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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=ES link="#0563C1" vlink="#954F72" style='word-wrap:break-word'><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>></span><span lang=EN-US>I thought the intent of the ballot was to require the CA to guarantee to the maximum extent possible that the keys are on a token of suitable security and to not let the subscriber to “claim” they are following the rules.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>With this “representation” the CA is not guaranteeing anything. The CA is just looking to the other side with a form/document that values nothing or very few.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>> That would mean shipping tokens with the keys on it, <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Yes, correct. This is an option.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>> to only permit key generation using a CA controlled/specified list of CSPs that will work only with tokens of suitable security.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Also correct.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>These are tasks that CAs are already using for issuing other certificate types so don´t understand why we´re not leveraging the level in place<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>I also agree with the question, if not rhetoric </span><span lang=EN-GB style='font-family:"Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>😊</span><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-GB>De:</span></b><span lang=EN-GB> Doug Beattie <doug.beattie@globalsign.com> <br><b>Enviado el:</b> miércoles, 9 de marzo de 2022 13:25<br><b>Para:</b> Inigo Barreira <Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com>; Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>; Dean Coclin <dean.coclin@digicert.com>; cscwg-public@cabforum.org; Bruce Morton <bruce.morton@entrust.com>; Ian McMillan <ianmcm@microsoft.com><br><b>Asunto:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>I thought the intent of the ballot was to require the CA to guarantee to the maximum extent possible that the keys are on a token of suitable security and to not let the subscriber to “claim” they are following the rules. That would mean shipping tokens with the keys on it, using the attestation certificate, or to only permit key generation using a CA controlled/specified list of CSPs that will work only with tokens of suitable security.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>What is the intent of the ballot in this area, to let the subscribe claim they are following the rules, or to force them to follow the rules?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Doug<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US> Inigo Barreira <<a href="mailto:Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com">Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 9, 2022 4:22 AM<br><b>To:</b> Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>>; Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:dean.coclin@digicert.com">dean.coclin@digicert.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>Yes, please. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>It looks like this representation means something like “click here if you are over 18” or “click here if you agree” because these are also facts not opinions. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>IMO the message here is that CAs will rely in whatever the subscriber says, e.g., “yes, I´m a good guy and promise that I will keep my keys in a hardware device …” rather on making the corresponding tasks to ensure. Is this the right approach? This is what I understand from Dean´s response because CAs are not attesting anything just relying in a form signed by the subscriber in where it may say whatever.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>Regards<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b>De:</b> Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>> <br><b>Enviado el:</b> martes, 8 de marzo de 2022 20:35<br><b>Para:</b> Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:dean.coclin@digicert.com">dean.coclin@digicert.com</a>>; Inigo Barreira <<a href="mailto:Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com">Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>><br><b>Asunto:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>“representation” is being used here in the legal sense: “</span><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#404040;background:white'>a <span class=hvr>statement</span> of <span class=hvr>fact.</span> A <span class=hvr>representation</span> <span class=hvr>should</span> be <span class=hvr>distinguished</span> <span class=hvr>from</span> a <span class=hvr>statement</span> of <span class=hvr>opinion</span> <span class=hvr>for</span> <span class=hvr>many</span> <span class=hvr>legal</span> <span class=hvr>purposes,</span> <span class=hvr>especially</span> in <span class=hvr>relation</span> to <span class=hvr>contractual</span> <span class=hvr>obligations.</span></span><span lang=EN-US>”<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>We should perhaps be using plain English instead of legalese.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>-Tim<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US> Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:dean.coclin@digicert.com">dean.coclin@digicert.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 8, 2022 1:00 PM<br><b>To:</b> Inigo Barreira <<a href="mailto:Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com">Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'>This means exactly what it says, some representation that the subscriber makes to honor the condition. This traditionally has been something in writing that the subscriber signs and submits to the CA. CAs can provide a form to the subscriber which they attest to.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US> Cscwg-public <<a href="mailto:cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org">cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Inigo Barreira via Cscwg-public<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 8, 2022 11:03 AM<br><b>To:</b> Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal>Hi all,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>Reviewing the section 16.3.1 I have a “wording” question. What does it mean that “The CA MUST obtain a representation from the Subscriber that the Subscriber will use one of the following options …”. So, what is a “representation from the subscriber”?