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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18/11/2021 4:09 μ.μ., Bruce Morton
wrote:<br>
</div>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Hi Dimitris,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I don’t accept that IT audit will not be
used. The reason is that the ballot will remove software keys
from non-EV code signing certificates. This is a new
requirement and will impact the majority of the certificates
and the Subscribers. In addition, there was no requirement to
check how Subscriber keys were generated or non-EV code
signing certificates, another new requirement.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
This is confusing. We had this language for EV Code Signing
Certificates and nobody was using it. How would it be used for
non-ev code signing certificates?<br>
<br>
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<p class="MsoNormal">I don’t think that a CA or Qualified
Auditor can audit a bank of HSMs in production, HA and DR
modes for all the keys which a software developer will need
for the next undefined period of time. They can only look at
the past. I understand that you can ship a token with more
than one key, but the HSM might have thousands or millions of
keys required for generation on-demand.</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
Ok, so you are thinking of a Subscriber that owns an HSM and gets an
IT audit that has an audit report that asserts that all Keys
associated with Code Signing Certificates are generated in an
on-prem certified HSM. Is this what this method is supposed to
cover?<br>
<br>
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cite="mid:DM5PR11MB00419DE53956BFF1201F1D01829B9@DM5PR11MB0041.namprd11.prod.outlook.com">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Option 5 Cloud-based protection is NOT
Option 7 Signing Service protection. Cloud-based protection
will allow a Subscriber to use an HSM from AWS. Signing
Service protection has many requirements in the CSBRs, which
currently includes an audit report. I assume that a CA will
provide a Signing Service or could be similar to a TSP
providing QSCD key generation and signing.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Option 5 states, “The Subscriber provides a
suitable report from the cloud-based key protection solution
subscription and resources configuration protecting the
private key in a suitable hardware crypto module meeting the
requirements specified in section 16.3.1.” This is essentially
a subscription agreement and not an audit report.</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
This "subscription agreement" has absolutely no assurances about
anything. Any company could suggest they are a "cloud-based"
provider with no audits and no assurances but would have a
"subscription agreement". Would CAs accept that?<br>
<br>
We can discuss more on the call today.<br>
<br>
Dimitris.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:DM5PR11MB00419DE53956BFF1201F1D01829B9@DM5PR11MB0041.namprd11.prod.outlook.com">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thanks, Bruce.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Dimitris Zacharopoulos
(HARICA) <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:dzacharo@harica.gr"><dzacharo@harica.gr></a>
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, November 18, 2021 1:58 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Bruce Morton <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:Bruce.Morton@entrust.com"><Bruce.Morton@entrust.com></a>;
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a>; Ian McMillan
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com"><ianmcm@microsoft.com></a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re:
Discussion: Proposed Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber
Private Key Protection Requirements<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">On 17/11/2021 8:56 μ.μ., Bruce Morton
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal">Hi Dimitris,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Regarding this statement, “I see that you
probably missed my comment for removing option 4. (a
suitable IT audit, etc). Are there any objections to
removing that problematic option?”<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The concern I have and has been raised on
a call is if a customer has purchased a server HSM, which
does not support key attestation, what is the CAs
alternative to verify that the many keys have been generated
on the HSM?<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
This is covered under option 6.<br>
<br>
<i>" 6. The CA or a Qualified Auditor witnesses the key
creation in a suitable hardware crypto module solution
including a cloud-based key generation and protection
solution. "
</i><br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I do understand that this is a
problematic option, but I do not see another option for the
above use case. We might be better suited to provide more
information on the IT audit. Here are some ideas:<o:p></o:p></p>
<ol style="margin-top:0in" type="1" start="1">
<li class="MsoListParagraph"
style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l5 level1 lfo3">Form audit
letter included in the CSBRs<o:p></o:p></li>
<li class="MsoListParagraph"
style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l5 level1 lfo3">Signed by
a verified identity, such as a Contract Signer<o:p></o:p></li>
<li class="MsoListParagraph"
style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l5 level1 lfo3">Audit
letter Includes a warranty that all keys for code signing
certificates requested will be generated on the HSM<o:p></o:p></li>
<li class="MsoListParagraph"
style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l5 level1 lfo3">Audit
includes crypto device make, model, serial number and
picture of serial number<o:p></o:p></li>
<li class="MsoListParagraph"
style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l5 level1 lfo3">Etc.
