[Cscwg-public] Ballot CSC-??: High Risk Requirements Update

[Martijn Katerbarg]

Bruce, I’ve added a single comment on the PR, as I think we’ve removed one paragraph too much. Other than that, I’m also happy to endorse. 

Regards,

Martijn 

From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> on behalf of Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public <cscwg-public at cabforum.org>
Date: Tuesday, 21 November 2023 at 20:25
To: cscwg-public at cabforum.org <cscwg-public at cabforum.org>
Subject: [Cscwg-public] Ballot CSC-??: High Risk Requirements Update 

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Here is a draft of the High Risk Requirements update ballot. Looking for comments and 2 endorsers. There is no future effectivity date proposed, since the ballot does not add new requirements. 

Thanks, Bruce. 


Purpose of the Ballot 
This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 3.4 in order to clarify language regarding Signing Service and signing requests. The main goals of this ballot are to: 

1. Remove references to High Risk Certificate Request, since the CSBRs do not provide any actions for a high risk application. 
2. Remove references to High Risk Region of Concern, since the CSBR appendix has never been populated. 
3. Remove rules for a Takeover Attack to require the Subscriber to generate keys in a crypto device, since crypto device key generation is now a baseline requirement for all code signing certificates. 
4. Remove option to transfer private key which has been generated in software. 
5. Cleanup to remove Subscriber key generation option which expired effective 1 June 2023. 
6. Cleanup to remove “any other method” to verify the Subscriber key was generated in a crypto device, since this option expired 1 June 2023. 
The following motion has been proposed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and endorsed by ?? and ??. 

MOTION BEGINS 

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” ("Code Signing Baseline Requirements") based on version 3.4. MODIFY the Code Signing Baseline Requirements as specified in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/31/files <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fcode-signing%2Fpull%2F31%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C63edc95120b549fc269e08dbeac79efe%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638361915320392388%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=gmqwV1FC70fTRYbrDtp%2B%2FJ8jzwupr0TaN5vmSa2%2BdoU%3D&reserved=0> 

MOTION ENDS 
The procedure for this ballot is as follows: Discussion (7 days) 

· Start Time: TBD 
· End Time: TBD 

Vote for approval (7 days) 

· Start Time: TBD 
· End Time: TBD 

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