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>Regards<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b>De:</b> Cscwg-public <<a href="mailto:cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org">cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>> <b>En nombre de </b>Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public<br><b>Enviado el:</b> jueves, 3 de marzo de 2022 15:08<br><b>Para:</b> Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Asunto:</b> Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div style='border:solid black 1.0pt;padding:2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:12.0pt;background:#FAFA03'><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:10.0pt;color:black'>CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Doug,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Regarding the 16.2 section, this statement was also struck-out, “After 2021-06-01, the same protection requirements SHALL apply to Non EV Code Signing Certificates.” So I believe that the requirement already applied to normal code signing certificates. The edits are just a cleanup.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Bruce.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US> Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 3, 2022 6:56 AM<br><b>To:</b> Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:Bruce.Morton@entrust.com">Bruce.Morton@entrust.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL] RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.<br>DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN-US><hr size=1 width="100%" align=center></span></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Hi Ian,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Good work on section 16.3, that is much more clear now. I have 2 more comments for your consideration.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Comment #1:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>In Section 11.7 we say:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:36.0pt'><span lang=EN-US>If the CA is aware that the Applicant was the victim of a Takeover Attack, the CA MUST verify that the Applicant is protecting its Code Signing Private Keys under Section 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2). The CA MUST verify the Applicant’s compliance with Section 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2) (i) through technical means that confirm the Private Keys are protected using the method described in 16.3.1(1) or 16.3.1(2) or (ii) by relying on a report provided by the Applicant that is signed by an auditor who is approved by the CA and who has IT and security training or is a CISA.</span><span lang=EN-US style='font-family:"Cambria",serif'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>But now there are actually 2 lists in sections 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2) with those list numbers. Do we need to be more specific, or renumber the second list a-c? <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>After 15 November, what is the right remediation for Take Over attack, do we need to reference one or more of the items in the new list (the list we might renumber a-c), or is there no remediation now?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>There are multiple references to 16.3.1(1) so we’d want to apply the same logic to all instances.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Comment #2:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Section 16.2 removed the reference to EV in the scope so this applies to normal Code signing certificates. Since this does not have a date associated with it, do we assume that this requirement change for normal code signing certs is effective immediately?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US> Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 2, 2022 5:56 PM<br><b>To:</b> Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Thank you, Tim, I really like the structure suggestions here. I’ve made those updates per your suggestion in the attached copy of the redline document. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>I’ll note your endorsement.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Ian<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US> Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 2, 2022 4:57 PM<br><b>To:</b> Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL] RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>I would recommend against using parentheticals to express the deprecation dates, as it makes the sentences more complicated than they need to be. I’d just modify the first sentence of each part so the structure is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US> For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to November 15, 2022, …<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US> For EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to November 15, 2022, …<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US> Effective November 15, 2022, …<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>But otherwise, the updates look good and we are willing to endorse CSC-13.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>-Tim<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt'><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=EN-US>From:</span></b><span lang=EN-US> Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 2, 2022 11:31 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Hi Folks,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Attached you will find an updated redline doc of v2.7 of the CSBRs with the updates to the subscriber private key protection requirements as outlined previously in CSC-6. This updated version also includes edits to address issues Doug Beattie raised during the voting period of CSC-6, so I am looking for confirmation from Doug on these edits addressing the concerns he raised. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Additionally, I’m looking to get endorsements on this ballot under <a href="https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.cabforum.org%2Fcscwg%2Fcsc_13_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements&data=04%7C01%7Cinigo.barreira%40sectigo.com%7C8c395e17677b473299fe08d9fd1f31e3%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C637819132704229104%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=vVY6kf6AeMZd%2FrkLBqxgdyGhAQRLqyqUXVG2B5vGejM%3D&reserved=0" title="cscwg:csc_13_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements">CSC 13 - Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements</a>, and hope that Bruce and Tim, as previous endorsers can review the edits and endorse the new ballot. Once we have endorsers I’ll proceed with the formal ballot process. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-US>Ian <o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></div></body></html>