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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link="#0563C1" vlink="#954F72" style='word-wrap:break-word'><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>I thought the intent of the ballot was to require the CA to guarantee to the maximum extent possible that the keys are on a token of suitable security and to not let the subscriber to “claim” they are following the rules. That would mean shipping tokens with the keys on it, using the attestation certificate, or to only permit key generation using a CA controlled/specified list of CSPs that will work only with tokens of suitable security.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>What is the intent of the ballot in this area, to let the subscribe claim they are following the rules, or to force them to follow the rules?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Doug<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Inigo Barreira <Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 9, 2022 4:22 AM<br><b>To:</b> Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>; Dean Coclin <dean.coclin@digicert.com>; cscwg-public@cabforum.org; Bruce Morton <bruce.morton@entrust.com>; Doug Beattie <doug.beattie@globalsign.com>; Ian McMillan <ianmcm@microsoft.com><br><b>Subject:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>Yes, please. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>It looks like this representation means something like “click here if you are over 18” or “click here if you agree” because these are also facts not opinions. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>IMO the message here is that CAs will rely in whatever the subscriber says, e.g., “yes, Iīm a good guy and promise that I will keep my keys in a hardware device …” rather on making the corresponding tasks to ensure. Is this the right approach? This is what I understand from Deanīs response because CAs are not attesting anything just relying in a form signed by the subscriber in where it may say whatever.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>Regards<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=ES>De:</span></b><span lang=ES> Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com> <br><b>Enviado el:</b> martes, 8 de marzo de 2022 20:35<br><b>Para:</b> Dean Coclin <dean.coclin@digicert.com>; Inigo Barreira <Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com>; cscwg-public@cabforum.org; Bruce Morton <bruce.morton@entrust.com>; Doug Beattie <doug.beattie@globalsign.com>; Ian McMillan <ianmcm@microsoft.com><br><b>Asunto:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=ES><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal>“representation” is being used here in the legal sense: “<span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:#404040;background:white'>a <span class=hvr>statement</span> of <span class=hvr>fact.</span> A <span class=hvr>representation</span> <span class=hvr>should</span> be <span class=hvr>distinguished</span> <span class=hvr>from</span> a <span class=hvr>statement</span> of <span class=hvr>opinion</span> <span class=hvr>for</span> <span class=hvr>many</span> <span class=hvr>legal</span> <span class=hvr>purposes,</span> <span class=hvr>especially</span> in <span class=hvr>relation</span> to <span class=hvr>contractual</span> <span class=hvr>obligations.</span></span>”<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>We should perhaps be using plain English instead of legalese.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>-Tim<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Dean Coclin <<a href="mailto:dean.coclin@digicert.com">dean.coclin@digicert.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 8, 2022 1:00 PM<br><b>To:</b> Inigo Barreira <<a href="mailto:Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com">Inigo.Barreira@sectigo.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>This means exactly what it says, some representation that the subscriber makes to honor the condition. This traditionally has been something in writing that the subscriber signs and submits to the CA. CAs can provide a form to the subscriber which they attest to.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Cscwg-public <<a href="mailto:cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org">cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Inigo Barreira via Cscwg-public<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 8, 2022 11:03 AM<br><b>To:</b> Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=ES>Hi all,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=ES><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>Reviewing the section 16.3.1 I have a “wording” question. What does it mean that “The CA MUST obtain a representation from the Subscriber that the Subscriber will use one of the following options …”. So, what is a “representation from the subscriber”?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB>Regards<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN-GB><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span lang=ES>De:</span></b><span lang=ES> Cscwg-public <<a href="mailto:cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org">cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org</a>> <b>En nombre de </b>Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public<br><b>Enviado el:</b> jueves, 3 de marzo de 2022 15:08<br><b>Para:</b> Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a><br><b>Asunto:</b> Re: [Cscwg-public] Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><span lang=ES><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div style='border:solid black 1.0pt;padding:2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt 2.0pt'><p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:12.0pt;background:#FAFA03'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;color:black'>CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>Doug,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Regarding the 16.2 section, this statement was also struck-out, “After 2021-06-01, the same protection requirements SHALL apply to Non EV Code Signing Certificates.” So I believe that the requirement already applied to normal code signing certificates. The edits are just a cleanup.