9.1.5 Refund policy**

**9.2 Financial responsibility**

**9.2.1 Insurance coverage**

For EV Code Signing Certificates, the CA must meet the requirements and abide by the obligation in Section 8.4 of the EV Guidelines.

**9.2.2 Other assets**

**9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities**

**9.3 Confidentiality of business information**

**9.3.1 Scope of confidential information**

**9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information**

**9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information**

**9.4 Privacy of personal information**

**9.4.1 Privacy plan**

**9.4.2 Information treated as private**

**9.4.3 Information not deemed private**

**9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information**

**9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information**

**9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process**

**9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances**

**9.5 Intellectual property rights**

**9.6 Representations and warranties**

**9.6.1 CA representations and warranties**

The Certificate warranties specifically include, but are not limited to the following:

1. **Compliance**. The CA and any Signing Service each represents that it has complied with these Requirements and the applicable Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement in issuing each Code Signing Certificate and operating its PKI or Signing Service.
2. **Legal Existence**: For EV Code Signing Certificates, the CA has confirmed with the Incorporating or Registration Agency in the Subject's Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration that, as of the date the EV Code Signing Certificate was issued, the Subject of the EV Code Signing Certificate legally exists as a valid organization or entity in the Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration.
3. **Identity of Subscriber**: At the time of issuance, the CA or Signing Service represents that it (i) operated a procedure for verifying the identity of the Subscriber that at least meets the requirements in [Section 3.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#32-initial-identity-validation) of this document, (ii) followed the procedure when issuing or managing the Certificate, and (iii) accurately described the same procedure in the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement.
4. **Authorization for Certificate:** At the time of issuance, the CA represents that it (i) operated a procedure for verifying that the Applicant authorized the issuance of the Certificate, (ii) followed the procedure, and (iii) accurately described the same procedure in the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement.
5. **Accuracy of Information:** At the time of issuance, the CA represents that it (i) operated a procedure for verifying that all of the information contained in the Certificate (with the exception of the subject:organizationalUnitName attribute) was true and accurate, (ii) followed the procedure, and (iii) accurately described the same procedure in the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement.
6. **Key Protection:** The CA represents that it provided the Subscriber at the time of issuance with documentation on how to securely store and prevent the misuse of Private Keys associated with Code Signing Certificates, or in the case of a Signing Service, securely stored and prevented the misuse of Private Keys associated with Code Signing Certificates;
7. **Subscriber Agreement:** The CA and Signing Service represent that the CA or Signing Service entered into a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber Agreement with the Applicant that satisfies these Requirements or, if they are affiliated, the Applicant Representative has acknowledged and accepted the Terms of Use.
8. **Status:** The CA represents that it will maintain a 24 x 7 online-accessible Repository with current information regarding the status of Certificates as valid or revoked for the period required by these Requirements.
9. **Revocation:** The CA represents that it will revoke a Certificate upon the occurrence of a revocation event specified in these Requirements.

**9.6.2 RA representations and warranties**

**9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties**

The CA or Signing Service MUST require, as part of the Subscriber Agreement, that the Applicant make the commitments and warranties set forth in this section, as applicable, for the benefit of the CA and the Certificate Beneficiaries.

Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, the CA SHALL obtain, for the express benefit of the CA and the Certificate Beneficiaries, either:

1. The Applicant’s agreement to the Subscriber Agreement with the CA, or
2. The Applicant’s acknowledgement of the Terms of Use.

The CA SHALL implement a process to ensure that each Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use is legally enforceable against the Applicant. In either case, the Agreement MUST apply to the Certificate to be issued pursuant to the certificate request. The CA MAY use an electronic or “click‐through” Agreement provided that the CA has determined that such agreements are legally enforceable. A separate Agreement MAY be used for each certificate request, or a single Agreement MAY be used to cover multiple future certificate requests and the resulting Certificates, so long as each Certificate that the CA issues to the Applicant is clearly covered by that Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use. The Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use MUST contain provisions imposing on the Applicant itself (or made by the Applicant on behalf of its principal or agent under a subcontractor or hosting service relationship) the following obligations and warranties:

