[Cscwg-public] Voting Period begins - Ballot CSC-22: High Risk Requirements Update

Inigo Barreira Inigo.Barreira at sectigo.com
Fri Jan 12 17:22:12 UTC 2024


Sectigo votes YES

De: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> En nombre de Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public
Enviado el: viernes, 5 de enero de 2024 21:02
Para: cscwg-public at cabforum.org
Asunto: [Cscwg-public] Voting Period begins - Ballot CSC-22: High Risk Requirements Update

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Purpose of the Ballot
This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 3.4 in order to clarify language regarding Signing Service and signing requests. The main goals of this ballot are to:

  1.  Remove references to High Risk Certificate Request, since the CSBRs do not provide any actions for a high risk application.
  2.  Remove references to High Risk Region of Concern, since the CSBR appendix has never been populated.
  3.  Remove rules for a Takeover Attack to require the Subscriber to generate keys in a crypto device, since crypto device key generation is now a baseline requirement for all code signing certificates.
  4.  Remove option to transfer private key which has been generated in software.
  5.  Cleanup to remove Subscriber key generation option which expired effective 1 June 2023.
  6.  Cleanup to remove “any other method” to verify the Subscriber key was generated in a crypto device, since this option expired 1 June 2023.
The following motion has been proposed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Ian McMillan of Microsoft.


MOTION BEGINS

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” ("Code Signing Baseline Requirements") based on version 3.4. MODIFY the Code Signing Baseline Requirements as specified in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/e0da5532ab81e35e2e92536c1bc9ea3c36765b26...50871dc08d39102daf6c93fa556a869790643fb6<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/e0da5532ab81e35e2e92536c1bc9ea3c36765b26...50871dc08d39102daf6c93fa556a869790643fb6__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!eGQ4FLzNANTdAsLaGTDHePbCY7_W0AsXx1qTmmyTqiyaSVcoj5VGsgK7r7e1D0YQaI5U-YDAzAAi90kRle47DpUbNXxd$>


MOTION ENDS
The procedure for this ballot is as follows: Discussion (minimum 7 days)


  *   Start Time: 2023-12-15 00:00 UTC
  *   End Time: 2024-01-05 20:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)


  *   Start Time: 2024-01-05 20:00 UTC
  *   End Time: 2024-01-12 20:00 UTC
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