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Bruce.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 3, 2022 6:56 AM<br><b>To:</b> Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:Bruce.Morton@entrust.com">Bruce.Morton@entrust.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL] RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.<br>DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.<o:p></o:p></p><div class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><hr size=1 width="100%" align=center></div><p class=MsoNormal>Hi Ian,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Good work on section 16.3, that is much more clear now. I have 2 more comments for your consideration.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Comment #1:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>In Section 11.7 we say:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>If the CA is aware that the Applicant was the victim of a Takeover Attack, the CA MUST verify that the Applicant is protecting its Code Signing Private Keys under Section 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2). The CA MUST verify the Applicant’s compliance with Section 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2) (i) through technical means that confirm the Private Keys are protected using the method described in 16.3.1(1) or 16.3.1(2) or (ii) by relying on a report provided by the Applicant that is signed by an auditor who is approved by the CA and who has IT and security training or is a CISA.<span style='font-family:"Cambria",serif'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>But now there are actually 2 lists in sections 16.3.1(1) or Section 16.3.1(2) with those list numbers. Do we need to be more specific, or renumber the second list a-c? <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>After 15 November, what is the right remediation for Take Over attack, do we need to reference one or more of the items in the new list (the list we might renumber a-c), or is there no remediation now?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>There are multiple references to 16.3.1(1) so we’d want to apply the same logic to all instances.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Comment #2:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Section 16.2 removed the reference to EV in the scope so this applies to normal Code signing certificates. Since this does not have a date associated with it, do we assume that this requirement change for normal code signing certs is effective immediately?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 2, 2022 5:56 PM<br><b>To:</b> Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Thank you, Tim, I really like the structure suggestions here. I’ve made those updates per your suggestion in the attached copy of the redline document. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>I’ll note your endorsement.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Cheers,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Ian<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 2, 2022 4:57 PM<br><b>To:</b> Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>>; <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL] RE: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>I would recommend against using parentheticals to express the deprecation dates, as it makes the sentences more complicated than they need to be. I’d just modify the first sentence of each part so the structure is as follows:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> For Non-EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to November 15, 2022, …<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> For EV Code Signing Certificates issued prior to November 15, 2022, …<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> Effective November 15, 2022, …<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>But otherwise, the updates look good and we are willing to endorse CSC-13.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>-Tim<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Ian McMillan <<a href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com">ianmcm@microsoft.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 2, 2022 11:31 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Doug Beattie <<a href="mailto:doug.beattie@globalsign.com">doug.beattie@globalsign.com</a>>; Bruce Morton <<a href="mailto:bruce.morton@entrust.com">bruce.morton@entrust.com</a>>; Tim Hollebeek <<a href="mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements (CSC-6 to CSC-13)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Hi Folks,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Attached you will find an updated redline doc of v2.7 of the CSBRs with the updates to the subscriber private key protection requirements as outlined previously in CSC-6. This updated version also includes edits to address issues Doug Beattie raised during the voting period of CSC-6, so I am looking for confirmation from Doug on these edits addressing the concerns he raised. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Additionally, I’m looking to get endorsements on this ballot under <a href="https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.cabforum.org%2Fcscwg%2Fcsc_13_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements&data=04%7C01%7Cinigo.barreira%40sectigo.com%7C8c395e17677b473299fe08d9fd1f31e3%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C637819132704229104%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=vVY6kf6AeMZd%2FrkLBqxgdyGhAQRLqyqUXVG2B5vGejM%3D&reserved=0" title="cscwg:csc_13_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements">CSC 13 - Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements</a>, and hope that Bruce and Tim, as previous endorsers can review the edits and endorse the new ballot. Once we have endorsers I’ll proceed with the formal ballot process. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Cheers,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Ian <o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div></body></html>