1. **Accuracy of Information:** To provide accurate and complete information at all times in connection with the issuance of a Certificate, including in the Certificate Request and as otherwise requested by the CA.
2. **Protection of Private Key:** Where the key is available outside a Signing Service, to maintain sole control of, keep confidential, and properly protect, at all times in accordance with [Section 6.2.7.4](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#6274-subscriber-private-key-protection-and-verification), the Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key to be included in the requested Certificate(s) (and any associated activation data or device, e.g. password or token). The CA MUST provide the Subscriber with documentation on how to protect a Private Key. The CA MAY provide this documentation as a white paper or as part of the Subscriber Agreement. The Subscriber MUST represent that it will generate and operate any device storing private keys in a secure manner, as described in a document of code signing best practices, which the CA MUST provide to the Subscriber during the ordering process. The CA MUST obligate the Subscriber to use passwords that are randomly generated with at least 16 characters containing uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols to transport private keys.
3. **Private Key Reuse:** To not apply for a Code Signing Certificate if the Public Key in the Certificate is or will be used with a non-Code Signing Certificate.
4. **Use:** To use the Certificate and associated Private Key only for authorized and legal purposes, including not using the Certificate to sign Suspect Code and to use the Certificate and Private Key solely in compliance with all applicable laws and solely in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.
5. **Compliance with Industry Standards**: An acknowledgment and acceptance that the CA may modify the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use when necessary to comply with any changes in these Requirements or the Baseline Requirements.
6. **Prevention of Misuse:** To provide adequate network and other security controls to protect against misuse of the Private Key and that the CA will revoke the Certificate without requiring prior notification if there is unauthorized access to the Private Keys.
7. **Acceptance of Certificate:** Not to use the Certificate until after the Applicant, or an agent of Applicant, has reviewed and verified the Certificate contents for accuracy.
8. **Reporting and Revocation:** To promptly cease using a Certificate and its associated Private Key and promptly request that the CA revoke the Certificate if the Subscriber believes that (a) any information in the Certificate is, or becomes, incorrect or inaccurate, (b) the Private Key associated with the Public Key contained in the Certificate was misused or compromised, or (c) there is evidence that the Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code.
9. **Sharing of Information**: An acknowledgment and acceptance that, if: (a) the Certificate or the Applicant is identified as a source of Suspect Code, (b) the authority to request the Certificate cannot be verified, or (c) the Certificate is revoked for reasons other than Subscriber request (e.g. as a result of private key compromise, discovery of malware, etc.), then the CA is authorized to share information about the Applicant, signed application, Certificate, and surrounding circumstances with other CAs or industry groups, including the CA/Browser Forum.
10. **Termination of Use of Certificate:** To promptly cease using the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key listed in a Certificate upon expiration or revocation of the Certificate.
11. **Responsiveness:** An obligation to respond to the CA's instructions concerning Key Compromise or Certificate misuse within a specified time period.
12. **Acknowledgment and Acceptance:** An acknowledgement and acceptance that the CA is entitled to revoke the certificate immediately if the Applicant were to violate the Terms of Use or the Subscriber Agreement.

**9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties**

**9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants**

The CA MUST contractually obligate each Signing Service to inform the CA if the Signing Service becomes aware (by whatever means) that the Signing Service has signed Suspect Code. The CA MUST require the Signing Service to request revocation of the affected Certificate and provide immediate notice to the CA if the Signing Service's private key, or private key activation data, is compromised or believed to be compromised. The CA MUST revoke the affected Certificate upon request by the Signing Service or if the CA determines the Signing Service failed to notify the CA within 24 hours after identifying a private key compromise.

Signing Services MUST obtain the Subscriber's commitment to:

1. Use such signing services solely for authorized purposes that comply with the Subscriber Agreement/Terms of Use, these Requirements, and all applicable laws,
2. Not knowingly submit software for Code Signature that contains Suspect Code, and
3. Inform the Signing Service if it is discovered (by whatever means) that Code submitted to the Signing Service for Code Signature contained Suspect Code

**9.7 Disclaimers of warranties**

**9.8 Limitations of liability**

For delegated tasks, the CA and any Delegated Third Party MAY allocate liability between themselves contractually as they determine, but the CA SHALL remain fully responsible for the performance of all parties in accordance with these Requirements, as if the tasks had not been delegated.