<o:p></o:p></li>
</ol>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I think we see that the current
environment has limited USB tokens which support both
3072/4096-bit RSA and key attestation. We also see that many
server HSMs do not support key attestation. It looks like
the ecosystem needs to evolve a little longer before we can
make our requirements perfect.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
As explained in previous discussions, there is no "IT audit"
today that can remotely attest that an operating environment
achieves the levels of security described in 16.3.1 (i.e. FIPS
140-2 level 2 or EAL 4+). I believe your use case is perfectly
covered with the new option 6.<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Also, I don’t see that option 4 IT audit
is any more problematic than option 5 a cloud provider
subscription agreement.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
The "cloud-based key protection solution" (or a "signing
service key protection solution") will include an audit report
that describes that the solution actually uses HSMs certified
according to 16.3.1. The CA will review this audit report,
ensure that the solution is compliant with 16.3.1 and then
allow the Subscriber to use that service. Actually, 5 is very
similar to 7, which is why I am suggesting we merge the
"cloud-based solution" and the "signing service".<br>
<br>
Dimitris.<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Bruce.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Cscwg-public <a
href="mailto:cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org"
moz-do-not-send="true">
<cscwg-public-bounces@cabforum.org></a> <b>On
Behalf Of </b>Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via
Cscwg-public<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, November 17, 2021 1:22 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Ian McMillan <a
href="mailto:ianmcm@microsoft.com"
moz-do-not-send="true"><ianmcm@microsoft.com></a>;
<a href="mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cscwg-public@cabforum.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cscwg-public] [EXTERNAL] Re:
Discussion: Proposed Ballot CSC-6: Update to Subscriber
Private Key Protection Requirements<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">On 17/11/2021 7:01 μ.μ., Ian McMillan
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Hi Dmitris, </span>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="mso-fareast-language:EN-US"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="mso-fareast-language:EN-US">This is not too
painful.
</span><span style="font-family:"Segoe UI
Emoji",sans-serif">😊</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="mso-fareast-language:EN-US"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Effective date set is
September 1, 2022 as stated in section 16.3, but 16.2
already has an effective date (June 1, 2021) for signing
services to use
</span>at least FIPS 140-2 level 2, or Common Criteria EAL
4+ for ALL Code Signing Certificates per the table in
section 1.3. I’ll add the effective date into the table
in section 1.3 for the changes in 16.3 on all code signing
certs . Please review the text I used in the 1.3 table,
and suggest some better language if possible.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">When I read the,"conforming to <b>at
least</b> FIPS 140-2 level 2, or Common Criteria EAL
4+", it does apply to CC EAL 4+ as well.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
Thanks for clarifying.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In 16.2, I’ve corrected the typo
(thanks!), but for cloud-based solutions they will have
their own terms for resources under a subscription. I
think the wording we’ll need to summarize to is for each
key generated and stored in the cloud-based subscription
it must be conforming to the requirements. With Azure and
AKV, if I have a subscription with a resource group and an
AKV resource underneath, for every key I generate, I’ll
need to specify the vault protection level (HSM) upon key
creation. This means I could have a subscription with N
number of keys with various protection levels. AKV
recommends users do not group secrets into one vault, but
it doesn’t stop users from making this risk decision on
their own (more keys in one vault, the larger impact if
compromised). GCP and AWS all have similar offerings and
concepts, but the common level of terminology is
subscription. I’ve updated the language to specifically
target the subscription configuration at the level that
manages the private key.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
I believe this is too prescriptive. I don't think we can
describe these specific options in a public standards
document. That's why the term "signing service" and
"cloud-based provider" must be described in terms of
functional expectations. Who knows what options will be
available in 2-5 years, or whether Microsoft, Amazon, Google
and others will change their models and call these options