For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates, the CA MAY disclaim liability to the Certificate Beneficiaries or any other third parties for any losses suffered as a result of use or reliance on such Certificate beyond those specified in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement. If the CA has not issued or managed the Certificate in compliance with these Requirements and its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement, the CA MAY seek to limit its liability to the Subscriber and to Relying Parties, regardless of the cause of action or legal theory involved, for any and all claims, losses or damages suffered as a result of the use or reliance on such Certificate by any appropriate means that the CA desires. If the CA chooses to limit its liability for Certificates that are not issued or managed in compliance with these Requirements or its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement, then the CA SHALL include the limitations on liability in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement.

For EV Code Signing Certificates, CAs MAY limit their liability as described in this Section 9.8 for Non-EV Code Signing Certificates, but MUST NOT limit its liability to Subscribers or Relying Parties for legally recognized and provable claims to a monetary amount less than two thousand US dollars per Subscriber or Relying Party per EV Code Signing Certificate.

**9.9 Indemnities**

Notwithstanding any limitations on its liability to Subscribers and Relying Parties, the CA understands and acknowledges that the Application Software Suppliers who have a Root Certificate distribution agreement in place with the Root CA do not assume any obligation or potential liability of the CA under these Requirements or that otherwise might exist because of the issuance or maintenance of Certificates or reliance thereon by Relying Parties or others. Thus, except in the case where the CA is a government entity, the CA SHALL defend, indemnify, and hold harmless each Application Software Supplier for any and all claims, damages, and losses suffered by such Application Software Supplier related to a Certificate issued by the CA, regardless of the cause of action or legal theory involved. This does not apply, however, to any claim, damages, or loss suffered by such Application Software Supplier related to a Certificate issued by the CA where such claim, damage, or loss was directly caused by such Application Software Supplier's software displaying as not trustworthy a Certificate that is still valid, or displaying as trustworthy: (1) a Certificate that has expired, or (2) a Certificate that has been revoked (but only in cases where the revocation status is currently available from the CA online, and the application software either failed to check such status or ignored an indication of revoked status).

**9.10 Term and termination**

**9.10.1 Term**

**9.10.2 Termination**

**9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival**

**9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants**

**9.12 Amendments**

**9.12.1 Procedure for amendment**

**9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period**

**9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed**

**9.13 Dispute resolution provisions**

**9.14 Governing law**

**9.15 Compliance with applicable law**

**9.16 Miscellaneous provisions**

**9.16.1 Entire agreement**

**9.16.2 Assignment**

**9.16.3 Severability**

If a court or government body with jurisdiction over the activities covered by these Requirements determines that the performance of any mandatory requirement is illegal, then such requirement is considered reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make the requirement valid and legal. This applies only to operations or certificate issuances that are subject to the laws of that jurisdiction. The parties involved MUST notify the CA/Browser Forum of the facts, circumstances, and law(s) involved.

**9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)**

**9.16.5 Force Majeure**

**9.17 Other provisions**

**Appendix A High risk regions of concern**

The geographic locations listed below have more than 5% of the Code Signing Certificates for that location associated with signed Suspect Code when compared to the number of all Code Signing Certificates for that area. Applications originating or associated from one of these HRRCs are considered high risk and require additional verification as specified under [Section 4.2.2](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#422-approval-or-rejection-of-certificate-applications) of this document:

NONE

**Footnotes**

1. Backdating the revocationDate field is an exception to best practice described in RFC 5280 (section 5.3.2); however, these Requirements specify the use of the revocationDate field to convey the “invalidity date” to support Application Software Supplier software implementations that process the revocationDate field as the date when the Certificate is first considered to be invalid. [↩](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#user-content-fnref-*-f82c2e242ddfd9b3ab6cfdb4e2c30fd9)
2. CAs MAY sign Cross-Certificates with Root CA RSA Private Keys whose modulus length is less than 4096 bits, provided that the Cross-Certificate is issued to a Root CA whose Public Key adheres to the key size requirements of this section. [↩](https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/blob/importTLSBRrefs/docs/CSBR.md#user-content-fnref-legacy_key_length-f82c2e242ddfd9b3ab6cfdb4e2c30fd9)