something different than "subscription".<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In 16.3.1, I’ve updated….<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<ol style="margin-top:0in" type="1" start="1">
<li class="MsoListParagraph"
style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo6">To be
the suggested text you provided, “Subscriber uses a
hosted hardware crypto module meeting the specified
requirement;” I feel this effectively closes the
loophole you pointed out.<o:p></o:p></li>
</ol>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On cloud-based vs signing service
solutions (2 & 3), they are distinctly different
solutions in the market for subscribers today, so I feel
we need to expressly call them out differently.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
I don't disagree with that statement, although we do need to
discuss and document their differences and even describe
their functions in a clear and unambiguous way. The term
"cloud" is overloaded and has been used in this industry to
mean very different things depending on the context.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For section 16.3.2, I am good with the
suggested change to #2 with a small ordering tweak being,
“The Subscriber counter-signs certificate requests that
can be verified by using a manufacturer’s certificate
indicating that the key was generated in a non-exportable
way using a suitable hardware module;”<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">With #1, I’d prefer keeping the same
way it is today. I’m interested how folks view section
10.2.4 playing a part here as well (and with signing
services).
<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
To help with the comparison, let me repeat the text here:<br>
<br>
<i>"1. The CA ships a suitable hardware crypto module,
with a preinstalled key pair" could be changed to:<br>
<br>
"1. The CA ships a suitable hardware crypto module,
with one or more pre-generated key pairs that the CA has
generated using those crypto modules"</i><br>
<br>
The current wording is limiting the key-pairs to just <b>one
key-pair</b> (singular) when the CA can ship more than one
key-pairs (for future use). I also wanted to avoid the case
where CAs generate keys outside of these hardware modules
(via software because it's faster) and then import them into
crypto-modules and ship them to Subscribers.<br>
<br>
I see that you probably missed my comment for removing
option 4. (a suitable IT audit, etc). Are there any
objections to removing that problematic option?<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On #8, My goal wasn’t to set a deadline
for new methods to be introduced, but to require any
innovations to be well documented by the CAs and brought
to the Forum’s working group for inclusion. That said, I
see the loophole this creates in that a CA could include a
new method in their CP/CPS docs and bring it to the WG in
the accordance with this requirement. But the WG could
deem the method not acceptable and there is no requirement
that states the CA must not use that now rejected method.
The downside is we really do not want to maintain a
rejected method list, so I am with you on the suggested
change you provided with the date being September 1, 2022.
I would like to keep the dates all aligned to reduce
confusion.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
I believe this was discussed during our last call and the
plan was for a roadmap that would ultimately remove this
"any other method" option. Until that time, CAs would need
to disclose their "any other methods" to the CABF until a
certain date (Sep 1, 2022 seems fine with me), so the WG can
evaluate the security of that method and either include or
reject it. I think we're in total agreement here :)<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The attached updated redline draft has
all these changes.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
Let me know how you feel about the other changes. To
summarize:<br>
<br>
In section 16.3.2:<o:p></o:p></p>
<ol type="1" start="1">
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l0
level1 lfo9">
Update option 1 to allow more keys to be shipped and keys
generated <b>in</b> crypto-devices instead of outside and
then imported<o:p></o:p></li>
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l0
level1 lfo9">
Removal of option 4<o:p></o:p></li>
</ol>
<p>We will probably need some more analysis comparing "signing
service" vs "cloud provider" to get a better feeling of the
functional differences and adjust accordingly.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Dimitris.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
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transmitted with it are confidential and are intended
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they are addressed. If this message has been sent to you
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<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
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